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A  UTHOR: 

BALL, 

WINECOFFEE 


TITLE: 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM 
AND  IMMORTALITY 

PLACE' 

[LINCOLN,  NEBRASKA] 

DA  TE: 

1907 


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Ball,  Jesse  Winecoffe. 

Absolute  idealisin  and  immortality  ...    iLincoln,  Neb., 
The  Woodruflf-ColliDs  press,  1908] 

xii,  76  p.   22"". 

Thesis  (ph.  D.)--ynjvcr8it7  of  Nebraska. 
Bibliography:  p.  7S-76. 

Vol,  of  pamphlets. 
Bound  with  another  work. 

L  Immortality.   Z  Idealimt 


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Library  of  Ctmcrcss 


B823.B3 


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MRNUFfiCTURED  TO  fillM  STRNDRRDS 
BY  APPLIED  IMAGE.    INC. 


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Absolute  Idealism  and 
Immortality 


By 
JESSE  WINECOFFE  BALL 


A  Thesif  preiented  to  the  graduate  faculty  of  the  University  of  Nebraska  in 

partial  fulfillment  of  the  requirements  for  the  degree  of 

Doctor  of  Philosophy 


The  Univiriity  of  Nibraska 
JuNi.  1907 


FOREWORD 

This  thesis  claims  to  be  no  more  than  its  title  indicates,  a 
discussion  of  the  problem  of  immortality  from  the  standpoint 
of  absolute  idealism.  Or  rather  it  is  an  attempt  to  evaluate 
the  motives  in  absolute  idealism  which  have  a  bearing  upon  the 
doctrine  of  immortaUty,  whether  negative  or  affirmative.  It 
therefore  does  not  aim  at  presenting  the  historical  or  the  theo- 
logical argument  for  immortality,  but  confines  itself  to  the 
metaphysical. 

Certain  currents  of  recent  thought,  mainly  naturalistic, 
make  such  a  discussion  timely.  The  trend  of  naturaUstic  sci- 
ence has  revealed  a  decided  tendency  to  cast  doubt  upon  the 
persistence  of  personality  after  death  if  not  to  discredit  it 
altogether.  It  is  impossible  to  be  wholly  indifferent  to  dis- 
cussions which  would  invalidate  the  most  cherished  beliefs  of 
mankind.  An  examination  of  the  foundation  principles  upon 
which  the  sciences  themselves  rest,  reveals  the  fact  that  these 
display  the  leadership  of  certain  regulative  ideals,  that  science  at 
bottom  rests  upon  faith,  although,  indeed,  upon  the  thoroughly 
rational  belief  that  the  world  displays  the  activity  of  a  Mind 
whose  thoughts  we  are  permitted  to  interpret.  The  belief  in 
immortality  is  similarly  grounded  and  in  its  influence  upon 
mankind  equally  displays  the  ultimate  Reality.  Our  govern- 
ing ideals  are  among  the  most  real  things  in  life.  Among 
those  ideals  is  the  historic,  the  universal  belief  in  immortality. 

Grateful  acknowledgment  is  hereby  made  of  many  helpful 
suggestions  in  the  preparation  of  this  thesis  from  Prof.  E.  L. 
Hinman,  Prof,  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics,  in  the  University  of 
Nebraska. 

Lincoln,  Neb.,  June  15,  1907. 


\ 


INTRODUCTION: 


1908 

The  Woodbupf-Collins  Pbbss 

Lincoln,  Neb. 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF 

IMMORTALITY. 

— A— 

The  Standpoint  of  Absolute  Idealism. 

I.  Its  hold  upon  the  philosophic  world 1 

1 .  Its  indebtedness  to  Hegel  and  its  independence 

of  him 1 

2.  Its  contest  with  naturalism  and  general  sym- 
pathy with  the  historic  culture  concepts 3 

3.  Its  power  to  discuss  an  idealistic  concept  by 
analyzing  the  implications  of  positive  science, 
and  by  thus  showing  the  idealistic  conception  in 
question  as  affirmatively  involved  in  the  world 

as   known 3 

II.  Its  logical  structure 4 

1.  Its  monism,  "concrete,"  "spiritualistic,"  "con- 
crete universal,"  "organic  unity."      Its  war- 

*  fare  on  abstractions 4 

2.  Its  recognition  of  the  ideality  of  finite  con- 
sciousness. The  leadership  of  the  universal  in 
science,  art,  ethics  and  religion 6 

3.  Ultimate  Reality  interpreted  in  terms  of  the 
Absolute  reading  of  the  ideality  of  our  finite  con- 
sciousness.    Degrees  of  reality 7 

The  Problem  of  Immortality. 

I .    The  import  of  the  conception 9 

1 .  The  positivist  conception  of  subjective  immor- 
tality      9 

2.  The  pantheistic  conception  of  submergence  of 

the  individual  in  the  Absolute 10 


i 


Vi  CONTENTS 

3 .  Metempsychosis  or  transmigration  of  souls 10 

4 .  Import  of  the  conception  in  its  popular  form 11 

a.  Permanent  self-identity  of    the  individual 
human  life. 

b.  In  a  genuine  sense  the  continuation  of  the 
life  of  the  present. 

c.  Deathanevent  inlife,not  theendof  life. 

d.  The  life  beyond  the  fulfillment  of  the  pres- 
ent life. 

II.     The  resources  of  absolute  idealism  for  the  affirma- 
tive treatment  of  the  conception  of  immortality 12 

1 .  Less  emphasis  upon  the  time-space  element  than 

the  popular  view 12 

2 .  The  affirmation  of  an  "eternal,"  spiritual  factor 

in  the  conscious  life  of  man 12 

3 .  Its  positing  of  spiritual  things  as  absolute  and 

and  final 13 

4 .  Its   historical   spirit 13 

5 .  Its  doctrine  of  the  reality  of  the  ideal 14 

III .    The  traits  of  absolute  idealism  which  make  for  a 

negative  or  obscuring  treatment  of  the  concep- 
tion     14 

1 .  The  domination  of  the  universal  over  the  finite 
individual 14 

2 .  The  denial  of  the  finality  of  time 16 

[IV.     Desirability  of  a  more  harmonious  adjustment  of 

these  seemingly  adverse  motives  within  absolute 
idealism 16 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  IDEALISTIC  ANALYSIS  OF  HUMAN 
INDIVIDUALITY. 

— A— 

The  Hlman  Self  Defined  Through  the  Unity  of 

Purpose. 

I .   Aristotle's  conception  of  human  individuality 18 

II .   Modern   idealism 20 

1 .  Its  emphasis  upon  the  systematizing  elements  in 

knowledge  and  in  all  facts 20 


CONTENTS  ^^ 

2 .  Leibniz'  doctrine  of  mind  as  a  will-center 20 

3  .  Hegel's  development  of  idealism 21 

4  Human  individuality  as  defined  by  contempo- 

22 

rary  writers 

a.  Unsatisfactory  use  of   terms  self,   person, 

individual 

b.  The  human  self  an  ideal 22 

(1)  Self-identity  in  terms  of  continuity  of 
purpose. 

(2)  How  one  self  is  distinguished  from 

other  selves. 

c.  Society  as  an  individual 23 

(1)  Enlargement  of  self,  of  child,  parent, 
man  of  business,  citizen. 

(2)  Society  as  one  inclusive  individual. 

d.  The  human  race  as  an  individual 25 

(1)  Organic     relation    of     persons    and 
families  through  heredity. 

(2)  Growth  of  world-consciousness. 

(3)  The  interests  of  individuals  coex- 
tensive with  those  of  mankind. 
Resume. 

e .  The  Absolute  as  the  completed  individual  ....  26 

(1)  Human  life  an  aspect  of  the  divine. 

(2)  The  Absolute  as  a  personal  being. 

— B— 

Difficulties  of  the  Teleological  Conception  of  Mind. 

Mind  as  Relative ^7 

I .   The  finite  individual  and  the  Absolute. 

Royce's  definition  of  the  individual 28 

1 .  The  human  self  defined  in  terms  of  meaning  and 
purpose  of  the  Absolute 28 

2 .  How  the  element  of  uniqueness  is  conserved 29 

3 .  The  Absolute  as  a  self  all-inclusive 30 

4.  a.  In    criticism,   the  elements  of  uniqueness 

not  sufficiently  safe-guarded  by  Royce 30 

b.  The  truth  that  "in  God  we  live  and  move 
and  have  our  being"  does  not  necessarily 
involve  identity  of  thought  and  will 31 


11^ 


U 


VIU 


CONTENTS 


c.  This  full  identity  endangers  ethical  distinc- 

tions that  are  fundamental 31 

d.  Royce's  failure  to  provide  an  adequate 
ground  in  the  individual  for  the  will  and 
purpose  whose  uniqueness  is  essential  to  his 
theory 32 

e.  The  individual  an  existent,  greater  than  the 

sum  of  his  thoughts  and  purposes,  related  to 
the  Absolute  by  inclusion  in  the  latter, 
rather  than  by  identity 33 

f.  His  will  therefore  free  even  to  oppose  the 

Eternal,  however  ineffectually  in  the  end 34 

n .    The  apparent  instability  of   the  organic  unity  of 

mind 34 

1.  Questions  raised  by  facts  of  "multiple  personality."  34 

2.  Study  of  these  comparatively  recent.     Hence 
conclusions  can  scarcely  be  considered  final 34 

3 .  Lines  of  dissociation  mainly  follow  tastes  and 
moods.  Dissociated  states  capable  of  being 
resolved  back  into  primary  states 34 

4 .  Possible  extent  of  dissociation 35 

6 .  The  range  of  the  subconscious  life  far  greater  than 

usually  supposed 35 

6.  The  development  of  secondary  selves  tends  to 
definition  of  the  individual  as  "the  organized  ex- 
pression of  special  functions  and  capacities." 

The  personal  "I"  an  index  of  personality  voicing 

the  predominant  state 36 

7 .  Causes  of  dissociation  and  its  general  effects 36 

8 .  May  it  be  that,  with  removal  of  physical  organism 
these  and  all  other  suppressed  purposes  will  come 

to  normal  expression 36 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  HUMAN  MIND  AND  THE  NATURAL  ORDER 

I.    The  finite  individual  and  the  physical  universe 38 

1 .  The  eternity  of  mass  and  energy  in  contrast  with 

the  ephemeral  nature  of  the  physical  individual ...  38 


CONTENTS 


IX 


2.  The  application  of  the  categories  of  physical 

sciences  to  human  life  and  development 39 

II .  The  apparent  dependence  of  mind  upon  the  body 40 

1 .  The  problem  grows  out  of  the  close  and  intimate 
relation  of  mind  and  body .    40 

2 .  Is  this  dependence  final? 40 

3.  Need  of  closer  definition  of  the  terms  of  the 
problem 41 

III.    The  body 42 

1 .  The  popular  vievr 42 

a .  Recognizes  reality  of  both  mind  and  body. 

b.  But  is  dualistic. 

2 .  The  naturalistic  view 42 

a .  Connects  the  body  with  organic  life  in  general. 

b .  Critique  of  naturalistic  view.    Idealistic  ele- 
ments involved. 

3 .  Idealistic  view 45 

a.  An  objective  expression  of  mind  through 
which  experience  arises  in  perceptive  life. 

b .  Exists  for  and  is  sustained  by  the  Absolute. 

c.  Possesses  a  relatively  low  degree  of  reality. 

IV .    The  mind 46 

1 .  The  popular  view  of  mind,  the  center  of  person- 
ality, intimately  connected  with  the  body  but 
never  completely  so 46 

2 .  The  natxiralistic  view  of  mind 46 

a    Mind  as  product  of  brain  activity. 

b.  Criticism  of  this  view. 

3 .  The  idealistic  view  of  mind 47 

a .  Manifestation  of  mind  in  imperfect  expression. 

b .  Defined  in  terms  of  teleology. 

c.  In  close  relation  with  physical  objects 
which,  like  mind  itself,  are  maintained  by 
the  Absolute. 

V .  Mutual  relations  of  body  and  mind 48 

1 .  Difficulty  of  defining  satisfactorily  — 48 

2 .  Need  of  keeping  in  view  that  body  and  mind  are 
manifestations  of  the  Absolute  in  different  de- 
grees of  reality.  Their  relations  not  necessarily 
parallel ^^ 


r 


CONTENTS 

3 .  The  true  relation  to  be  found  in  some  form  of  in- 
teractionism.     Bradley's  conclusions 

4 .  Nevertheless  the  mind  being  the  more  complete 
expression  of  the  Absolute  is  more  fundamental 
than  the  body  and  capable  of  surviving  it 


49 


50 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ETERNAL  LIFE  AND  THE  FLOW  OF  TIME 

I .    The  ideas  of  worth  and  permanence  in  early  con- 
ceptions of  eternal  life 51 

1 .  The  ideas  of  worth  and  permanence  seeking  har- 
monious expression 

2.  Immortality  among  the  Greek    philosophers, 

Plato  and  Aristotle 51 

3 .  The  Persian  hymns  and  prayers 53 

4 .  The  Hebrew  Psalms 53 

II .    The  Christian  conception 54 

1 .  Nature  of  eternal  life 54 

2.  Implications.     Man's   capacity   to  receive   the 
divine    gift 55 

3 .  Over-individual  aspects  of  human  life 55 

III .     Eternal  life  defined  with  over-emphasis  upon  value 56 

1 .  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  immortality 56 

2 .  The  conception  of  MUnsterberg 57 

a .  Human  life  beyond  time.     Time  a  creation 
of  mind. 

b .  Science  likewise  created  by  mind  and  can  give 
no  information  of  our  true  self. 

c .  The  real  personality  found  in  will-attitudes . 

d .  Mind  as  expression  of  value  is  uncaused. 

e .  Relation  to  the  Absolut^e. 

3 .  Criticism  of  Mnnsterberg 59 

a .  Obscurity  of  his  doctrine. 

b .  Individuality  dissipated  in  the  Absolute . 

c .  Over-emphasis  upon  value. 

IV .  Temporal  aspect  of  eternal  life 60 

1 .  Need  of  clearer  presentation 60 

2 .  Unreality  of  time  as  presented  by  Taylor 60 


I. 


II. 


CONTENTS  *1 

3.  Reality  of  time,  the  view  of  naive  realism  and 
pragmatism ^^ 

4 .  Mediating  position  of  Watson 61 

5 .  Time  as  "a  sublated  form  within  a  perfected  ex- 
perience."   "^ 

6.  The  eternal  expresses  itself  in  the  temporal, 

otherwise  an  abstraction 63 

The  eternal  life  the  fulfillment  of  the  present. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  REALITY  OF  THE  IDEAL. 

The  ideals  of  science  and  knowledge 64 

1 .  Science  presupposes  a  rational  order  in  the  world ...  64 

2 .  It  results  from  processes  of  idealization 65 

3 .  Knowledge  in  any  sense  is  possible  only  through 
the  activity  of  the  universal  mind  within  human 
thought 66 

4 .  How  scientific  knowledge  advanced.  It  is  pri- 
marily a  faith.  But  the  degree  of  verification  of 
that  faith  shows  the  scientific  to  be  a  true  ex- 
pression of  Reality 66 

Immortality  as  an  ideal  of  reason 68 

1 .  It  is  likewise  rests  on  faith  in  the  rational  order 

of  the  world.     The  reasonableness  of  this  faith 68 

2 .  The  persistence  of  the  belief.  Practically  uni- 
versal       ^^ 

3 .  Its  cultural  value  and  influence 69 

a.  Influence  of  the   ideal   as   a    social   factor. 

(1)  in  overthrow  of  slavery  and  every  form  of 
human  servitude ;  (2)  in  the  creation  of  asy- 
lums for  orphans,  the  aged,  blind,  insane 
and  the  like;  (3)  in  reformatories,  industrial 
homes  and  generally  in  efforts  to  reform  and 
care  for  convicted  persons;  (4)  in  systems  of 
public  instruction ;  and  (5)  in  efforts  to  estab- 
lish international  peace 70 


M 


xu 


CONTENTS 


b.  Influence  of  immortality  upon  poetry  and 

the  fine  arts 71 

(1)  Method  by  which  poetry  attains  its  end. 

(2)  Themes  of  music,  painting,  etc.,  drawn 
from  human  destiny. 

c.  Presence  of  the  ideal  of  immortality  in  morals 

and  religion 72 

vl)  The  ethical  ideals  eternal  verities. 

v2)  The  note  of   permanence  involved    in 

moral  and  religious  movements  for  reform .  74 
4.    Reality  involved  in  the  ideal  of  immortality  as 
as  truly  as  in  scientific  ideals. 


INTRODUCTION: 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF 

IMMORTALITY. 


The  Standpoint  of  Absolute  Idealism. 

I     Its  hold  upon  the  philosophic  world.    Its  indebtedness  to  Hegel  and 
its  independence  of  him.     Its  contest  with  naturalism  and  general  sympathy 


known. 


II  Its  logical  structure.  Its  monism,  "concrete,"  "spiritualistic," 
"concrete  universal,"  "organic  unity."  Its  warfare  on  abstractions.  Its 
recognition  of  the  ideality  of  finite  consciousness.  The  leadership  of  the 
univereal  in  science,  art,  ethics  and  religion.  Ultimate  Reality  interpreted 
in  terms  of  the  absolute  reading  of  our  finite  consciousness.  Degrees  of 
reality. 

I.     Its  hold  upon  the  philosophic  world. 

The  influence  of  a  system  of  thought  upon  any  age  may  be 
due  either  directly  to  the  system  itself,  or  indirectly  to  its  gen- 
eral point  of  view.  The  system  itself  usually  bears  in  a  marked 
degree  the  peculiarities  of  its  founder.  The  general  point  of 
view,  however,  is  apt  to  have  wider  relations  to  the  general 
development  of  thought  which  the  founder  of  the  system  has 
succeeded  in  bringing  to  a  focus. 

1.  Absolute  idealism  traces  its  descent  from  the  philosophy 
of  Hegel.  It  would  be  a  mistake,  however,  to  identify  it  fully 
with  the  system  of  Hegel;  for  in  adopting  this  general  point  of 
view  it  by  no  means  adopted  the  details  of  his  system  in  their 
entirety.  It  has,  on  the  contrary,  developed  a  considerable 
degree  of  independence  of  its  founder.  In  Germany  the  Hege- 
lian system  took  root  at  once.  But  presently  it  gave  rise  to 
conflicting  parties.  In  the  controversies  which  thus  arose  over 
the  application  of  its  principles  in  particular  directions  the 
special  significance  of  the  Hegelian  point  of  view  was  largely 
lost.  In  England  and  America  it  has  exerted  a  greater  influ- 
ence.»     It  was  introduced   into    England    by  Dr.   Hutchison 

>8ee  The  HegeUmn  Point  of  View,  by  J.  8.  Mackensie,  Mind,  n.  8.  p.  64.ff. 


2  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND  IMMORTALITY 

Stirling  who  sought  to  propagate  the  system  as  a  whole.  Few 
of  the  later  exponents  of  the  Hegelian  tendency  followed  him 
in  this  respect.  Wallace  did  more  than  any  other  to  render  the 
works  of  Hegel  accessible  to  English  readers,  but  he  dealt  with 
him,  not  so  much  as  the  maker  of  a  system,  as  one  who  brought 
out  certain  large  ideas  and  modes  of  treatment.  T.  H.  Green 
is  justly  regarded  as  having  been  a  leading  representative  of 
Hegelian  thought,  yet  he  too  was  far  from  being  a  close  ad- 
herent of  the  Hegelian  system.  The  same  remark  holds  true  of 
Edward  Caird  and  F.  H.  Bradley.  Bosanquet  has  followed 
Hegel  more  closely.  His  general  attitude,  however,  is  that  of 
one  who  has  absorbed  certain  leading  ideas  of  the  Hegelian 
standpoint,  but  has  used  them  with  considerable  freedom  in 
his  own  way.  These  men  have  been  leaders  in  the  philosophi- 
cal thought  of  recent  times,  and  may  all  be  classed  as  exponents 
of  absolut  eidealism  in  one  form  or  another.  On  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic  the  name  of  Royce  is  probably  more  conspicuous  than 
that  of  any  other  in  the  circles  of  philosophy.  With  him  may 
be  ranked  Morris.  Watson  and  Taylor,  all  of  whom  are  repre- 
sentatives of  this  same  school  of  thought. 

It  has  commonly  been  assumed  that  an  important  distinc- 
tion between  German  and  English  speculation  has  been  the 
appeal  of  the  latter  to  experience.  This,  it  is  now  generally 
admitted,  does  not  accurately  point  out  the  difference;  for  it 
would  be  difficult  to  find  systems  of  philosophy  that  make  a 
more  emphatic  appeal  to  experience  than  do  those  of  Kant  and 
Hegel.  The  point  of  difference  lies  rather  in  the  emphasis  of 
German  thought  upon  the  reality  of  the  universal  as  expressing 
the  element  of  identity  in  difference.  In  contrast  with  this 
there  is  to  be  found  in  English  speculation  what  has  been  re- 
garded as  a  disintegrating  atomism,  attaining  a  constructive 
result  in  Hobbes  and  a  sceptical  result  in  Hume.^  It  should  be 
pointed  out,  likewise,  that  this  recognition  of  the  universal  in  more 
recent  English  thought,  due  to  German  influence,  has  brought 
about  a  remodeling  of  the  treatment  hitherto  given  to  certain 
fundamental  questions  in  logic,  in  psychology,  in  ethics  and  in 
political  philosophy.  In  logic  this  result  has  been  accomplished 
by  Bosanquet  and  others,  following  the  lead  of  Bradley.  In 
psychology  a  similar  result  has  followed  the  labors  of  Ward  and 

*Maekensie,  J.  8.  The  Heselian  Point  of  View.    Mind.  n.  s.  p.  58. 


i 


INTRODUCTION  « 

Stout.  In  political  philosophy  the  works  of  Green,  Caird, 
Bradley  and  Bosanquet  have  been  produced  from  the  same 
standpoint.  The  same  remark  applies  to  the  works  of  Green, 
Mackenzie,  Muirhead  and  a  considerable  number  of  others  in 

the  field  of  ethics. 

The  influence  of  a  school  is,  however,  not  confined  to  its 
direct  representatives.  It  may  be  extended  by  other  men  who, 
while  agreeing  with  it  in  the  main,  have  been  found  among  its 
sharpest  critics.  And  this  has  frequently  happened  in  the 
history  of  thought.  The  attitude  of  Lotze  toward  the  philosophy 
of  Hegel  was  precisely  this.  He  is  found  in  sharp  antagonism 
to  it  at  times,  and  yet  his  own  system  of  metaphysics  has  much 
in  common  with  that  of  Hegel.  Both  directly  and  indirectly 
therefore,  it  has  come  about  that  absolute  idealism  has  exerted 
a  ruling  influence  over  a  large  part  of  the  philosophic  world. 

2.  Two  features  of  this  system  are  worthy  of  special  mention 
here.'  It  has,  on  the  one  hand,  conducted  a  vigorous  contest 
with  naturalism  on  account  of  the  attempt  of  the  latter  to  ex- 
plain all  events  and  phenomena  in  terms  of  mechanism.  No 
such  explanation,  it  contends,  can  ever  be  adequate  or  satisfy- 
ing. But  while  mechanism  is  freely  recognized  by  idealism, 
it  is  also  pointed  out  that  mechanism  is  always  found  in  the 
service  of  l^ger  ends  and  purposes.  In  respect  of  these  idealism 
also  contends  that  naturalism  has  no  sufficient  explanation. 
On  the  other  hand  absolute  idealism  early  disclosed  a  genuine 
and  profound  appreciation  of  the  culture  concepts  that  have 
been  historic  in  developing  civilization.  It  has  uniformly  dis- 
played  a  keen  interest  not  only  in  science,  but  also  in  art,  ethics 
and  religion.     Its  genius  is  that  of  evolution  in  the  best  sense, 

not  of  revolution. 

3.  From  the  outset  the  idealism  of  Kant  and  of  the  Kantian 
school  recognized  the  mind-given  elements  in  the  grouping  of 
phenomena  and  in  the  development  of  science.  But  for  the 
Kantian  the  deeper  meaning  of  the  phenomena  is  unknown. 
We  know  things  as  they  appear,  we  cannot  know  them  as  they 
are  in  themselves.  The  physical  world  was  therefore  given  over 
to  the  mechanical  categories  of  the  understanding,  which  ad- 
mittedly are  powerless  to  apprehend  things  in  their  inner  mean- 
ing. 1^1  the  sphere  of  the  practical  reason  or  morals,  however, 
it  was  maintained  that  we  come  directly  upon  the  noumenal 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND  IMMORTALITY 


INTRODUCTION 


world  as  opposed  to  the  phenomenal.  For  the  practical  reason 
there  are  directly  given  certain  postulates  which  theoretical 
reason  can  neither  demonstrate  nor  deny.  These  postulates 
are  native  to  reason.  They  are  grounded  in  the  moral  nature, 
and  essential  to  its  complete  expression.  These  postulates 
are  God,  freedom,  and  immortality. 

To  this  arbitrary  breaking  up  of  philosophy  and  throwing 
all  that  pertains  to  the  natural  world  over  into  the  unknown, 
the  absolute  ideaUst  is  decidedly  opposed.  Neither  can  the 
activities  of  the  mind  be  so  sharply  separated  and  placed  over 
against  each  other.  The  absolute  ideaUst,  therefore,  seeks  a 
closer  analysis  of  the  implications  of  science  and  aims  to  show 
that  the  higher  and  more  speculative  categories  of  ideaUsm  are 
directly  and  affirmatively  involved  in  the  world  as  known.  They 
are  in  fact  the  very  conditions  of  its  being  known.  Therefore 
absolute  ideaUsm  does  not  turn  over  to  naturahsm  the  whole 
world  of  intelligible  experience,  meanwhile  seeking  to 
conserve  in  some  other  way  the  higher  cultural  values, 
or  to  recoup  itself  in  some  transcendental  world  affirmed 
for  practical  reason  alone.  On  the  contrary  it  enters  directly 
into  the  very  structure  of  science.  It  aims  to  show  that  nature 
is  in  fact  imintelUgible  until  the  higher  categories  of  idealism 
have  received  their  due;  for  these,  it  claims,  are  no  less  signifi- 
cant for  natural  science  than  for  ethics,  rehgion,  or  art. 

II.     Its  logical  structure, 

1.  Attention  has  already  been  drawn  to  the  common  charac- 
teristic of  German  ideaUstic  philosophy  that  of  its  recognition 
of  the  dominant  influence  of  the  universal  within  experience. 
If  it  is  the  merit  of  German  philosophy  in  general  to  have 
brought  out  the  significance  of  the  true  universal,  it  is  the  merit 
of  Hegel  in  particular  to  have  laid  chief  emphasis  upon  the 
concreteness  of  the  universal,  to  point  out  its  living  relation  to 
the  whole,  in  short  to  bring  into  prominence  the  solidarity 
of  experience.  This,  the  goal  of  his  dialectic  method,  rather 
than  the  method  itself  constitutes  Hegel's  chief  value  for 
present  day  thought. 

Kant,  in  bringing  out  the  importance  of  the  thought  element 
in  experience  had  in  effect  left  sensation  outside  the  range  of 
thought.     Its  office  was  to  furnish  the  materials  for  thought 


to  work  upon.     On  the  other  hand,  things-in -themselves  were 
even  more  beyond  the  range  of  thought  activity  and  inaccessible 
to  it.     The  intellectual  element  in  experience  was  in  this  way 
rendered  mainly  formal.     Its  business    was  considered  to  be 
that     of     bringing     the     particulars,    accumulated     through 
sense-perception,  into  the  unity  of  thought.      Hegel,  on  the 
other  hand,  took  an  entirely  different  view  of  the  matter.     The 
manifold  of  sense  in  the  meaning  of  Kant  he  did  not  admit. 
In    consequence  he  did  not  regard  the  task  of  thought  to  bring 
unity  into  it,  or  to  make  experience  one.     For  him  it  is  already 
one:     The  office  of  thought  is  to  bring  out  the  systematic  con- 
nection implicit  in  experience.     From  this  standpoint  it  will 
readily  be   seen  that  the  universals  which  have  value  for  us  are 
principles  which  arise  out  of  the  materials  of  experience,  not 
any  abstract  formal  principles  brought  to  it.     These  principles 
absolute  idealism  seeks  to  discover  and  to  bring  to  suitable 
recognition.      This    style    of  thinking  has  a  direct  connection 
with  that  of  Kant.      It  has  even  been  supposed  that  this  was 
what  Kant  himself  was  really  aiming  at.     But  his  doctrine  of 
the  structure  of  knowledge,  namely  that  it  is  the  work  of  thought 
to  bring  into  unity,  by  means  of  categories  discovered  through 
analysis  of  the  judgment,  the  various  disconnected  materials 
supplied  by  the  senses,  led  to  quite  a  different  result.     He  was    \ 
led  to  introduce  the  imagination  as  a  mediating  faculty  between   J 
the   contrasted  elements  of  sense   and  those   of  thought.     A 
closer  study  led  Hegel  to  reject  this  whole  line  of  treatment  of 
the   problem  of  knowledge.     The   Kantian   manifold  of  sense 
seemed  to  him  mythical.       Pure  sense  without  an  admixture 
of  thought  he  declared  to  be  ^*for  us  thinking  beings  as  good 
as  nothing'^     But  in  rejecting  the  Kantian  view  that  the  sense 
materials   ar^j   independent   of   thought   until    thought   brings  y 
order  and  unity  into  them,  Hegel  necessarily  adopted  also  a 
different  conception  of  the  office  of  thought  itself.     He  there- 
fore came  to  regard  the  work  of  thought  as  that  of  interpreta- 
tion, rather  than  that  of  construction.     For  absolute  idealism 
in  general,  then,  "sense  and  thought  are  no  longer  opposed 
except  as  implicit  and  explicit;  and  so  the  work  of  thought 
becomes,  in  a  sense,  analytic  rather  than  synthetic— or  rather 
both  at  once".* 

iMackenrie,J.8.    The  Hegelian  Point  of  View.     Mind,  n.  a.  vol.  11,  p.  64. 


6 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


This  does  not  mean  that  the  sense  element  has  lost  its  sig- 
nificance or  that  it  has  disappeared.  The  Hegelian  position  has, 
it  is  true,  sometimes  been  so  understood,  but  unjustly.  It 
means  that  within  the  elements  supplied  by  sense,  as  in  all 
others,  there  are  involved  universal  determinations  that  can  not 
be  interpreted  except  in  the  light  of  thought. 

This  distinction  between  Kant  and  Hegel  is  involved  also 
in  their  respective  views  of  the  world  of  phenomena  and  of  the 
world  of  things-in-themselves.  The  groimd  of  opposition 
between  the  world  of  phenomena  and  the  world  of  things-in- 
themselves  lay  in  the  opposition  between  the  sense  element  and 
the  thought  element.  If,  however,  the  universal  principles  of 
thought  are  traceable  in  the  materials  furnished  by  sense- 
experience  it  is  evident  that  there  is  nothing  excluded  from 
thought's  dominion.  Some  things  may  indeed  be  out  of  the 
present  range  of  our  thinking,  so  that  they  are  not  immediately 
grasped,  but  from  this  it  does  not  follow  that  they  are  totally 
beyond  the  domain  of  thought.  From  the  Hegelian  standpoint, 
^therefore,  thought  is  conceived  as  ''the  real  world  rising  to 
f  consciousness  of  itself,  not  as  a  more  or  less  foreign  power  im- 
l  posing  its  laws  on  a  partially  subjected  territory*'.'  Absolute 
idealism  is,  therefore,  monistic  in  structure.  The  ultimately 
real  is  an  organic  unity,  of  which  the  most  characteristic  type 
is  mind.  The  all-pervading  thought  in  which  the  ideals  and 
purposes,  which  constitute  the  center  and  truth  of  things,  in- 
here and  which  supplies  their  structural  basis  finds  its  unity 
in  the  Absolute. 

2.  Accordingly  the  finite  consciousness  finds  in  itself  the  same 
ideals  which  it  discovers  in  the  world  of  physical  nature  and  of 
organic  life.  It  discovers  these  because  of  the  leadership  of 
the  ideals  within  itself.  Because  of  this  fact  also  science  in  the 
first  instance  is  possible.  Even  half-unconsciously  men  have 
assumed  in  the  construction  of  science  that  the  world  exhibits 
rational  order,  and  that  the  laws  governing  the  movements  of 
things,  or  promoting  growth  and  decay,  are  capable  of  inter- 
pretation by  the  human  mind.  The  successful  building  up  of 
the  various  sciences,  therefore,  fully  justifies  our  confidence  in 
the  rational  order  inherent  in  things.  Nay,  if  this  analysis  be 
correct,  it  would  appear  to  involve  the  admission  that  absolute 

iMAckuisM,  J.  8.  The  Hegelian  Point  of  View.     Mind,  n.  s.  vol.  11,  p.  65. 


INTRODUCTION  ' 

idealism  is  the  logical  foundation  of  the  sciences,  that,  in  short, 
their  very  existence  furnishes  the  most  cogent  evidence  of  the 
truth  and  vitality  of  an  absolute  ideal  at  work  in  human  con- 
sciousness. .   J 1.    ^1.   1     J 

Art,  likewise,  not  less  than  science,  is  prompted  by  the  leader- 
ship of  the  universal;  for  it  is  not  merely  the  copying  of  that 
which  exists.  It  is  more.  It  seeks  in  the  copy  to  ideahze  and 
perfect  that  which  in  the  object  exists  but  imperfectly.  Thus 
the  painter  selects  the  finest  features  of  his  subject  and  endeavors 
to  present  them  in  ideal  form.  The  sculptor  strives  towardatype, 
and  that  the  perfect  type,  rarely  if  ever  realized  outside  his  art 
and  hardly  with  perfection  even  there,  so  imperfectly  do  the 
materials  with  which'  he  works  yield  to  his  purposes. 

Ethics  no  less  finds  itself  to  be  the  embodiment  of  a  system 
of  universals  which  have  as  their  aim  the  highest  expression  of 
character  and  conduct.  Within  conscience  there  speaks,  indeed, 
the  voice  of  organized  human  society,  but  over  and  above  this, 

the  voice  of  the  Eternal.  .     ,      ^  • 

Equally  with  these  and  more  than  these  religion  is  the  striv- 
ing after  the  ideal.  It  is  the  craving  for  fellowship  with  the 
author  of  our  being,  a  voice  in  the  dark  it  may  be,  as  of 

"An  infant  crying  for  the  light 
And  with  no  language  but  a  cry." 

It  is  the  call  of  the  ideal  within  man,  the  craving  for  that 
which  is  highest  and  holiest,  for  fellowship  with  the  divine. 

From  the  determining  influence  of  the  ideal  along  these 
various  lines  it  becomes  evident  that  any  development  of  science 
which  appears  to  militate  against  idealistic  conceptions  is  mov- 
ing wide  of  the  mark  and  failing  utterly  to  give  a  truly  adequate 

interpretation  of  the  real.  ._^l" 

3  Taking  the  ideality  of  our  finite  consciousness  then  icTits 
deepest  significance  and  its  widest  possible  reading,  and  combining 
its  various  suggestions  as  to  the  nature  of  the  ultimately  real 
drawn  from  these  various  sources  in  science,  art,  ethics  ana 
religion,  absolute  idealism  interprets  reality  in  terms  of  Abso- 
lute  Mind.  This  Absolute  Mind  is  at  once  the  source  and  the 
completion  of  those  spiritual  values  which  operate  withm  our 
minds  in  the  building  up  of  culture.     In  our  minds  their  reahza- 


i 


i 


ill 


8 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


INTRODUCTION 


« 

( 


tion  is  relative  and  incomplete.     In  the  Absolute  Mind  they 
find  their  perfection. 

It  follows,  then,  that  in  any  given  stage  of  existence  the 
nature  of  the  reality  therein  contained  is  not  completely  revealed. 
That  stage  of  existence  is  not,  however,  on  that  account  unreal. 
It  is  real  only  in  a  lower  degree  or  in  a  manner  more  or  less 
shallow. 

^  This  doctrine  of  degrees  of  reality  is  closely  related  to  the 
Aristotehan  doctrine  of  matter  and  form.  Aristotle  conceived 
that  these  two  never  exist  separately,  but  each  seeks  the  other. 
Though  separable  in  thought  they  are  not  separable  in  fact. 
The  child  holds  the  relation  to  the  full  grown  man,  of  matter  to 
form.  The  latter  is  the  goal  of  the  potential  development  of 
the  child.  Thus  a  given  object  may  be  "form*'  for  one  group 
of  beings,  **matter"  for  another.  The  oak  is  "form"  for  the 
acorn,  the  potential  tree.  It  is  ^matter"  for  the  lumber  which 
may  be  gotten  out  of  it,  and  this,  in  turn,  becomes  "matter" 
for  the  table  or  chair  into  which  it  is  made.  The  vegetable  upon 
our  table  is  "form"  in  relation  to  the  materials  which  entered 
into  its  composition.  It  is  matter  with  reference  to  our  physi- 
cal body. 

This  doctrine  of  degrees  of  reality  thus  propounded  orig- 
inally in  Aitistotle's  theory  of  development  has  been  main- 
tained by  Hegel,  and  by  every  other  writer  who  has  consistently 
held  his  point  of  view.  It*is  essential  to  a  monistic  view  of  the 
world.  From  this  standpoint  no  stage  of  existence  short  of 
the  absolute  is  final  or  complete.  All  are  relative  and  incom- 
plete, some  more,  others  less.  The  inorganic  stage  of  exist- 
ence is  not  unreal,  it  is  simply  real  in  a  lower  degree  than  the 
organic.  The  animal  life  discloses  a  fuller  degree  of  reality  than 
the  vegetable.  Similarly  Reality  is  more  completely  expressed  in 
man  than  in  the  orders  of  animal  life,  and  in  society  and  the  state 
or  nation  still  more  completely  than  in  the  individual  man.  All  of 
these  are,  from  the  ideahstic  viewpoint,  mere  appearances  in  which 
the  ultimately  real  is  revealed.  According  to  this  doctrine, 
therefore,  it  may  be  readily  recognized  that  nature,  interpreted 
at  the  level  common  to  naturalistic  science  is  interpreted  cor- 
rectly so  far  as  natural  science  properly  goes.  The  difficulty 
arises  when  it  is  assumed  that  nature  so  interpreted  is  adequately 
understood.     The   idealist   maintains   that   the   interpretation 


of  nature  common  to  naturalistic  science  overlooks  its  deeper 
meaning.     The  degree  of  reality  therein  revealed  is  too  super^j 
ficial  to  be  regarded  as  final. 


z' 


■W 


B 

The  Problem  of  Immortality. 

I  The  import  of  the  conception.  The  Positivist  conception  of  sub- 
jective immortality.  The  pantheistic  conception  of  submergence  of  the  in- 
dividual in  the  Absolute.  Metempsychosis  ortransmigration  of  souls,  im- 
port of  the  9onception  in  its  popular  form.  Pennanent  self-identity  of  the 
Gdividual  human  life;  in  a  genume  sense  the  continuation  of  the  life  of  the 
present.     Death  an  event  in  life,  not  the  end  of  life.     The  life  beyond  the 

nilfillment  of  the  present  life.  .        _       ^  •      ^      x        4. 

II  The  resources  of  absolute  idealism,  for  the  affirmative  treatment 
of  the  Conception  of  immortality:  less  emphasis  upon  the  time-space  element 
than  the  popular  view;  the  affirmation  of  an  eternal,  spu-itual  factor  m  the 
co^cioi^^^  of  man;  its  positing  of  spiritual  things  as  absolute  and  final; 
its  historical  spirit;  its  doctrine  of  the  reality  of  the  ideal. 

III  The  traits  of  absolute  idealism  which  make  for  a  negative  or  ob- 
scuring'treatment  of  the  conception:  the  domination  of  the  universal  over 

the  finite  individual;  the  denial  of  the  finality  of  tune. 

tne  nniie  g^.^^^^j^y  ^j  ^  ^^^^  harmonious  adjustment  of  these  seemingly 

adverse  motives  within  absolute  idealism. 

I.     The  Import  of  The  Conception. 

The  term  immortality  has  been  accepted  in  several  widely 

different  senses. 

1.   Least  satisfactory  of  these  is  that  sense  in  which  Auguste 
Comte  and  his  followers  of  the  Positivist  creed  spoke  of  nhe 
subjective  life."     Of  the  cry  of  Danton  upon  the  scaffold,  ^Ter- 
ish  my  memory,  only  let  my  country  be  free",  Comte  remarks: 
**Even  in  this  heroic  cry  we  trace  the  idea  that  the  outward 
reward  of  a  great  life  extends  to  its  subjective  immortality. 
He  who  truly  lived  for  others  should  hope  to  live  on,  in  and  by 
others.     This  subjective  return  is  purer  at  once  and  surer  than 
the  objective,  for  it  carries  on  the  services  rendered  and  per- 
fects the  judgment  of  those  services.     Under  the  impulse  given 
by  the  Positivist  spirit,  spontaneously  and  systematically  this 
noble  recompense  is  accessible  to  all  who  are  capable  of  under- 
standing it  and    deserving  it."»     Clothed  in  the  garb  of  poetic 
beauty  and  given  an  attractiveness  which  it  would  not  other- 
wise possess,  this  conception  of  immortality  speaks  eloquently 
through  the  famous  lines  of  George  Eliot,— 

i8y8t0m  of  Positivist  Phnosophy.  vol.  4,  chap.  1.  p.  45.  Congreve.  tr..  quoted  by 
WtUdon. 


10  ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  AND  IMMORTALITY 

Oh,  may  I  join  the  choir  invisible, 

Of  those  immortal  dead  T^ho  live  again 

In  minds  made  better  by  their  presence;  live 

In  pulses  stirred  to  generosity. 

In  deeds  of  daring  rectitude,  in  scorn 

For  miserable  aims  that  end  with  self. 

In  thoughts  sublime  that  pierce  the  night  like  stars. 

And  with  their  mild  persistence  urge  man's  search 

To  vaster  issues.     So  to  live  is  heaven. 

To  make  undying  music  in  the  world 

Breathing  as  beauteous  order  that  controls 

With  growing  sway  the  growing  life  of  men, 

*   *****   This  is  life  to  come. 

Which  martyred  men  have  made  more  glorious 

For  us  who  strive  to  follow. 

Such  an  immortality  would  have  little  indeed  to  offer  to  that 
vast  multitude,  who  Uve  out  their  life's  day  in  obscurity,  and 
who,  no  less  than  the  illustrious  and  the  martyred,  are  the  true 
nobiUty  of  the  earth.  The  immortality  offered  by  the  Pos- 
itivist,  and  indeed  any  immortality  depending  upon  the  judg- 
ment of  men,  can  not  but  fail  to  satisfy.  How  often  we  judge 
each  other  wrongfully  if  at  all! 

2.  Immortality  is  sometimes  spoken  of  in  a  sense  which  is 
not  individual  or  in  which  individuality  is  submerged,  that  is, 
the  individuaUty  of  the  finite  self  is  lost  in  the  Infinite.  This 
view  of  the  soul,  although  held  by  some  among  modern  thinkers, 
is  not  modern  but  ancient.  It  had  its  representatives  among 
the  Greek  and  Roman  philosophers  and  poets.  There  is  almost 
a  modern  flavor  in  the  sentiment  of  Euripides,  **The  mind  of 
the  dead  is  not  alive,  yet  hath  it  immortal  consciousness,  when 
it  hath  been  merged  in  the  immortal  ether.">  Similarly  Virgil 
spoke  of  the  deity  who  pervades  all  things,  from  whom  flocks 
and  herds  and  men  and  the  wild  beasts  draw  the  vital  air  and 
into  whom  at  last  they  all  return.  The  doctrine  of  the  Uni- 
versal Soul  among  the  ancient  Greeks  and  Romans  found  its 
chief  representatives  among  the  Stoics.  It  has  had  a  few  ad- 
herents also  among  modern  philosophers.  Even  among  theolo- 
gians it  claimed  no  less  an  adherent  than  Schleiermacher  who 

^Helena,  10.  14. 


INTEODUCTION 


11 


sought  to  console  a  friend  of  his  eariy  youth  upon  the  untimely 
death  of  her  husband  with  thoughts  better  adjusted  to  this 
philosophic  creed  than  to  the  Christian  faith.  This  doctrine  fails 
equally  with  the  foregoing  to  meet  the  requirements  of  human 
thought  and  desire,  for  what  is  longpd  for  is  not  submergence 
in  the  Absolute,  but  personal  indentity  in  the  life  to  come. 

3.  It  remains  simply  to  notice  that  conception  of  immortal- 
ity,  known  as  metempsychosis  or  transmigration  of  souls.    This 
view  has  had  its  stronghold  in  India  among  both  Brahmans  and 
Buddhists.     It  has  had  some   acceptance   also  among  other 
widely  scattered  peoples,  mainly  of  a  primitive  stage  of  civihza- 
tion      It  has  been  ascribed  to  Pythagoras  among  the  Greeks, 
and  according  to  Herodotus  was  borrowed  from  the  Egyptians 
Among  modern  philosophers  it  was  held  by  Fichte.     While  it 
conserves  in  a  measure  the  individual  human  life,  yet  in  effect 
it  deprives  life  of  its  unique  dignity.     The  soul  after  death  is 
in  no  closer  or  more  vital  relation  to  its  Creator  than  before.     No 
ultimate  harmony  between  it  and  the  conditions  of  its  being 
is  provided  for.     Nor  can  this  belief  provide  for  such  a  har- 

4  As  commonly  conceived  the  doctrine  of  immortality  con- 
templates a  permanent  self  identity  of  the  individual  human 
life  The  course  of  events  may  serve  to  resolve  the  physical 
body  back  into  the  earthly  elements  of  which  it  is  composed. 
But  over  the  true  self,  the  soul,  it  has  no  power  whatever,  ihe 
return  of  the  body  to  the  earth  whence  it  was  taken  simply 
serves  to  set  free  the  undying  spirit  which  continues  to  hve  on. 
The  soul  therefore  does  not  share  the  fate  of  the  body.  JNor 
does  it  undergo  a  similar  fate,  that  of  being  absorbed  mto  one 
fountain  of  being  where  its  individuality  is  lost.  The  universe 
may  scatter  the  body,  but  in  all  our  popular  thought  the  soul 
remains  secure  in  the  possession  of  its  individual  bemg,  and 
**We  shall  know  as  we  are  known*'. 

The  Ufe  after  death  is,  therefore,  regarded  as,  in  a  genmne 
sense,  the  continuation  of  the  finite  life  of  the  present.  The 
interests  of  the  life  to  come  are  conceived  as  genmnely  related 
to  the  interests  of  the  present.  The  guiding  motive,  the  deepest 
desires,  all  in  short  that  goes  to  form  character,  are  considered 
as  finding  their  fulfillment  in  the  after-life,  but  in  such  manner 

»Cf.  WeWdon.  The  Hope  of  Immortality.  Chapter  1.  The  Nature  of  the  Belief. 


I 


.^k^^tii^BA^AiHii^ 


12 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


INTRODUCTION 


13 


as  to  be  the  unfolding,  the  ever  enlarging  development  of  that 
which  had  its  beginning  in  the  present  order. 

This  conception  of  immortality  considers  death  an  event 
in  life,  not  as  the  end  of  life.  It  contemplates,  an  identity 
of  personal  self-consciousness  after  death  with  that  before. 

The  life  beyond  is  regarded,  therefore,  as  the  satisfaction 
and  complete  perfection  of  the  life  that  is  now,  in  fulness  of 
being  of  which  we  can  not  adequately  conceive. 

II.  The  resources  of  absolute  idealism  for  the  affirmative 
treatment  of  the  conception  of  immortality. 

1.  It  should  perhaps  be  expected  that  a  philosophical  discuss- 
ion of  the  belief  in  immortality  would  place  less  emphasis  upon 
the  time  element  than  our  popular  conception  does,  and  that  it 
would  bring  into  bolder  relief  the  timeless  element  of  the  life 
eternal.  We  should  expect  also  that  it  would  have  little  to 
offer  in  the  way  of  attempting  to  image  the  unseen.  How- 
ever, it  is  e\adent  that  the  doctrine  of  immortality  itself  is  not 
thus  destroyed;  for  such  a  discussion  seeks  merely  to  lay  bare 
the  philosophical  foundations  of  the  doctrine.  At  best  the 
imagery  associated  with  the  common  conception  of  the  life  to 
come  is  an  effort  to  present  the  grandeur  of  that  which  tran- 
scends present  experience  from  that  which  is  noblest  and  best  in 
the  present  order,  truer  in  its  purpose  no  doubt  than  in  its 
fulfillment. 

What,  then,  are  the  resources  of  absolute  idealism  for  an 
affirmative  treatment  of  this  conception? 

2.  From  its  doctrine  of  the  universal  operative  in  human 
thought  it  is  led  to  affirm  a  spiritual  factor  which  is  eternal. 
It  is  this  spiritual  factor  operative  in  our  thinking  which  so  con- 
stitutes the  norm  of  thought  and  reason  that  its  conclusions 
are  accepted  as  true  and  valid.  It  is  by  no  chance  or  haphazard 
arrangement  that  our  concepts  are  formed  and  group  them- 
selves in  those  general  relations  that  are  common  to  all  normal 
minds.  But  this  power,  working  in  and  through  the  human 
mind  in  all  ages,  inheres  in  the  Over-Mind  or  Soul. 

From  its  doctrine  of  the  ideality  of  the  human  conscious- 
ness, likewise,  it  is  led  to  conclude  to  the  spiritual  factor  in  man. 
We  can  not  believe  that  these  ideals  are  present  as  illusions, 
since  they  are  inwrought  into  the  fabric  of  our  most  secure 


sciences.  They  are  present  to  our  minds  often  as  the  types  and 
suggestions  of  things  subsequently  discovered  through  their 
leading.  They  are  spiritual  in  their  nature,  not  material,  and 
can  inhere  only  in  a  being  who  is  spiritual. 

3.  In  its  insistence  upon  spiritual  things  as  absolute  and 
final  the  idealistic  philosophy  is  again  found  to  be  in  line  with 
the  implications  of  the  belief  in  immortality.  For  it  material 
things  are  relative.  Their  status  is  wholly  secondary.  The 
idea  of  nature  as  absolute,  a  system  of  rigid  law,  is  not  a  part 
of  its  creed.  In  consequence  this  philosophy  is  in  more  general 
sympathy  with  the  historic  culture  concepts  which  have  gone 
to  promote  human  progress  than  with  those  concepts  of  the 
"abstract  understanding"   whose   tendency  is  to  level  rather 

than  to  build  up. 

4.  In  this  connection  mention  should  be  made  of  the  historical 
spirit  which  has  always  characterized  this  school  of  thought. 
It  has  constantly  manifested  a  fine  appreciation  of  the  positive 
import  of  various  stages  in  history  and  civilization.     In  this 
appreciation  it  has  even  at  times  anticipated  their  subsequent 
rational  grounding  and  explanation  of  the  stages  of  history  and 
civilization.      The    history    of     philosophy    itself,   under    the 
treatment  of    the    representatives    of    this    school,  came     to 
possess    a   meaning  which  is    now,  indeed,  generally  accepted 
but  was  almost  entirely  new  with  it.     And  while  the  Hegehan 
philosophy  of  history  has  been  found  defective  in  many  details 
it  has  been  fertile  in  valuable  suggestions  toward  a  truer  inter- 
pretation of  the  progress  of  human  events  than  existed    pre- 

\'iously. 

The  question  may  be  raised  in  this  connection,  to  what 
extent  has  the  aspiration  for  immortality  been  one  of  the  essen- 
tial culture  ideals  of  humanity?  That  it  has  been  historic  is 
beyond  question.  It  has  been  and  is  now  well-nigh  universal 
among,  men  of  every  stage  of  civilization.  It  is  true  the  form 
of  the  belief  has  undergone  modification,  just  as  other  beliefs  of 
men  have  been  modified,  and  it  may  be  destined  to  undergo 
further  change.  But  the  belief  itself  has  been  among  the  most 
persistent  ideals  of  the  race  and,  all  things  considered,  among  the 
most  beneficent.  Unless  then  it  can  be  conclusively  shown  that 
this  belief  is  the  by-product  of  some  psychological  motive  and 
its  validity  thus  overthrown,  the  absolute  idealist  can  not  fail 


I 


14 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALSIM   AND  IMMORTALITY 


INTRODUCTION 


15 


to  take  account  of  it  as  among  the  essential  culture  ideals  of 
humanity.  But  we  shall  have  occasion  to  return  to  this  subject. 
5.  It  is  especially  important  to  observe  also  that  the  doctrine 
of  the  reality  of  the  ideal  inevitably  leads  the  idealist  to  take 
account  of  the  aspiration  for  an  eternal  life.  Without  the  as- 
surance of  a  life  to  come  the  highest  aspirations  of  our  being 
must  remain  unsatsfied,  life  itself  incomplete,  and  our  noblest 
ideals  unfulfilled.  Everything  that  is  best  in  us,  "bears  witness  in 
itself  of  a  power  of  life  and  growth  far  beyond  the  utmost  afforded 
by  the  opportunities  of  earth.  These  distinctly  human  quali- 
ties do  not  serve  any  merely  physical  purpose.  They  are  not 
useful  in  the  biological  sense.  If,  therefore,  the  realization  of 
such  powers  has  a  purpose,  not  fulfilled  till  put  forth  to  full 
capacity,  we  must  suppose  that  human  existence  is  constructed 
on  a  scale  such  that  each  man  can  put  them  forth  in  their  full- 
ness. *  *  *  These  ideals  are  the  only  things  that  give  value  to 
life.  If  we  have  a  right  to  believe  anything,  we  have  the  strong- 
est moral  and  intellectual  right  to    believe    that    these  abide 

forever."* 

Therefore  idealism  can  not  be  indifferent  to  this  persistent 
faith  of  humanity.  So  long  as  absolute  idealism  retains  its 
fundamental  principle  that  the  ideal  is  real  and  the  truly  real 
the  ideal,  immortality  as  one  of  the  most  persistent  of  ideals 
must  find  a  place  in  its  very  texture.  Otherwise  it  might  as 
well  abandon  the  task  of  endeavoring  to  interpret  reality.  yWith 
"tEeTailure  of  the  belief  in  immortality,  idealism  itself  must  fail. 

III.  Traits  of  ahsolvie  idealism  which  make  for  a  negative 
treatment. 

It  must  not  be  overlooked,  however,  that  there  are  impor- 
tant traits  of  absolute  idealism  which  make  for  an  obscuring, 
or  even  a  negative,  treatment  of  immortality. 

1.  The  domination  of  the  Universal  over  the  finite  individual 
is  such  that  the  latter  may  appear  virtually  to  lose  his  individu- 
ality entirely.  At  least  such  is  the  natural  conclusion  from  the 
statements  of  eminent  representatives  of  this  system  of  thought. 
This  position  seems  in  fact  essential  to  an  idealistic  monism. 
At  no  stage  either  of  the  beginning  or  development  of  the  in- 

>S.  H.  Mallone,  Present  Aspects  of  the  Problem  of  Immortality,  Hibbert  Journal, 
II,  725. 


dividual  does  he  appear  self-initiated  or  independent,  so  com- 
pletely is  he  subjected  to  the  universe.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how, 
as  thus  expressed,  any  type  of  eternal  life  or  absoluteness  can 
be  assigned  to  the  finite  individual  at  all.  Hegel,  himself, 
points  out  the  dialectical  negativity  by  which  every  finite  some- 
what is  dissolved  into  heing-for-another,  and,  while  this  inde- 
pendent being  is  finally  restored  it  is  restored  only  in  the  Abso- 
lute.    The  independence  of  the  finite  as  such  is  not  restored. 

To  like  purpose  Haldane  remarks:     "For  there  is  but  one 
single  subject  within  which  all  knowledge  and    all  reality  fall. 
With  and  in  that  single  subject  philosophy  and  faith  assure  us 
that  we  are   one."*      Again  he  remarks,  "Finite  mind  is  this 
same    (ultimate)  Mind  in    imperfect  forms  of  self-comprehen- 
sion, self-determinations  on  the  part  of  the  absolute  mind,— 
that  are  but  phases  of  the  activity  in   which  it  creates  and 
gathers  up  the  full  riches  of  its  concrete  self -comprehension.  "* 
In  similar  vein  A.  E.  Taylor  discusses  The  Place  of  The  Self 
in  Reality  and  comes  to  the  conclusion:     "In  short,  unless  you 
are  to  be  content  with  a  beggarly  modicum  of  continuity  of 
purpose  too  meager  to  be  more  than  an  empty  name,  you  seem 
forced  to  conclude  that  the  origination  and  again  the  disappear- 
ance of  selves  in  the  course  of  psychical  events  is  a  fact  of  con- 
stant occurrence.  ********  We  seem  driven,  then,  to  con- 
elude  that  the  permanent  identity  of  the  self  is  a  matter  of 
degree,  and  that  we  are  not  entitled  to  assert  that  the  self  cor- 
responding to    a  single  organism  need  be  either  single  or  per- 
manent.    It  is  possible  for  me,  even  in  the  period  between  birth 
and  death,  to  lose  my  old  self  and  acquire  a  new  one,  and  even 
to  have  more  selves  than  one,  and  those  of  different  degrees  of 
structure,  at  the  same  time.     Nor  can  we  assign  any  certain 
criterion  by  which  to  decide  in  all  cases  whether  the  self  has 
been  one  and  identical  through  a  series  of  psychical  events.    Be- 
yond the  general  assertion  that  the  more  completely  occupied 
our  various  interests  and  purposes  are  the  more  permanent  is 
our  selfhood,  we  are  unable  to  go.''' 

What  have  we  here,  then,  other  than  that  the  finite  indi- 
vidual is  ultimately  dissolved  into  the  Universe,  while  the 
only  thing  that  stands  fast  eternally  is  this  same  Universe  itself, 

iHaldaae,  Pathway  to  Reality,  vol.  2,  p.  248. 

«Ibid.  vol.  2.  p.  256.  ,  „  ^     u     •  -  «   ^m 

rraylor,  A.  ET,  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  p.  353. 


\    f 


16 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY" 


or  the  Absolute?  If  we  accept  statements  such  as  these  at  their 
face  value  we  seem  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  when  absolute 
idealism  speaks  of  immortality  its  fine  phrases  are  uttered  with 
reference  not  to  this  or  that  finite  individual  but  with  reference 
to  the  Universe  as  a  whole.  We  have  asked  for  bread  and 
received  a  stone.  The  difference  between  this  view  of  the  world 
and  of  life  and  that  by  which  the  empirical  sciences  would  ex- 
plain away  everything  pertaining  to  the  proper  individuality 
of  man  is  not  material  so  far  as  the  net  result  to  man's  true 
individuality  is  concerned.  In  both  alike  the  universe  appears 
to  give  and  take  away  the  life  and  soul  of  man.  His  individual 
being  appears  as  the  wave  of  the  sea  that  rears  its  crest  for  a 
little  while,  presently  to  subside  into  the  great  ocean  whence  it 

came. 

2.  Another  feature  of  absolute  idealism  that  appears  essential 
to  it  and  yet  obscures,  even  if  it  does  not  deny,  the  conception 
of  immortality  is  its  denial  of  time  as  final  in  the  universe. 
For  the  idealist,  since  Kant  at  least,  time  is  the  a  priori  condi- 
tion of  our  sense-perceptions.  It  is  not  independent  of  the 
human  self  or  of  the  mind,  but  is  mind-given.  Time  is  in  some 
sense  the  product  of  mind.  Hence  the  mind  is  greater  and 
exists  above  and  beyond  time  relations.  To  get  at  the  truth 
about  such  a  matter  as  eternal  life,  it  is  maintained  by  Haldane 
among  others,  we  must  resort  to  conceptions  of  a  higher  order 
than  that  of  time  and  only  then  are  we  delivered  from  the 
dilemma  that  this  life  either  ends  with  the  grave  or  continues 
beyond  it.  Hegel  points  out  that  it  is  an  endless,  eternal  quality 
of  the  soul  to  be  a  citizen  in  the  kingdom  of  God.  This,  he 
holds,  is  a  quality  and  a  life  which  is  beyond  time  and  that 
which  is  transitory. 

^'Diesz  ist  eine  Bestimmung  und  ein  Leben,  das  der  zeit  und 
Verganglichkeit  entriickt  ist,  und  indem  es  dieser  beschrankten 
Sphare  zugleich  entgegen  ist  so  bestimmt  sich  diese  ewige 
Bestimmung  zugleich  als  eine  Zukimft.  Die  unendliche 
Forderung,  Gott  zu  schauen,  d.  h.  im  Geiste  seiner  Warheit  als 
einer  gegenwartigen  bewuszt  zu  werden,ist  fiir  das  Bewusztsein 
als  das  vorstellende  in  dieser  zeitlichen  Gegpnwart  noch  nicht 
befriedigt."* 


>Heiel  Werke  XII.  p.  313. 


INTRODUCTION 


17 


The  eternal  life  must  be  regarded  as  in  some  sense  the  time- 
less completion  of  our  historic  life.  One  can  readily  see,  how- 
ever how  the  emphasis  upon  the  character  of  life  as  timeless 
or  independent  of  time  t«nds  to  identify  it  with  the  Eternal, 
as  is  the  case  for  example  with  Spinoza.  It  may  be  questioned, 
however,  whether  emphasis  upon  the  timeless  aspect  of  human 
life  necessarily  identifies  it  with  the  Eternal  and  Absolute.  It 
does  indeed  lead  to  a  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  immortahty 
such  as  is  likely  to  arouse  the  suspicion  that  the  truly  human 
immortality  remaining  is,  if  not  a  form  of  words,  at  least  ex- 
ceedingly obscure.  But  the  idealistic  doctrine  of  the  timeless 
life,  as  it  relates  to  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  can  scarcely  be 
said  to  deprive  the  belief  in  immortality  of  its  real  bearings. 

IV.     Desirability  of  a  more  harmonious  adjustment  of  these 
conflicting  m^otives. 

In  view  of  these  considerations  it  is  desirable  to  secure  a 
more  harmonious  adjustment  of  these  conflicting  motives  within 
absolute  idealism  with  reference  to  their  bearing  upon  a  l^lief 
so  vital    to   human    happiness   and  wellbeing.      It  should  be 
possible  to  give  all  due  recognition  to  the  overlordship  of  the 
Universal  in  relation  to  our  finite  life  without  surrendering 
our  confidence  in  the  reality  of  spiritual  values  or  our  recogni- 
tion  of  their  historic  worth  as  factors  in  the  development  of 
the  truest  culture.     Upon  the  success  of  the  effort  to  estabhsh 
some  such  harmony  rests  the  hope  of  making  effective  head- 
way against  the  advance  of  naturalism  at  the  present  time. 
For  that  the  recent  development  of  the  empirical  sciences, 
notably  biology  and  psychology,  t^nds  to  undermine  and  over- 
throw one  of  the  most  cherished  ideals  of  mankind  is  evident 
to  every  thoughtful,  intelligent  person.    There  is  good  reason 
to  believe  that  a  careful  scrutiny  will  show  that  the  conclusions 
of  naturalism  in  this  field  have  been  hastily  drawn  and  that 
the  foundations  of  the  ancient  faith  in  the  life  beyond  stand 
as  secure  today  as  ever. 


■.  S 


.! 


18 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


IDEALISTIC   ANALYSIS   OF    HUMAN   INDIVIDUALITY 


19 


H 


CHAPTER  I. 


THE  IDEALISTIC  ANALYSIS  OF  HUMAN  INDIVID- 

UALTY 

A. 

Self  Defined  as  Unity  of  Purpose. 

I.  Aristotle's  conception  of  human  individuality  and  the  present  day 

use  of  it.  ... 

II.  Modem  Idealism.  Its  emphasis  upon  the  systematismg  element 
in  knowledge  and  in  all  facts.  Leibniz'  doctrine  of  the  mind  as  a  will 
center.  Hegel's  development  of  idealism.  Human  individuality  as  defined 
by  contemporary  writers:  unsatisfactory  use  of  terms  self,  person,  indi- 
vidual; the  human  self  an  ideal;  how  one  self  is  distinguishea  from  other 
selves;  society  as  an  individual;  enlargement  of  self,  of  child, parent,  man  of 
business,  citizen;  society  as  one  inclusive  individual;  the  human  race  as  an 
individual,  organic  relation  of  persons  and  families  through  heredity,  growth 
of  worid  consciousness;  resume,  the  Absolute  as  the  complete  individual. 

Since  a  proper  discussion  of  immortality  necessarily  turns 
upon  the  conception  of  individuality  entertained,  it  is  in  order 
to  consider  at  some  length  the  idealistic  analysis  of  the  indi- 
\ddual  and  some  of  the  difficulties  which  this  analysis  encount- 
ers. This  conception  of  the  individual  early  defined  itself  in 
terms  of  purpose. 

I.     Aristotle's  conception  of  individuality. 

First  among  philosophers  to  give  anything  like  an  adequate 
discussion  of  individuality  was  Aristotle.  For  him  the  primary 
basis  of  all  reality  is  substance,  owrta.  All  other  determinations 
assume  this  one  as  fundamental.  Substantiality  is  to  be  found, 
not  in  the  matter  of  things,  but  in  their  form  or  essence.  This 
form  or  essence  is  unlike  the  matter  which  underlies  the  exist- 
ing thing  in  that  it  is  determinate.  The  essence  alone  expresses 
the  specific  nature  of  the  thing  from  which  it  cannot  be  separated. 
The  reality  is  constituted  by  this  conceptual  or  ideal  essence. 
Neither  form  nor  matter,  however,  exist  per  se.  They  exist 
as  formed  matter  in  the  concrete  individual. 

It  is  important  in  Aristotle's  thought  to  distinguish  between 
what  things  are  actually,  ^epyeia  and  what  they  are  poten- 
tially Swo/Aci.  The  potential  is  the  persistent  tendency 
toward  the  actual,  not,  however,  to  an  indefinite  actual,  but 


to  its  own  actualized  being.  The  acorn  is  the  possibility  of 
the  oak,  not  of  some  other  tree.  The  child  is  the  potential  man. 
But  oak  and  man  exist  also  ideally,  and  this  ideal  existence  is 
prior  to  the  potential  in  time  and  in  substance.  This  ideal  is 
also  the  ''end"  to  be  realized  by  the  potential.  It  is  the  active 
principle  guiding,  as  it  were,  the  process  of  realization.  And 
nothing  is  to  be  considered  potential  which  can  not  realize  its 

"end". 

The  soul  is  this  realization  or  entelechy  of  the  body.     It  is 

its  full  development,  its  earlier  perfect  realization.  It  occupies 
the  relation  to  body  which  ''form"  holds  to  "matter"  in  Aris- 
totle's thought.     As  the  first  entelechy  of  the  body  it  possesses 

life  potentially. 

Applying  this  principle  to  the  popular  conception  of  the 
soul  Aristotle  regarded  the  soul  as  the  seat  of  personality,  and 
as  having  an  existence  capable  of  being  separated  from  the 
bodily  life.  However,  at  this  point,  involving  as  it  does  the 
persistence  of  personality  after  death  and  the  immortality  of 
the  soul,  he  is  somewhat  obscure. 

Aristotle's  doctrine  of  the  soul  exerted  a  profound  influence 
upon  all  succeeding  thought.     It  can  hardly  be  considered  a 
spent  force  even  now.     His  method  of  viewing  the  soul  was 
neither    introspective    exclusively    nor    empirical    alone.     He 
combined  the  two.     He  recognized,  to  a  degree  which  his  prede- 
cessors did  not,  the  relation  of  body  and  soul  as  a  subject  which 
the  psychologist  dare  not  leave  unnoticed.     That  the  greater 
part  of  our  mental  states  have  a  direct  relation  to  the  condition 
of  the  bodily  organs  was  quite  evident  to  him.     However,  he 
was  at  complete  variance  with  the  materialistic  psychology  of 
the  Atomists,  and  with  all  attempts  to  assign  physical  attri- 
butes to  the  soul.     For  him,  it  is  only  through  the  soul  that  it 
is  possible  to  comprehend  or  explain  the  body.     It  is  to  be 
noticed  that  the  procedure  of  modern  psychology  is  just  the 
reverse.     The  soul  is  to  be  understood  through  a  careful  study 
of  the  physical  states.     In  consequence  the  psychology  of  Aris- 
totle is  inadequate  to  meet  the  problems  raised  by  modern  psy- 
chology.     In  its  wider  relations  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of 
the  vegetative  and  sensitive  soul  fails  also  to  satisfy  the  require- 
ments of  the  present-day  biology.     A  restatement  is  therefore 
needed  which,  while  giving  full  recognition  to  the  established 


20 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM  AND  IMMORTALITY 


.V 


»' 


results  of  modern  science,  will  retain  the  elements  of  permanent 
value  in  Aristotle's  discussion  of  the  soul,  namely  its  teleology 
and  its  confidence  in  the  reality  of  the  ideal. 

II.     Modern  idealism. 

1.  It  is  this  task  which  modern  idealism  has  undertaken  in 
opposition  to  the  categories  of  modern  science  which  attempt 
to  explain  all  things  in  terms  of  mechanism.  Modern  idealism 
is  throughout  teleological,  no  less  than  that  of  Aristotle.  It 
regards  all  individuality  as  being  expressive  of  purpose.  The 
degree  of  reality  which  is  expressed  in  any  given  individual  is 
the  degree  to  which  the  underlying  thought  is  adequately  ex- 
pressed, or  rather,  perhaps,  the  degree  in  which  it  reveals  the 
organizing  universal  as  Mind.  For  it  holds  no  less  confidently 
than  did  Aristotle  to  the  belief  that  the  ideal  alone  has  per- 
manent reality.  It  is  the  ideal,  or  thought,  in  things  which 
constitutes  them  real. 

Modern  idealism  lays  great  emphasis  upon  the  systematiz- 
ing element  in  all  facts.  These  facts  are  not  isolated.  They 
have  no  independent  existence,  but  are  closely  interrelated  in 
one  pervading  unity.  That  unity  likewise  determines  our 
knowing  processes.  It  is  through  it,  indeed,  that  our  knowl- 
edge comes  to  be  organized  and  systematized.  The  thorough- 
going character  of  this  systematizing  element  in  knowledge  and 
in  all  phenomena  betrays  at  once  the  indebtedness  of  modern 
idealism  to  Aristotle  and  its  point  of  departure  from  him. 

2.  The  first  among  modern  philosophers  to  apply,  in  the  true 
Aristotelian  spirit,  the  category  of  purpose  to  the  new  knowl- 
edge being  brought  forward  in  the  modern  age  was  Leibniz. 
He  rejected  the  doctrine  of  substance  and  matter  advanced  by 
Descartes  and  further  developed  by  Spinoza.  For  the  definition 
of  matter  as  extended  substance  he  substituted  the  conception 
that  its  power  of  resistance  is  the  essential  quality  of  matter. 
He  also  regarded  matter  as  essentially  immaterial.  What  we 
call  matter  is  for  him  an  accumulation  of  centers  of  force,  the 
activity  of  whicTi  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  spiritual.  These 
centers  of  force  are  termed  monads.  From  the  lowest  of  these 
monads  up  to  the  highest  there  is  a  continuous  series.  The 
life  of  each  is  a  life  of  perceptual  activity.  It  is  a  life  of  thought, 
but  of  thought  capable  of  being  vastly  confused.     This  confused 


IDEALISTIC   ANALYSIS   OF    HUMAN   INDIVIDUALITY  21 

thought    characterizes   the    material    monads.     Souls,   on   the 
contrary,  are  monads  in  which  there  is  at  least  partial  self- 
consciousness.     But  even  in  man  a  part  of  this  soul  life  is  obscure. 
On  account  of  this  confusion  the  world  appears  to  us  as  a  mate- 
rial rather  than  an  immaterial  world.      In  reality  it  is  immate- 
rial, and  the  only  difference  between  souls  and  other  monads 
is  one  of  degree.     Under  this  conception  whatever  develop- 
ment occurs  is  brought  about  by  the  unfolding  nature  of  the 
monads  themselves,  not  through  any  mechanical  interaction 
among  them.    They  are  in  fact  without  the  means  of  such 
interaction.     Each  is  sufficient  to  itself.    The  relation  of  whole 
and  part  Leibniz  does  not  conceive  as  one  of  greater  and  less  but 
he  conceives  that  the  part  contains  in  itself  the  whole  in  such 
wise  that,  from  within  the  part,  the  whole  might  be  entirely 
unfolded.    The  part   must  therefore  have  within  itself  a  certain 
spontaneity,   which    manifests   itself   through   perception   and 
appetition.    In  so  far  as  it  is  symbolic  of  the  whole,  and  is  capa- 
ble of  producing  the  whole,  it  has  perception.     In  so  far  as  it 
tends  actually  to  realize  itself  as  the  whole  it  has  appetition. 
Thus  the  process  of  change  is  simply  the  unfolding  of  the  nature 

of  the  several  monads. 

That  the  unity  of  the  world  may  not  be  completely  set 
aside  these  monads  are  held  together  in  their  mutual  relations 
by  the  law  of  pre-established  harmony. 

3  In  Hegel  we  trace  the  conception  of  individuaUty  in  terms 
of  purpose  no  less  clearly  than  in  Leibniz,  although  with  a  some- 
what different  emphasis.  Hegel's  thought  is  more  rigorously 
and  consistently  monistic  than  that  of  Leibniz.  Indeed  in  this 
respect  he  comes  nearer  to  the  position  of  the  great  opponent 
of  the  latter  in  the  field  of  philosophy,  namely  Spinoza.  Yet 
his  system  is  by  no  means  to  be  identified  with  that  of  the  lat- 
ter. For  Hegel  the  element  of  thought  is  paramount  m  all 
things.  It  is  this  which  constitutes  them  real.  The  degree  of 
reality  which  any  given  thing  reveals  is  precisely  that  degr^ 
to  which  the  Supreme  Thought  is  adequately  expressed.  Di- 
alectic is  not  only  involved  in  the  human  thought  and  speech, 
but  is  involved  in  all  existence.  The  conception  of  any  given 
thing  suggests  at  the  same  time  that  which  is  its  opposite,  which 
negates  it.  But  this  opposition  is  overcome  in  a  higher  mode 
of  being.    Thought,  therefore,  in  the  Hegelian  system  holds 


n 


22 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM  AND   IMMORTALITY 


I 


r 


( 


\ 


much  the  same  place  which  force  or  will  holds  in  that  of  Leibniz. 
The  various  individual  objects  exist  in  and  for  the  Absolute  and 
are  maintained  by  it  to  serve  various  determinate  purposes. 
The  human  individual,  likewise,  holds  this  same  relation  in  the 
Absolute  life.  Man's  thought  is  at  the  same  time  the  thought 
of  the  Over-Mind,  his  will  that  in  which  the  will  of  God  finds 
expression.  His  life  is  the  unique  expression  of  a  purpose,  the 
progressive  attainment  of  an  ideal.  But  that  purpose  has  its 
origin  and  completion  within  the  Absolute.  In  the  system  of 
Hegel,  consequently,  the  ideal  and  the  real  can  not  be  set 
of!  in  opposition  to  each  other.  The  ideal  is  necessarily  real. 
This  principle  is  axiomatic  in  his  system. 

4.  Human  individuality  as  presented  by  contemporary  writers, 

a.  In  endeavoring  to  formulate  the  present  thought  of  ideal- 
ism in  regard  to  human  individuality  one  is  impressed  with  the 
limitations  of  language  to  express  adequately  the  ideas  which 
it  is  sought  to  convey.     What  meaning  shall  be  attached  to 
such  terms  as  self,  person,  individual?     It  is  scarcely  possible 
to  use  any  of  these  in  a  single  sense,  or  to  avoid  using  them 
interchangeably.      A.  E.  Taylor,  in  his  Elements  of  Metaphysics, 
goes  perhaps  farther  than  any  other  contemporary  writer  to- 
ward a  well-defined  usage  of  these  several  terms,  but  his   usage 
is  by  no  means  free  from  objection  since  it  places  too  narrow  a 
meaning  upon  the  term  self,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other, 
so  restricts  his  usage  of  the  term  person  as  to  deny  personality 
for    the    Absolute    altogether.     When  the  terms  self,  person, 
individual,  stand  alone  in  this  discussion  they  are  to  be  under- 
stood as  employed  in  the  common  usage,  having  reference  to 
the   finite   individual   person,   unless   the    connection   requires 
another  shade     of  meaning.     Ordinarily  when  the  idea  to  be 
presented  is  that  of  the  social  self,  or  of  society  as  an  individual, 
or  of  the  Absolute  as  an  individual,  the  appropriate  descriptive 
adjective  will  be  used.     The  full  meaning  of  these  several  terms 
will  appear  in  the  course  of  the  discussion.     For  the  present 
the  general  definition  of  individuality  by  Prof.  Fite  will  serve 
our  purpose:     "The  individual,  in  the  idealistic  sense,  is  the 
organized  expression  of  special  functions  and  capacities."* 

b.  The  idealist,  as  we  have  already  noticed,  defines  individu- 

>Fite,  Warner.  Introductory  Study  of  Ethics,  p.  210. 


IDEALISTIC   ANALYSIS   OF    HUMAN   INDIVIDUALITY 


23 


•»^ 


ality  in  terms  of  purpose.     This  purpose  is  germinally  expressed 
even  in  the  infant  life.     Fite,  for  example,  points  out  that  from 
earliest  childhood  the  new  life  has  been  the  expression  of  purpose 
even  though  at  that  early  stage  the  particular  purpose  is  not 
yet  evident.      Notwithstanding,  before  the  child  has  come  to 
full  consciousness,   that  purpose  has  already  begun  unfolding 
its  characteristic  life.     It  makes  little  difference  if  subsequent- 
ly, after  choosing  a  life  aim  and  working  toward  it  for  a  time, 
the  person  comes  to  feel  himself  obliged  to  abandon  that  aim 
for  another  more  congenial  to  his  taste,  or  better  adapted  to 
his  ability.      This  very  change  points  to  the  deeper  teleology 
thus  working  out  a  purpose  or  end  more  congenial  to  his  nature. 
The  mature  choice  is  the  self^s  truest  expression. 

Consciousness  is  therefore  essential  to  the  fullest  expression 
of  individuality.  When  we  are  most  fully  conscious  we  are 
most  ourselves.  This  principle  of  self-consciousness  is  at  the 
same  time  the  principle  of  self-identity.  True  personality 
cannot,  therefore,  be  stated  or  explained  in  terms  of  mechamsm. 
Consciousness  is  an  entirely  different  principle.  The  distinc- 
tion between  them  is  fundamental. 

The  conscious  individual  is  also  a  rational  individual.  Con- 
scious reason  determines  his  activities  toward  an  end  which  is 
also  self-chosen.     He  seeks  to  attain  definite  ideals. 

It  is  at  this  point  that  the  distinction  between  personahties 
enters.  We  are  distinguished  from  each  other  because  our 
life  aims  are  different.  When,  however,  it  comes  to  defining 
more  closely  what  constitutes  a  life  aim  or  purpose  we  can  not 
avoid  expressing  our  thought  through  some  one  or  more  univer- 
sal qualities.  It  begins,  then,  to  appear  a  question  whether 
it  be  truer  to  say  we  have  ideals  or  ideals  have  us. 

Our  life-purpose  is  not  immediate  to  consciousness  espe- 
cially in  youth.  Neither  is  it  fully  realized  atany  given  moment. 
Self-consciousness  is  progressive.  Likewise  our  ideals  grow 
and  expand.  Death  interrupts  the  process,  or  at  least  appears 
to  do  so,  but  who  will  say  that  the  possibilities  of  growth  have 

then  reached  their  limit? 

c  It  is  not  long  before  the  self-consciousness  of  the  child,  which 
has  to  do  mainly  with  bodily  need,  is  surpassed.  The  interests 
of  youth  broaden.  The  man  of  mature  years  is  personally 
concerned  about  a  variety  of  things  beyond  his  immediate  self, 


i  t> 


1 


24 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


family,  business,  state.  Social  sympathy  leads  to  an  ever  in- 
creasing interest  in  the  welfare  of  others.  We  come  to  speak 
of  the  social  whole,  of  the  social  body,  of  organized  society,  and 
the  like.  This  line  of  thought  leads  many  idealists  further  to 
declare  that  one  whose  capacities  had  found  full  expression, 
an  indi^idual  person  whose  powers  were  harmoniously  developed 
would  be  identical  with  the  mind  of  society  itself.  This  degree 
of  common  interests  on  the  part  of  two  or  more  persons  would 
render  them  "absolutely  harmonious  and  identical."* 

The  conception  is  thus  reached  that  in  reality  there  are 
not  manv  individuals,  that  there  is  in  fact  but  one.  The 
personal  will  becomes  subservient  to  social  ends.  Each  one, in 
so  far  as  he  has  come  to  his  best  estate,  has  become  conscious 
that  his  personal  interests  are  those  of  the  social  whole.  The 
welfare  of  society  has  become  his  primary  concern.  Just  as 
the  artist  or  the  scientist  places  everything  secondary  to  his 
art  or  to  his  science,  so  it  is  when  the  social  motive  has  become 

supreme. 

The  absolute  idealist  goes  even  further  than  this  in  pointing 
out  the  essential  oneness  of  society.  He  comes  to  the  denial  that 
even  our  bodily  selves  are,  after  all  as  separate  and  independent 
as  they  appear.'  A  real  independence  would  require  that  they 
be  thoroughly  self-sustaining,  as  well  as  self-moved.  But  this 
state  is  never  quite  realized.  Each  is  dependent  upon  a  wide 
range  of  social  activities,  the  child  upon  the  mother  from  whom 
it  has  drawn  its  life  and  derives  its  sustenance,  the  wife  upon 
the  husband,  and  each  individual  upon  the  interaction  of  social 
forces  related  to  every  other  individual.  What  a  variety  of 
relations  is  brought  to  bear  for  example,  in  the  furnishing  of 
our  food  supply!  The  choice  viands  upon  our  table  have  be- 
come ours  through  the  working  of  a  vast  system  of  related 
activities  on  the  part  of  many  men.  That  we  might  enjoy  the 
dinner  thus  served  the  farmer  or  stockman  has  carefully  tended 
his  cattle.  These  have  not  only  grazed  upon  the  pasture  but 
have  been  fed  from  the  com  supply  which  was  planted,  culti- 
vated, gathered,  and  shelled  by  means  of  a  variety  of  imple- 
ments that  engaged  the  best  thought  of  many  minds  to  contrive, 
and  the  best  skill  of  others  to  manufacture.    The  cattle  thus 

»Fit«,  Introdttctory  Study  of  Ethics,  p.  214. .     .  ™.  .    ,  .    j     .       «.  j 

>For  ■  fuller  diteuasion  of  the  aoeisl  indindual  eompare  Fit**!  IntroduetoryStiidy 
«l  EtUee.    pp.  213-217,  220-224.      ^ 


l.ifl' 


IDBAUSTIC   ANALYSIS  OF    HUMAN  INDIVIDUALITY 


25 


ii 


raised' have  been  sold  to  the  stock-dealer,  they  have  been  trans- 
ported by  means  x>f  a  complex  railway  system  to  the  packing 
house,  they  have  been  slaughtered  and  prepared  for  market  by 
an  organized  force  of  workmen  which  in  itself  is  almost  a  perfect 
machine.  Thus  prepared  the  product  has  been  transported  to 
the  local  dealer  and  there  retailed  to  the  consumer.  But  be- 
fore you  can  enjoy  your  dinner  it  must  be  further  prepared  by 
the  housewife  or  maid,  with  the  aid  of  fuel  which  orgamzed 
labor  and  capital  have  combined  to  transfer  from  beneath 
the    earth  to    your  home  and  fireside.    Complete  isolation  is 

impossible.  ,    „i,„i„ 

d  This  interdependence  of  man  upon  man  and  upon  the  whole 
of  society  carried  out  still  farther  along  the  line  of  heredity 
discloses  the  fundamental  unity  of  the  human  race.  The 
individual  is  physically  related  to  his  parents,  each  of  these  m 
turn  to  other  parents  and  so  on.  Tribes  exist  which  have  for 
the  most  part  grown  from  single  families.  These  tribes 
related  by  blood  among  their  individual  members,  are  simi- 
larly related  to  other  tribes.  Interesting  illustrations  of  this 
tribal  relation,  growing  out  of  earlier  family  ties,  are  easily 
traced  among  the  Hebrews  and  surrounding  peoples  of  antiquity. 
So  in  a  still  larger  sense  nation  is  related  to  nation.  From 
Great  Britain  on  the  West  to  India  on  the  East  may  be  traced 
one  common  original  stock,  the  Aryan  or  Indo-European. 

Following  this  principle  still  further  we  acquire  a  complete 
view  of  the  organic  oneness  of  the  human  family. 

A  similar  view  or  conclusion  in  regard  to  the  race  as  an  ideal 
individual  may  be  reached  if  we  take  into  consideration  recent 
and  pending  international  movements.  Such  expressions  as 
"class  consciousness",  and  "national  consciousness  have  long 
had  a  tolerably  clear  and  fixed  meaning.  Are  we  not  develop- 
ing at  the  present  time  something  in  the  nature  of  a  world  con- 
sciousness? The  international  congresses  convoked  among  the 
Christian  nations  for  various  purposes  during  the  past  century, 
culminating  in  the  Peace  Conferences  at  the  Hague  and  the 
machinery  devised  by  them  for  the  adjustment  of  mternat.ona 
differences  which  threaten  war,  the  numerous  international 
arbitration  treaties  and  many  other  movements  less  conspicuous, 
point  to  the  growth  of  a  world  consciousness  containing  immense 
possibilities  for  the  future  of  mankind.    It  is  an  ideal  that  m- 


>i 


26 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM  AND   IMMORTALITY 


\il. 


spires  these  international  movements  toward  a  "federation  of 
the  world' ^  one  possessing  many  indications  that  it  is  already 
in  process  of  fulfillment. 

e.  To  sum  up  this  discussion  of  individuality,  it  has  been 
observed  that  the  distinction  of  individuals  is  not  mean- 
ingless nor  to  be  ignored.  What  the  idealist  denies  is  that  they 
are  separate  and  mutually  independent.  The  individual  is 
regarded  as  **an  organized  expression  of  special  functions  and 
capacities''  which  are  potentially  those  of  the  human  race  itself. 
Not  all  nor  indeed  many  of  these  capacities  become  developed 
in  any  single  individual.  The  vast  majority  of  them  remain 
latent.  Special  functions  do,  however,  come  to  a  tolerably 
full  development.  How  or  why  the  individual  came  to  express 
the  particular  functions  which  have  become  characteristic  of 
him  the  idealist  does  not  attempt  to  explain  beyond  the  sug- 
gestion that  the  inner  life  of  humanity  may  somehow  exert  a 
determining  influence  of  this  character  in  order  that  special 
needs  as  they  arise  in  the  unfolding  life  of  humanity  may  thus 
be  supplied.  Who  can  tell  whether,  through  the  removal  of 
present  restraints,  these  suppressed,  unrealized  purposes  which 
remain  latent  in  the  individual's  present  life  may  not  attain 
to  a  development  commensurate  with  the  complete  life  of  hu- 
manity? Specialization,  it  is  pointed  out,*  far  from  being 
inconsistent  with  common  interests  is  in  fact  the  most  effective 
means  by  which  these  fundamental  interests  gain  realization. 
Indi^'iduality,  moreover,  is  marked  by  the  organization  of  the 
interests  to  be  subserved,  and  the  degree  of  that  organization 
determines  the  degree  of  individuality. 

From  the  standpoint  of  humanity  the  absolute  idealist  de- 
clares that  the  one  complete  individual  is  the  social  individual, 
attaining  its  full  expression  in  racial  unity.  This  is  considered 
by  Fite  and  others  the  one  complete  organism  and  the  only 
perfect  personality.  Relative  to  this  whole  of  humanity,  the 
finite  individual  is  a  mere  abstraction.  As  we  know  him  his 
whole  nature  is  but  partially  expressed. 

But  the  human  standpoint  is  not  the  final  point  of  view. 
Above  and  beyond  the  human  individual,  viewed  at  any  level 
we  may  choose,  there  remains  a  more  inclusive,  a  more  perfect 


I.  i:> 


>Fite.  Introductory  Study  of  Ethics,  p.  219.1 


IDEALISTIC   ANALYSIS   OF    HUMAN   INDIVIDUALITY 


27 


and  complete  individual,  in  whom  all  others  have  their  bemg, 
the  Absolute.     All  things  have  their  source  and  goal  in  Him. 

f  The  discussion  of  the  idealistic  analysis  of  the  human  indi- 
vidual culminates,  then,  in  the  Absolute  Being.  The  measure  of 
reality  in  finite  individuals  is  the  degree  in  which  the  Absolute 
finds  expression  in  them  as  the  differentiations  of  its  funda- 
mental  unity.  Our  human  lives  present  aspects  of  the  divine 
life.  In  a  more  profound  sense  even  than  St.  Paul  had  m 
mind   the  absolute  idealist  maintains,  "It  is  God  that  worketh 

in  you."  .  -       x     tv. 

The  relation  which  the  finite  individual  sustains  to  the 
Absolute  is  therefore  seen  to  be  one  of  great  interest  and  import- 
ance for  the  deeper  issues  of  our  subject. 


B 

Difficulties  of  the  Teleological  Conception  of  Mind. 

The  Mind  as  Relative. 

I  The  finite  individuaJ  and  the  Absolute.  Royce's  definition  of  tto 
indiv  W  Jl  Th^^lf  defined  in  terms  of  meaning  and  purpose  of  the  Absolute^ 
How  the  element  of  uniqueness  is  concerved.    The  Absolute  as  a  seU,  au 

""^to'ckicism.  the  element  of  uniquene«.  not  «"ffi««"y  ^t^'SfJi^fJ,^ 
■D  ;£.-♦-..» i.  «h«t  "in  Ood  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  bem^    aoes 

^^^^Jc^aS;^*  inv'Ste  fdeX  ofVought  -d  waM^Waii^^^ 
dangeis  ethical  dUtinctions  t^t  are  fundamental;  Royce  s  ^'i'"^  »°  P^ 

■""T  Th^\"pSnt  ^^ait?T?te  organic  unity  of  mind     Questions 

rai«=d  by  facttTSliple  persoUty  '>\P^^'^^f^Ji^^'Z^Z 
J^^^i^Jm  rpcpnt  hence  conclusions  for  the  most  part  tentative,  imes  oi 
eSteiSriy  folfow%tes  and  moods;  dj-ociated  states  cap*bk  of 
heine  resolved  back  into  primary  states;  possible  extent  »'  dissomuon, 
thfLw  of  the  subconscious  life  far  greater  than  "8«Jly,?>JPP°J^;i*>„T. 

trrhrovrorph^^ic^aT^rmSe^^afd-sMr^^^^^^^^ 

^V'"lSrfin*rh.r!d'^rdThl  physical  unive^  Discussed  in  the 
next  chkpter.  the  Human  Mind  and  The  Natural  Order. 

That  the  effort  to  conceive  of  mind  as  a  unity  of  purposes 
more  or  less  fully  expressed,  and  yet  as  genuinely  one,  is  not 
free  from  certain  difficulties,  is  apparent  (1)  from  the  relation 


ii 


28 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  AND  IMMORTALITY 


of  the  human  mind  to  the  Absolute,  (2)  from  a  consideration 
of  the  nature  of  the  mind  itself,  and  (3)  from  the  relation  of 
the  human  individual  to  the  physical  universe. 

I.  The  finite  individual  and  the  Absolute.  Royce^s  defini" 
Hon  of  the  individual. 

1.  From  the  metaphysical  side,  then,  can  the  individual  person, 
as  that  term  is  commonly  used,  be  said  in  any  proper  sense  to 
to  have  an  existence  of  his  own?  Is  the  human  mind  purely 
relative  in  all  its  thoughts  and  emotions,  nothing  more  nor 
less  than  the  momentary  expression  of  the  one  great  All? 
This  question  Prof.  Royce  seems  to  answer  in  the  affirmative. 

After  discussing  at  some  length  the  empirical  self  and  the 
self  of  realism  and  rejecting  both  as  unsatisfactory  statements 
of  the  true  meaning  of  individuality  he  thus  defines  the 
implications  of  individuality:*  "Primarily,  then,  the  con- 
trast of  Self  and  not-Self  comes  to  us  as  the  contrast 
between  the  Internal  and  External  meaning  of  this 
present  moment's  purpose.  In  the  narrowest  sense  the 
Self  is  just  your  own  present  imperfectly  expressed  pulsation 
of  meaning  and  purpose, — this  stri\'ing,  this  love,  this  hate, 
this  hope,  this  fear,  this  inquiry,  this  inner  speech  of  the  instant's 
will,  this  thought,  this  deed,  this  desire, — in  brief  this  idea  taken 
as  an  Internal  meaning.  In  the  widest  sense,  the  not-Self  is 
all  the  rest  of  the  divine  whole  of  conscious  life, — the  Other, 
the  outer  World  of  expressed  meaning  taken  as  in  contrast 
with  what,  just  at  this  instant  of  our  human  form  of  conscious- 
ness, is  observed,  and  relatively  speaking,  possessed."  The 
mental  states  and  attitudes,  capable  of  a  certain  amount  of  self- 
hood have,  or  ought  to  have,  some  one  principle  whereby  they 
would  possess  a  united  and  permanent  meaning.  This  uniting 
purpose  or  principle  would  identify  "the  part  of  the  world's 
life  which  is  to  be  in  the  larger  sense  one's  own."  This  feeling 
that  one  ought  to  be  able  to  select  from  the  universe  a  certain 
portion  of  purposeful  life  as  that  of  his  true  individual  self,  such 
that  he  would  contrast  with  this  whole  of  his  individual  life,  all 
other  individual  selves  and  the  Absolute,  reveals  the  self  as  an 
ethical  category.  One's  whole  meaning  is  and  will  remain  one 
with  the  whole  life  of  God.    At  the  same  time  this  whole  mean- 

iRoyce.  The  World  and  the  Individual,  rol.  II.  p.  272. 


!i: 


IDEALISTIC  ANALYSIS   OF   HUMAN  INDIVIDUALITY 


29 


ing  is  conceived  by  Royce  as  finding  expression  in  the  form  of 
contrasting  and  cooperating  lives,  of  which  the  one,  for  example, 
which  is  mine  is  ''linked  more  closely  in  purpose,  task  and  mean- 
ing with  the  life  of  this  instant  than  is  the  life  of  any  other  indi- 
vidual. *  *  *  *  By  this  meaning  of  my  life-plan,  by  this  posses- 
sion of  an  ideal,  by  this  intent  always  to  remain  another  than 
my  fellows  despite  my  divinely  planned  union  with  them, — by 
this  and  not  by  the  possession  of  any  soul-substance  I  am 
defined  and  created  a  self."* 

2.  The  self  then  has  no  absolutely  independent  being.  But 
in  distinction  from  Kant's  definition  of  self  as  merely  a  valid 
law  Royce  defines  it  as  a  life.  Its  individuality  is  gained  through 
its  relation  to  God.  Yet  in  Him  it  nevertheless  dwells  as  an 
individual.  It  is  an  unique  expression  of  the  divine  purpose. 
At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be  insisted  upon  that  in  the  present 
form  of  human  consciousness,  the  true  Self  of  any  individual 
man  is  an  ideal  rather  than  a  datum.  All  individual  lives,  plans 
and  experiences  find  their  unity  in  God.  They  do  so,  however, 
in  such  a  manner  that  there  is  but  one  ultimate  and  integrated 
Self,  that  of  the  Absolute.  Our  individuality  as  distinct  from 
other  individualities  is  retained  merely  in  so  far  as  our  life-plans 
are  mutually  contrasting  life-plans,  each  one  reaching  its  com- 
pletion only  as  it  recognizes  its  own  difference  from  other  life- 
plans.  The  self,  then,  is  never  found  as  a  completely  realized 
fact.  It  is  an  ideal,  having  its  true  place  in  the  eternal  world 
where  all  plans  have  their  fulfillment. 

The  degree  of  uniqueness  attaching  to  each  individual  life 
is  further  emphasized  by  Royce  in  maintaining  that  the  depend- 
ence of  the  self  means  simply  that  it  derives  from  the  other 
lives  everything  it  possesses  except  its  uniqueness,— "every- 
thing except  its  individual  fashion  of  acknowledging  and  taking 
interest  in  its  very  dependence,  and  of  responding  thereto  by  its 
deeds.  In  taking  your  place  among  men  you  must  derive  all 
of  your  life  from  elsewhere  except  in  so  far  as  your  life  becomes 
for  you  your  own  way  of  viewing  your  relation  to  the  whole,  and 
of  actively  expressing  your  own  ideal  regarding  this  relation. 
This  your  own  way  of  expressing  God's  will  is  not  derived.  It 
is  yourself.      And  it  is  yours  because  God  worketh  in  you."* 


M 


iRoyce.  The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  II,  p.  226. 
*Ibid,  vol.  II.  p.  293. 


30 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND  IMMORTAUTY 


ii 


This  purpose  of  yours  is  entirely  your  own,  therefore,  and  can 
be  shared  by  no  other.  It  is  underived,  because  directly  pro- 
duced in  you  by  the  God  whose  will  you  thus  uniquely  express 
in  the  totality  of  your  life-plan. 

3.  Royce  conceives  of  the  Absolute  as  a  Self,  in  its  form  "in- 
clusive of  an  infinity  of  various,  but  interwoven,  and  so  of  inter- 
communicating selves,  each  one  of  which  represents  the  totality 
of  the  Absolute  in  its  own  way  and  with  its  own  unity,  so  that 
the  simplest  conceivable  structure  of  the  Absolute  Life  would 
be  statable  only  in  terms  of  an  infinitely  great  variety  of  types 
of  purpose  and  of  fulfillment,  intertwined  in  the  most  complex 
fashion."*  Accordingly  he  holds  that  all  ignorance,  striving, 
defeat,  error,  narrowness,  and  so  on,  that  are  seen  in  us  are 
present  from  the  Absolute  point  of  view,  and  seen  in  unity  with 
the  overcoming  of  all  defeats,  ignorance,  error,  narrowness  and 
the  like.  If  it  be  asked,  then,  how  we  have  become  sundered 
from  the  Absolute  and  our  consciousness  narrowed,  it  is  replied, 
that  *'such  narrowness  must  find  its  place  within  the  Absolute 
life  in  order  that  the  Absolute  should  be  complete.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  the  Absolute,  the  finite  beings  never  fall  away,'" 
The  inseparable  aspect  of  a  man's  nature,  incapable  of  causal 
explanation,  is  that  which  finds  expression  in  his  resolve  to  be, 
in  God's  world,  himself  and  no  one  else.  But  in  this  will  to  be 
a  unique  individual,  God  also  wills  and  His  will  or  act,  whereby 
your  individuality  becomes  what  it  is  in  purpose  and  meaning, 
is  identical  with  your  own  individual  will.  Except  as  thus 
identical  it  does  not  exist.* 

Royce  therefore  concludes  his  discussion  of  the  Place  of  the 
Self  in  Being  by  laying  down  what  he  takes  to  be  the  deepest 
truth  that  religion  has  been  seeking  to  teach  humanity,  namely 
that  ''God  can  not  be  One  except  by  being  many,  nor  can  the 
various  selves  be  many  without  being  one  in  Him."* 

4a.  In  criticism  of  Royce's  discussion  of  the  finite  individual 
the  Absolute  it  is  to  be  urged  that  the  individual  is  so  completely 
relative  to  the  Absolute  and  is  so  dominated  by  the  Absolute 
that  the  element  of  uniqueness  is  largely  lost  to  view  and  the 
individual,  in  comparison,  is  nothing  but  a  phase,  an  aspect  of 

iRoyce.  The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  II.  p.  298. 
'Ibid.  vol.  II.  p.  302. 
«Ibid.  vol.  II.  p.  327. 
«Ibid.  vol.  II.  p.  331. 


IDEALISTIC   ANALYSIS   OF   HUMAN  INDIVIDUALITY 


31 


the  Over-Mind.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the  self  is  defined  as 
an  ideal  to  be  chosen  and  incorporated  in  the  life-plan  of  the 
individual,  and  that  the  Absolute  is  defined  as  a  complex 
interrelation  of  selves,  each  of  which  has  a  certain  measure  of 
uniqueness,  types  of  purpose  and  of  fulfillment,  intertwined  in 
the  most  complex  fashion.  But  what  is  thus  granted  appears 
to  be  again  withdrawn  when  it  is  maintained  that  "the  divine 
act  whereby  God  wills  your  individuality  ******  is  identical 
with  your  own  individual  will,  and  exists  not  except  as  thus 
identical."*  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  any  true  individuality 
can  be  adequately  maintained  upon  this  basis  as  having  any 
permanent  significance. 

b.  The  general  statement,  which  is  indeed  also  fundamental 
to  Royce's  discussion,  that  '*in  God  we  live  and  move  and  have 
our  being,"  probably  few  persons  would  be  disposed  to  deny. 
But  that  this  conception  involves  the  degree  of  identity  for 
which  Royce  contends  is  not  so  clear.  We  may  recognize  that 
the  ideals  which  find  expression  in  our  lives  exist  by  virtue  of 
the  divine  nature  and  the  divine  will,  we  may  admit  that  the 
modes  of  their  combination  and  the  general  behavior  of  our 
minds,  as  of  all  other  things,  find  their  possibility  in  the  crea- 
tive activity  of  God  and  that  the  power  which  brought  these 
into  being  constantly  upholds  them,  without  finding  in  these 
the  complete  expression  of  the  divine  life,  or  that  measure  of 
identity  by  which  every  human  thought  and  act  are  at  the  same 
time  God's  thought  and  God's  act.  The  family  may  be  taken 
in  a  general  sense  as  a  unit  in  which  the  will  of  its  head  is  ex- 
pressed. But  should  the  father  therefore  be  considered  ident- 
ical with  the  child,  or  the  child's  thought,  purpose  and  act  at 
the  same  time  the  father's? 

c.  The  degree  of  identity  between  the  human  individual  and 
the  Absolute  individual  upon  which  Royce  lays  so  much  em- 
phasis, and  indeed  any  identification  of  this  kind,  has  a  tend- 
ency to  confuse  ethical  distinctions.  If  my  thought  and  my 
act  may  properly  be  considered  at  the  same  time  God's  thought 
and  act,  so  that  God's  will  is  thus  identical  with  my  will,  "and 
exists  not  except  as  thus  identical,"  my  thought,  purpose  and 
act,  no  matter  what  their  ethical  character,  are  His.     God  thus 


^ 


>The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  II.  p.  327. 


32 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND  IMMORTALITY 


^ 


comes  to  have  the  same  moral  character  that  man  has.  and  the 
holiness  of  God  to  be  a  conception  largely  devoid  of  true  mean- 
ing. Logically  it  would  appear  also  that  man  must  be  exon- 
erated from  moral  guilt,  if  he  be  identical  with  God.  These 
are  deductions  which  Royce  probably  would  repudiate  or  from 
which  he  would  seek  to  vindicate  his  scheme  of  thought.  And 
it  may  be  that  the  doctrine  of  degrees  of  reality  is  susceptible 
of  an  interpretation  which  would  go  far  toward  breaking  the 
force  of  these  criticisms.  Nevertheless  the  fuller  development 
of  Royce's  doctrine  has  not  safeguarded  it  from  a  criticism  of 

this  character. 

One  might  question  also  whether  it  is  a  true  and  adequate 
expression  of  *'the  deepest  truth  which  religion  has  been  seeking 
to  teach  humanity/'  to  say  with  Royce,  this  truth  is  that 
God  cannot  be  One  except  by  being  many,  nor  can  the  various 
selves  be  many  without  being  one  in  Him.*'* 

d,  Royce's  presentation  of  the  meaning  of  individuality  fails 
to  satisfy  when  he  represents  the  self  as  '*this  possession  of  an 
ideal,  this  intent  always  to  remain  another  than  my  fellows 
despite  my  divinely  planned  union  with  them,"  and  when  he 
says  further,  "by  this  and  not  by  the  possession  of  any  soul-sub- 
stance 1  am  identified  and  created  a  self."'  One  inevitably 
thinks  of  an  existent,  call  it  soul-substance  or  what  you  may, 
in  which  this  purpose  inheres,  in  which  the  will  to  assert  a  certain 
uniqueness  finds  root.  Denying  this  there  is  no  recourse  but 
to  make  the  self  completely  one  with  the  Absolute,  so  com- 
pletely, in  fact  that  "the  divine  will  exists  not  except  as  thus 
identical"  with  my  individual  will.  Let  is  be  assumed  that 
the  individual  is  not  merely  the  special  purpose  of  the  Absolute, 
but  a  being  brought  into  existence  by  the  special  purpose  of 
the  Absolute  and  endowed  with  thought,  feeling  and  will  truly 
his  own  and  not  identical  with  that  of  some  other,  yet  pre- 
served and  upheld  by  the  thought  and  purpose  of  the  Omnip- 
otent, and  all  that  has  here  been  said  of  the  determination  in 
God's  world  to  express  "my  own  freely-chosen  life-plan"  becomes 
more  capable  of  being  consistently  thought  and  defended. 
Lacking  this  we  have  a  thorough-going  monism  indeed  but  not 
true  individuality. 


iRoyee,  The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  II.  p.  331. 
aind.  vol.  II.  p.  226. 


IDEALISTIC  ANALYSIS   OF   HUMAN   INDIVIDUALITY 


33 


I  have  been  much  pleased  to  find  that  this  general  criticism 
of  Royce  is  that  also  of  Prof.  A.  T.  Ormond  as  expressed  in 
his  recent  book  on  Concepts  of  Philosophy.  With  regard  to  the 
relation  of  the  conscious  individual  to  the  eternal  conscious- 
ness, Ormond  holds  that  the  individual  existence  is  grounded 
by  the  specialized  thought  and  purpose  of  the  divine.  This 
concentrated  meaning,  he  maintains,  liberates  the  energy  of 
of  which  I  am  conscious  as  my  energy.  "In  short,"  he  declares, 
"the  divine  energy  is  instUtUive  and  grounds  the  center  of  exis- 
tence and  conscious  energy  which  I  call  myself.  If  it  be  asked 
whether  the  divine  thought-purpose  that  institutes  me  is  identi- 
cal with  the  thoughts  and  purposes  which  I  form  and  under 
which  my  agency  is  exercised,  I  am  forced  to  deny  this  identity 
because  the  divine  idea-purpose  institutes  me,  the  existent,  and 
I  am  conscious  of  being  more  than  the  sum  of  my  thoitghts  and 
purposes.  There  is  a  permanent  backgroimd  or  inroot  of  these 
thoughts  and  purposes,  which  is  also  included  in  my  existence 
and  it  is  an  existent  that  is  thus  instituted."' 

These  existents,  he  holds,  are  related  to  each  other  by  inter- 
penetration,  not  by  identity.  A  certain  measure  of  self-assert- 
iveness  lies  at  the  center  of  the  existent,  by  which  the  individual 
is  kept  in  being  by  exclusion  of  other  individuals.  Inter- 
penetration  is  accomplished  by  means  of  representation  and 
sympathyj  the  instruments  for  which  are  tjnitation  and  sugges- 
tion, "The  great  lesson  we  need  to  learn  here,"  observes  Or- 
mond further,  "is  that  we  may  enter  into  the  life  of  our  fellow 
and  influence  it  to  any  extent,  without  ever  becoming  identical 
with  him  or  actually  thinking  his  thoughts  or  feeling  his  emo- 
tions. The  category  of  interpenetration  is  not  identity  but 
community, ^*^ 

e.  The  individual  is,  then,  not  merely  a  specialized  purpose 
of  the  Absolute  but  the  existent  intended  by  this  specialized 
purpose.  The  relation  to  the  eternal  is  that  of  an  instituted 
individual  capable  of  thoughts  and  purposes  of  its  own.  The 
divine  idea-purposes,  Ormond  teaches,  are  related  to  the  finite 
idea-purposes  by  inclusion,  not  by  identity.  There  are,  then, 
two  purposes,  not  one,  and  being  coexistent  they  are  liable  to 
collide.     One  of  these  however  is  certain  to  triumph. 


li 


*Ormond,  A.  T.,  Concepts  of  Philosophy,  p.  522. 
>Ibid.  p.  624. 


34 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM  AND   IMMORTAUTY 


f.  In  relation  to  the  eternal  the  individual  is  thus  seen  to  be 
a  free  cause.  He  has  the  power  of  moral  choice  and  this  power 
of  choice  rests  on  the  prior  assent  to  the  ethical  demand  or  law 
as  obligatory.  One  can,  if  he  will,  choose  to  disregard  his  duty, 
thus  violating  the  ethical  law.  All  this  is  within  the  province 
of  the  individual.  Accordingly  he  is  a  true  cause  and  brings 
results  into  the  world  which  may  even  be  in  opposition  to  the 
will  of  the  Eternal.' 

II.     The  apparent  instability  of  the  organic  unity  of  the  mind, 

1.  A  further  difficulty  in  the  way  of  conceiving  of  the  mind  as 
an  organized  system  of  purposes  at  various  stages  of  realization, 
yet  as  genuinely  and  organically  one,  arises  from  a  group  of 
facts  of  great  interest,  but  imperfectly  understood.  They  are 
connected  iJ^'ith  the  study  of  multiple  personality  or  dissociation, 
a  field  of  investigation  in  mental  phenomena  that  is  receiving 
more  attention  at  the  present  time  than  ever  before.*  From 
the  imperfect  state  of  investigation  into  these  phenomena  it 
seems  fair  to  conclude  that  it  is  too  early  to  claim  finality  for 
any  interpretation  of  them  that  has  yet  been  advanced. 

2.  The  facts  here  referred  to  are  those  connected  with  what 
is  commonly  termed  dual  or  multiple  personality,  in  which  two 
or  more  "selves'*  are  developed,  each  ha\dng  widely  different 
characteristics  but  little  or  no  common  memory.  In  most 
cases  so  far  studied,  they  appear  as  successive  states,  in  a  few 
instances  as  coexistent  and  alternating  selves,  each  having 
well  marked  characteristics  of  its  own.  The  closer  investiga- 
tion of  these  cases  goes  to  show  that  they  are  dissociated  states 
of  the  primary  self,  and  ultimately  resolvable  into  that  primary 
and  more  normal  person.  Hence  the  general  title,  dissociation, 
is  more  accurate  than  dual  or  multiple  personality.  However, 
they  raise  a  number  of  interesting  questions  concerning  the 
nature  of  individuality  and  its  true  stablity. 

3.  Dissociation  follows  along  the  lines  of  taste,  or  mood. 

>Onnond,  A.  T.,  Concepts  of  Philosophy,  p.  529. 

Tlie  literature  of  this  subject,  on  this  account,  is  somewhat  meai^.  Several  well 
authenticated  cases  of  dual  or  multiple  personality  are  cited  by  James  in  his  Elements  of 
Psychology,  vol.  I,  Chap.  X.  Among  other  interesting  studies  of  this  character  may  be 
mentioned  Binet's  AUerati<m»  of  Per$onal%ty;  Sidis  and  Goodhart's  Af  utt»pto  Pertonality; 
Jastrow's  The  Subeonteiou*;  Morton  Prince,  The  Di99ociation  of  a  Penonaaiy.  The  last 
named  forms  the  descriptive  part  of  a  larger  work  Problemt  in  Abnormal  Ptydidloay.  It 
ii  a  highly  interesting  study  of  a  very  complicated  case  of  dissociation,  and  is  to  oe  fol- 
lowedby  a  volume  dealing  with  the  theory  of  this  case  and  with  kindred  phenomena  in 
the  field  of  atmormal  psychology. 


IDEALISTIC   ANALYSIS   OF    HUMAN   INDIVIDUALITY 


35 


», 


So  far  as  the  study  of  these  cases  has  gone,  it  has  apparently  not 
been  found  to  occur  along  moral  lines  to  any  marked  degree,  so 
that  the  case  of  Dr.  Jekyl  and  Mr.  Hyde  still  exists  solely  in 
fiction.  An  altered  personality  may  be  nothing  more  than 
the  exaggeration  of  a  mood  of  the  dominant  temper.  Jastrow^ 
likens  these  defections  to  the  sprouts  of  budding  personalities, 
which,  if  grafted  upon  a  suitable  stem  may  under  favorable 
circumstances,  send  forth  distinctive  flower  and  fruit.  There 
is  this  difference,  however,  that  an  altered  personality  may 
become  an  alternate  personality,  or,  carr)ring  out  the  figure, 
the  tree  that  bore  plums  today  may  tomorrow  bear  prunes  or 
apricots.  For  the  recurrence  of  secondary  personality  there 
must  be  a  recurrent  and  systematized  liability  to  these  lapsed 
states,  so  that  there  comes  to  be  acquired  a  memory  capable  of 
integrating  events,  and  an  avenue  of  assimilation  and  expres- 
sion through  the  new  personality  gaining  control  of  the  sensory 
and  muscular  systems.  There  is  also  found  some  participation 
in  the  endowments,  acquisitions  and  habits  of  the  original  and 
primary  self.  In  a  true  sense  all  personality  is  acquired.  Not 
merely  nature  but  nurture  also  enters  into  the  development  of 
the  individual.  He  is  the  sum  total  both  of  what  he  has  inher- 
ited and  of  what  he  has  acquired. 

4.  The  case  of  Miss  Beauchamp,  studied  by  Prince,  has  furn- 
ished ground  for  the  conclusion  that  the  possible  extent  of  dis- 
sociation is  almost  without  limit.  Such  at  least  is  the  conclusion 
reached  by  Prince  himself.  In  his  treatment  of  the  case,  ex- 
tending over  a  period  of  eight  or  nine  years,  by  accident,  hypno- 
tism, or  other  means,  no  less  than  five  or  six  "selves''  were  devel- 
oped or  discovered.  No  one  of  these  possessed  the  proper 
characteristics  of  a  normal  person,  however,  and  all  were  sub- 
sequently resolved  back  into  the  self  from  which  they  had  sprung 
until  finally  the  true  primary  individual  was  restored. 

5.  The  study  of  these  various  cases  of  dissociation  suggests 
that  the  range  of  our  subconscious  life  is  vastly  greater  than  has 
ordinarily  been  supposed.  In  the  case  of  Miss  Beauchamp,  B 
III  or  Sally,  who  had  a  strong  dislike  io:  her  other  selves,  par- 
ticularly for  "the  saint",  B  II,  maintained  that  her  own  separate 
consciousness  extended  back  as  far  as  Miss  Beauchamp 's  early 
childhood.     She  appears  as  the  impersonation  of  "the  spirit 


31 


*The  Subconscious,  pp.  464-529. 


1 


'4 

It 


I 

t 

i 

iri 


36 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND  IMMORTALITY 


IDEALISTIC   ANALYSIS   OF    HUMAN   INDIVIDUALITY 


37 


that  contradicts."  At  times  she  is  the  dominant  "self".  Then 
again  she  is  superseded  by  the  more  normal  B  I.  In  the  final 
restoration  she  accepts  her  place  in  the  subconscious  life,  still 
liable,  however,  to  reappear  when  mental  strain  or  great  emo- 
tion tends  to  bring  about  dissociation  of  the  primary  self. 

6.  That  the  individual  is  in  some  sense  the  organized  express- 
ion of  a  system  of  ideals  and  purposes  in  very  intimate  relation 
with  the  body  is  the  natural,  and  perhaps  the  only  satisfactory 
conclusion  which  can  be  drawn  from  these  and  like  facts  relat- 
ing to  the  subconscious  life. 

It  appears  likewise  that  the  personal  ego,  the  I  of  conversation, 
is  an  index  or  function  of  the  personality  rather  than  the  whole 
of  the  personal  life  or  self.  It  reflects  the  dominant  state  or 
the  passing  mood.  Accordingly  it  is  found  in  the  service  of  all 
the  various  selves  into  which  the  primary  self  may  be  resolved. 

7.  Dissociation  has  usually  been  attended  with  results  that 
are  destructive,  so  long  at  least  as  the  dissociated  state  con- 
tinues. The  new  self  is  narrowed  in  outlook  and  compara- 
tively helpless  except  as  it  is  permitted  to  develop,  but  it  is  never, 
or  rarely,  a  normal  self.  In  a  few  instances,  however,  as  in  the 
case  of  Mary  Reynolds,  studied  by  Dr.  Weir  Mitchell,  the  result 
of  apparent  dissociation  has  been  beneficent,  indicating  an  early 
inhibition  afterward  removed. 

The  conclusion  to  which  the  study  of  dissociation  of  per- 
sonality tends  is,  as  noted  above,  that  of  the  idealist,  namely 
that  the  mind  is  a  unity  expressive  of  ideals  and  purposes,  not 
all  of  which  come  to  mature  development  or  dominate  the  life. 
Many  of  these  are  continually  repressed.      The  facts  of  dis- 
sociation reveal  in  an  impressive  manner  the  complexity  of  that 
unity.    That  physical  accidents  or  great  mental  strain,  or  in- 
tense emotion  may  occasion  a  certain   measure  of  apparent 
disintegration  does  not  indicate  a  permanent  instability  in'  the 
unity  of  the  mind,  or  that  it  is  merely  the  expression  of  physical 
functions.      It  points  rather  to  the  temporary  inefficiency  of 
the  physical  organism  to  afford  it  normal  expression.     Conse- 
quently when  the  effects  of  accident  have  been  removed,  or 
have  been  overcome,  or  when  improved  health  has  succeeded 
to  an  abnormal  physical  condition  or  other  causes  of  dissocia- 
tion have  been  removed,  the  mind  comes  to  its  normal  expression 
once  more.    It  may  well  be,  therefore,  that  after   death   has 


intervened,  a  development  of  our  personality  will  occur  in  which 
the  suppressed  possibilities  will  find  their  complete  fulfillment 
and  this  individual  come  to  a  perfected  realization  of  all  his 

capacities. 

A  further  difficulty  in  the  way  of  conceiving  the  unity  and 
permanent  stability  of  the  human  mind  arise  from  the  physical 
side  and   will  be  discussed  at  length  in  the  next  chapter. 


38 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  AND  IMMORTAUTY 


CHAPTER  II. 


THE  HUMAN  MIND  AND  THE  NATURAL  ORDER 


39 


l»  ' 


The  Human  Mind  and  the  Natural  Order. 

I.  The  finite  individual  and  the  physical  imivene.  The  eternity  of 
man  and  energy  in  contrast  with  the  ephemeral  nature  of  the  physical  mdi- 
vidual.    The  application  of  the  categories  of  physical  science  to  human  life 

and  development.  .      .    ,  .     .         »#     •      i        • 

II.  The  apparent  dependence  of  mmd  upon  body.  Man  s  place  in 
nature.  The  problem  grows  out  of  the  close  and  intimate  relation  of  mmd 
and  body.  Is  this  dependence  final?     Need  of  closer  definition  of  the  terms 

iified« 

III.  The  body.  The  popular  view  recognizes  reality  ef  both  mind  and 
body  but  is  dualistic.  The  naturalistic  view  connects  the  body  with  otvanie 
life  in  general  Critique  of  naturalistic  view;  idealistic  elements  involved. 
The  idealistic  view:  an  objective  expression  of  mind  through  which  ex- 
perience arises  in  perceptive  life;  exists  for  and  is  sustained  by  the  Abswute, 
possesses  a  relatively  low  degree  of  realitv. 

IV.  The  mind.  The  popular  view  of  mmd,  the  center  of  personality, 
intimately  connected  with  the  body  but  never  completely  so.  The  natural- 
istic view  of  mind.mind  as  the  product  of  brain  function.  Criticism  of  this 
view.  The  idealistic  view  of  mmd:  manifestation  of  mind  in  imperfect  ex- 
pression; defined  in  terms  of  teleology;  in  close  relation  with  physical  object* 
which,  like  mind  itself,  are  maintained  by  the  Absolute.    ,  ^  ^  . 

V.  Mutual  relations  of  body  and  mmd.  Difficulty  of  definmg  satisfac- 
torily. Need  of  keeping  in  view  that  body  and  mind  manifest  the  Abswute 
Indifferent  degrees  of  reality.  Their  relations  not  necessarily  paraUel.  The 
true  relation  m  to  be  found  In  some  form  of  Interactionlsm.  Bradley  s  con- 
clusions. Nevertheless  the  mind,  being  the  more  complete  expression  of  the 
mind  of  the  Absolute,  Is  more  fundamental  than  the  body  and  capable  of 
surviving  It. 

I.     The  finite  individual  and  the  physical  universe. 

1.  In  the  physical  world,  we  are  assured,  the  things  that  are 
truly  permanent  are  few.  Among  the  most  important  of  these 
are  mass  and  energy.  It  was  formerly  maintained  that  the 
so-called  elements  are  equally  stable  and  enduring,  but  through 
the  discoveries  of  Ramsay  and  Rutherford  this  position  has 
been  considerably  modified.  It  has  been  ascertained  that 
radium,  for  example,  can  change  into  helium  and  another  sub- 
stance unknown  as  yet.  The  investigations  of  Rutherford 
disclosed  a  whole  series  of  elements  having  similar  character- 
istics. These  facts  are  recognized  as  teaching  that  some  ele- 
ments are  decidedly  mortal.  But  not  so  mass  and  energy. 
These  at  least  are  held  to  be  eternal.  For  the  physical  scientist 
this  means  that,  just  as,  under  no  known  circumstances  has  the 
amount  of  mass  or  the  amount  of  energy  changed,  so  no  circum- 
stance will  occur  in  future  that  will  cause  such  a  change.    The 


scientist  recognizes  the  impossibility  of  demonstrating  an  event 
which  mav  occur  in  the  remote  future,  but  bases  his  conclusion 
upon  reasonable  prediction  growing  out  of  past  experience. 

What  is  equally  impressed  upon  the  physical  scientist,  m 
addition  to  the  apparent  eternity  of  mass  and  energy,  is  the 
ephemeral  nature  of  the  individual.    If  two  different  masses 
are  combined  the  resulting  mass  is  found  to  behave  hke  the 
8um  of  the  two  single  masses.    This  is  simply  the  consequence 
of  the  conservation  of  mass.     But  though  the  two  masses  re- 
tain their  quantity,  their  individuality  is  lost.    Similarly,  if 
two  glasses  of  water  be  poured  into  one  vessel,  the  sum  of  the 
two  is  obtained,  but  their  individuality  has  disappeared.    If 
the  glasses  be  refilled  there  is  no  possible  means  of  determimng 
whether  the  water  in  each  glass  is  now  the  same  water  that  was 
there  before.    The  question  of  individuality  here  is  without 
meaning,  since  there  is  no  means  of  seeking  out  the  individu^ 
particles  of  water  and  identifying  them.    Even  if  the  atoms 
could  be  separated  it  would  be  impossible  to  identify  them 
since,  by  definition,  they  are  all  alike  in  shape,  weight,  and  other 
properties.    The  same  conclusion  is  held  for  energy. 

2    This  law,  generally  admitted  as  applicable  to  the  physical 
world,  the  physicist  is  very  apt  to  regard  as  applicable  also  to 
humaii  development.     For  him  the  difficulty  in  its  application 
arises  from  insufficient  means    to    measure   homogeneity  and 
heterogeneity  in  human  affairs.    Ostwald,  for  e^^'f  •  ^J^ 
tains  :    "It  seems  pretty  certain  that  increase  of  culture  tends 
to  diminish  the  differences  between  men.     It  equalizes  not  only 
the  general  standards  of  lining,  but  attenuates  also  even  the 
natufal  differences  of  sex  and  age.    *****  *  Now  if  we  recall 
the  happiest  moments  of  our  lives,  they  will  be  found  m  every 
case  to  be  connected  with  a  curious  loss  of  personahty.    In  tne 
happiness  of  love  this  fact  will  be  at  once  discovered     And  if 
you  are  enjoying  intensely  a  work  of  art,  a  symphony  of  Beetho- 
Ws  for  eSmple,  you  find  yourself  relieved  of  the  burden  of 
personality  and  carried  away  by  the  stream  of  music  as  a  drop 
is  carried  by  a  wave.      The  same  feeling  comes  with  th«  g^aj« 
impressions  nature  gives  us.    Even  when  I  am  sitting  qmetly 
sketching  in  the  open  there  comes  to  me  in  a  happy  moment  a 

K3omp«.  Ctwdd'.  IntenwU  L«tar..  IndivausUty  ^  ImmortJity.    Ho«,h»«i. 
lliiBin  &  Co^  Boston,  Mass. 


40 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTAUTT 


THE    HUMAN    MIND   AND   THE    NATURAL  ORDER 


41 


sweet  feeling  of  being  united  with  the  nature  about  me,  which 
is  completely  characterized  by  complete  forge tfulness  of  my 
poor  self.  We  may  conclude  from  this  that  individuality  means 
limitations  and  unhappiness,  or  is  at  least  closely  connected 
with  them!"' 

3.  If  this  statement  from  Ostwald  appears  to  go  beyond  the 
realm  of  the  physical  into  the  metaphysical,  we  may  turn 
to  the  physiologist  or  to  the  psychologist  who  maintains  that 
what  we  call  mind  is  simply  a  system  of  nerve  reactions,  devel- 
oped among  the  ancestors  of  man  during  the  long  ages  of  the 
past  and  so  deeply  imbedded  in  the  nervous  organization  that 
they  now  occur  in  this  particular  manner  and  in  no  other. 
Thought,  being  functioned  by  the  brain,  it  follows  that  what 
we  commonly  call  mind  is  merely  a  series  of  bodily  phenomena 
and  has  no  separate  existence.  When  the  brain  has  ceased  to 
act,  thought  for  that  individual,  is  forever  at  an  end.  There  is 
no  permanent  self-identity,  but  man  surrenders  up  ''his  in- 
dividual being, 

To  mix  forever  with  the  elements. 

To  be  a  brother  to  the  insensible  rock, 

And  to  the  sluggish  clod  which  the  rude  swain 

Turns  with  his  share  and  treads  upon." 

II.     The  apparent  dependence  of  the  mind  on  the  body. 

1,  The  problem  here  presented  grows  cut  of  the  intimate  rela- 
tion between  body  and  mind.  At  no  period  of  life  does  the  mind 
appear  wholly  free  from  the  states  of  the  body.  In  infancy  the 
mental  powers  are  as  rudimentary  as  the  physical.  They  ex- 
pand as  the  body  develops.  Important  physical  changes  at  the 
critical  periods  of  life  are  accompanied  by  corresponding  mental 
changes.  Certain  mental  activities  have  their  seat  in  corre- 
sponding fixed  areas  of  the  brain.  An  undeveloped  brain  goes 
with  imbecility.  Old  age  is  accompanied  not  only  with  physical 
debility  but  also  with  loss  of  mental  vigor.  Memory  fails  and 
the  reasoning  powers  become  enfeebled.  Bryant  is  said  to 
have  ceased  to  write  poetry  after  the  age  of  fifty  and  to  have 
begun  the  translation  of  Homer  because,  in  his  opinion, old  age 
is  not  conducive  to  creative  activity. 

2.  The  question  very  naturally  arises,  therefore,  as  to  how 

lOstwald,  Indiriduatity  and  Immortality  pp.  44-46. 


these  two  series  of  facts  are  related  to  each  other.  Are  the 
bodily  conditions  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  corresponding  mental 
phenomena  that  attend  them?  If  so  then  what  we  term  mind 
appears  to  have  a  purely  ephemeral  existence.  When  age  and 
decay  shall  have  done  their  work  upon  the  physical  frame  and 
the  body  shall  be  dissolved  into  the  elements  of  which  it  is  com- 
posed, the  mind  likewise,  as  the  effect  of  its  activities,  will  have 
perished.  Having  had  no  prior  existence  and  no  independent 
being  it  can  have  none  now.  It  is  in  daily  peril  also,  equally 
with  the  body,  from  every  chance  accident  arising  from  the 
hostile  working  of  the  same  nature  that  built  up  the  body,  work- 
ing now  through  storm,  now  through  excessive  heat  or  cold,  now 
through  the  ravages  of  disease. 

3.  It  is  frequently  pointed  out  that  to  establish  a  causal  relation 
of  this  character  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  sciences  of  nature, 
that,  in  the  field  of  mental  phenomena,  or  in  the  borderland 
between  the  mental  and  the  physical,  natural  science  can  do  no 
more  legitimately  than  to  recognize  that  the  two  series  of  phenom- 
ena are  concomitant,  that  when  an  event  belonging  to  one 
series  occurs,  a  corresponding  event  belonging  to  the  other 
occurs  with  it.  And  even  this  is  methodological,  rather  than 
ontological.  To  go  beyond  this  is  to  enter  the  province  of 
metaphysical  speculation.  Of  course  it  is  not  expected  that 
the  inquiring  mind  will  pause  in  its  search  for  ultimate  truth  at 
this  stage.  It  will  seek  something  further  whether  that  some- 
thing be  labeled  scientific  or  metaphysical.  We  are  here  simply 
recognizing  the  limitation^  of  scientific  method. 

If  these  changes  be  concomitant  two  explanations  of  them 
seem  possible.  They  may  both  be  produced  from  one  cause 
lying  further  back,  which  reveals  itself  on  the  one  hand  as  physi- 
cal, on  the  other  as  mental,— the  doctrine  of  parallelism.  Or 
they  may  be  regarded  as  so  disparate  in  their  nature  as  to  be 
measurably  independent  each  of  the  other,  in  the  sense  of  not 
being  involved  in  the  other's  fate,  while  each  is  intimately  bound 
up  with  the  other,  acts  upon  the  other,  and  in  turn  is  acted  upon 
in  a  vast  variety  of  ways.  This  doctrine  of  interactionism  has 
been  held  in  several  forms.  It  is  frequently  held  in  a  dualistic 
form  as  just  outlined.  It  is  held  also  in  an  idealistic  form  in 
that  the  body  is  regarded  as  an  objective  expression  of  mind  for 
the  purposes  of  its  perceptive  life,  and  that,  as  such,  it  exists  for 


^ 


■r 


42 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND  IMMOBTAUTY 


THE    HUMAN    MIND   AND   THE    NATURAL   ORDER 


43 


I 

H 


and  is  maintained  by  the  mind  as  Absolute.  It  is  in  this  form 
that  the  interactionist  theory  of  the  relation  of  the  body  to  the 
mind  possesses  chief  interest  for  us. 

However,  it  has  doubtless  become  evident  that,  before  any 
satisfactory  headway  can  be  made  in  setting  forth  the  mutual 
relations  of  mind  and  body,  or  the  place  of  the  human  mind  in 
the  order  of  nature,  a  closer  definition  of  both  mind  and  body  is 
needed. 

III.     The  body. 

1.  The  popular  view  of  the  body  makes  of  it  an  object  sepa- 
rate from  the  mind.  It  is  the  instrument  of  the  latter,  not  in 
the  sense  that  the  mind  is  essentially  in  need  of  such  a  means  of 
expressing  its  activity,  but  more  in  the  sense  that  for  purposes 
of  the  present  life  amid  physical  surroundings  it  is  the  medium 
of  the  mind's  self-expression.  The  body,  therefore,  is  in  no 
proper  sense  to  be  identified  with  the  mind.  It  occupies  space, 
requires  a  certain  amount  of  food  to  keep  it  in  health,  and  a 
certain  amount  of  activity  in  order  to  maintain  its  vitality  in 
normal  condition.  The  human  body  is  material  in  its  structure, 
and  is  subject  to  the  laws  which  control  matter  in  all  its  forms. 
It  is  in  no  sense  the  true  person,  but  is  often  regarded  as  some- 
thing of  an  encumbrance,  so  that,  when  at  last  death  intervenes, 

the  true  self  is  set  free. 

As  little  need  be  said  in  exposition  of  the  popular  view  of 
the  body  so  also  the  criticism  of  it  may  be  brief.  Its  dualism 
is  so  transparent  as  to  give  it  no  place  in  serious  philosophical 
or  scientific  thought.  It  recognizes  body  and  mind  as  separate 
modes  of  being  and  in  this  respect  approaches  somewhat  the 
position  of  the  idealist.  But  while  it  recognizes  a  certain 
mutual  relation  and  interaction  between  mind  and  body  it  gives 
no  adequate  explanation  whatever  of  that  relation. 

2.  The  naturalistic  view  of  the  body  has  been  partly  outlined 
above.  It  takes  fuller  notice  of  the  various  activities  of  the 
body  and  of  the  relations  which  these  sustain  to  what  we  have 
commonly  regarded  as  the  mind.  But  the  term  mind  is  one 
with  which  the  naturalistic  writer  seeks  to  dispense  as  of  com- 
paratively little  service.  Or  he  redefines  it  in  terms  of  neural 
adjustments.  The  body,  under  this  view,  is  the  product  of 
evolution  through  long  ages  and  a  variety  of  forms  of  organic 


life.  In  the  long  process  its  modes  of  activity  have  become 
clearly  defined.  ^A  nervous  system  has  been  built  up,  which 
controls  the  varied  movements  of  the  body  by  means  of  a 
system  of  reactions  the  most  complex.  Governing  and  direct- 
ing all  as  a  sort  of  clearing  house  for  the  redirection  of  motions, 
the  brain  rules.  It  is  the  central  organ  which  regulates  our 
activities.  The  type  of  body  thus  developed  through  the  ages 
shows  traces  of  redundant  organs.  But  while  it  is  still  capable 
of  a  certain  degree  of  further  perfection  it  is  securely  established 

in  the  order  of  nature. 

The  naturalistic  view  marks  an  advance  over  the  popular 
view  of  the  body.     It  recognizes  that  no  dualistic  view  can  be 
permanently  satisfactory.     It  has  a  keen  appreciation  also  of 
the  intimate  connection  between  the  body  and  what  is  commonly 
termed    mind.     The    difficulty    arises    when    the    naturalistic 
scientist  sets  out  to  treat  the  mind  in  terms  of  physical  matter 
alone,  to  interpret  it  as  an  adjective  of  the  body.     Naturalism 
stands  for  the  doctrine  that  the  phase  of  the  world  presented 
at  the  level  of  the  physical  is  a  final  reading  of  nature.    It  fails 
to  find  any  deeper  reality  and  provides  no  place  for  a  recogni- 
tion of  ideal  factors  guiding  the  development  of  the  physical. 
It  is  curious  and  interesting  to  observe,  therefore,  how  the  ideal 
avenges  itself  of  this  neglect  particularly  in  the  fuller  exposition 
of  the  subject  now  before  us,  involved  in  the  naturalistic  theories 
of  transmission  through  heredity. 

Spencer  accounted  for  the  facts  of  heredity,  as  well  as  for 
the  restoration  of  lost  parts  of  certain  animals,  by  assuming  the 
existence  of  physiological  units  in  each  of  which  there  is  an 
intrinsic  aptitude  to  develop  the  particular  forms  of  the  given 
species,  just  as  the  atoms  of  a  salt  crystallize  in  a  particular 
way.  These  units,  far  more  complex  than  molecules  permeate 
the  organism.  Reproduction  is  rendered  possible  through  the 
physiological  units  contained  in  the  gprm.  In  different  species 
the  units  are  of  different  kinds.  In  one  body  they  are  of  the 
same  kind  but  differently  arranged  for  producing  the  various 
parts  under  the  guiding  influence  of  the  whole.  It  is  objected 
to  this  explanation  of  heredity  that,  while  it  keeps  in  view  the 
end  to  be  attained,  it  fails  to  point  out  the  means  sufficiently 
and  their  organic  connection  with  the  goal  of  the  process. 


44 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


#i 


!•   ) 


I'l     ■. 


Spencer's  error  was  an  excess  of  the  idealistic  element  in  an 
abstract  form. 

Darwin's  theory  of  pangenesis  was  free  from  the  strongest 
objections  to  Spencer's  view  of  heredity.  It  teaches  that  all 
the  cells  of  the  organism  throw  off  minute  gemmules  which, 
through  mutual  affinity,  cluster  together  and  under  proper 
conditions  reproduce  the  tissues  and  organs  from  which  each 
individual  gemmule  was  originally  derived.  In  criticism  of 
Darwin  it  is  urged  that  he  pointed  out  the  means  for  the  develop- 
ment of  the  new  individual,  but  the  theory  of  pangenesis  does 
not  point  out  sufficiently  the  organic  relation  to  the  plan  of  the 
whole  to  be  carried  out  through  them.  The  theory  furnishes 
a  mechanical  basis  for  accounting  for  the  facts,  but  the  ideal- 
istic element  is  clearly  and  necessarily  presupposed. 

Weismann's  theory,  which  is  more  widely  current  than 
either  of  the  foregoing,  assumes  the  existence  of  a  germ  plasm 
which  is  continuous  from  parent  to  offspring  and  remains  un- 
changed in  the  latter.  This  germ  plasm  is  naturally  immortal, 
dying  only  by  accident,  whereas  the  cells  forming  the  body  die 
of  their  own  nature.  In  Weismann's  theory  there  is  a  synthesis 
of  the  directing  totality  with  the  mechanical  means  organic  to 
that  totality.  We  find  at  once  an  idealistic  and  a  mechanical 
element  in  S3mthesis.  Whether  this  S3mthesis  is  complete  or 
not  the  students  of  the  logic  of  biology  must  determine. 

In  all  these  explanations,  attempting  as  they  do  to  account, 
upon  a  mechanical  basis,  for  the  development  of  life,  the  ideal 
persistently  obtrudes.  It  is  the  continuance  of  the  general  type 
that  is  to  be  explained.  How  is  it  that  the  creature  newly 
brought  into  being  conforms  to  the  type  of  the  parents,  and  is 
not  made  up  of  parts  confusedly  related  to  each  other?  It  is 
not,  indeed,  the  old  conception  of  purpose,  taught  by  Paley  and 
his  successors,  of  an  external  purpose  realized  by  direct  creation. 
It  is  that  of  immanent  design  through  mediate  creation  or  develop- 
ment. Nature  cannot  otherwise  be  understood  than  through 
this  conception  of  immanent  purpose.  Even  the  inorganic 
world  reveals  plan  in  its  arrangement  and  in  the  adjustment  of 
part  to  whole.  Without  the  aid  of  this  conception  of  purpose  the 
organic  world  would  be  even  more  difficult  of  explanation  than 
the  inorganic.  The  organism  is  a  unit  whose  every  part  sub- 
serves the  plan  of  the  whole.    In  the  idea  of  a  formative  hered- 


J* 

li'; 


THE    HUMAN    MIND  AND   THE    NATURAL  ORDER  45 

itary  substance  mechanism  is  combined  with  teleology  and 
finds  its  significance  in  it.  These  units  have  their  "tendency" 
to  form  organisms.  But  "tendency"  and  "influence,"  though 
inhering  in  the  material  unit  or  germ,  are  not  themselves  material. 
In  the  final  analysis  they  exhibit  the  thought  and  will  of  the 
Absolute.  The  laws  which  they  follow  in  their  working  are  the 
manifestations  of  the  Divine  Mind. 

3.  Some  further  definition  of  the  body,  is,  therefore,  needed 
than  that  offered  by  naturalism,  one  which  will  give  fitting  and 
full  expression  to  the  idealistic  elements  within  the  naturalistic 
conception  itself.     This  need  the  idealist  endeavors  to  supply. 
To  the   absolute  idealist  the  human  body,  like  the  entire 
order  of  nature,  is  an  outward  expression  of  mind.     It  has  come 
to  its  present  form  through  an  evolution  extending  through 
many  ages.     But  at  no  stage  could  it  be  considered  in  any  sense 
self-subsistent.     It  expresses  the  purposes  of  mind.     The  human 
body  is  the  instrument  through  which  the  mind  as  finite  attains 
outward  expression.     As  all  lower  forms  of  organic  and  inorganic 
existence  have  their  meaning  in  the  life  of  the  Absolute  so  also 
does  the  body  of  man.     It  is  the  medium  through  which  arise 
the  sense-perceptions  in  which  the  human  mind  discovers  order 
and  significance,  and  which  it  employs  for  its  various  purposes. 
Its  preservation  is  due  to  the  activity  of  the  Absolute.     It  is 
through  the  Universal  Mind  and  by  it  that  these  bodies  are 
successively  developed  and,  when  they  have  served  their  pur- 
pose,  are  in  turn  laid  aside. 

The  body,  therefore,  is  the  medium  for  the  activity  of  the 
Absolute  at  the  same  time  that  it  serves  the  finite  mind;  for  it 
is  by  means  of  the  human  individual,  therefore  also  of  the  human 
body,  that  the  Absolute  becomes  expressed  within  human  rela- 
tions in  the  time-space  world.  ,    j     .     • 

The  degree  of  reality  which  belongs  to  the  body  is,  m 
consequence,  of  a  relatively  low  order.  It  is  in  no  sense  a  final 
form  of  being.  Since  it  exists  simply  to  serve  certain  ends, 
these  ends  once  fulfilled  the  reasons  for  its  existence  are  satis- 
fied and  its  individuality  is  surrendered.  In  the  end,  therefore, 
according  to  the  absolute  idealist,  the  body  has  no  abiding 
reality. 


^' 


46 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  AND  IMMORTALITY 


THE   HUMAN   MIND  AND   THE   NATURAL  ORDER 


47 


IV.     The  mind. 


1.  The  view  of  the  mind  commonly  held  regards  it  as  the  seat 
of  true  personality.  It  is  an  entity  separate  from  the  body  and 
measurably  independent  of  it.  It  is  the  seat  of  the  emotional 
life,  of  thought  and  of  will.  It  is  preeminently  the  person.  It 
is  the  soul,  the  immaterial  part  of  man  which  survives  the  body 
at  death.  Intimately  joined  to  the  body  it  is  powerfully  influ- 
enced by  the  states  of  the  latter,  but  it  is  not  wholly  subject  to 
these.  It  possesses  within  itself  the  power  to  defy  the  physical 
state  when  interest  impels  it  to  do  so,  and,  upon  the  destruction 
of  the  body,  is  set  free  to  follow  its  own  characteristic  life. 

2.  The  view  of  the  mind  taken  by  the  biologist  and  the 
physiological  psychologist,  as  already  remarked,  starts  from 
the  physical  states  of  the  body  as  forming  the  basis  of  what 
we  call  mind.  They  have  noted  the  relation  of  imbecility 
to  defective  brain  development,  and  the  effect  upon 
memory  or  consciousness  occasioned  by  blows  on  the 
head.  They  have  investigated  the  influence  of  ether, 
mescal  and  other  stimulants  and  drugs  upon  the  quality  of  one's 
ideas.  Starting  from  these  admitted  facts  they  have  concluded 
that  thought  is  simply  the  product  of  brain  function.  These 
thoughts,  to  be  sure,  are  related  to  each  other,  but  they  are  so 
related  because  of  their  relation  to  the  physical  organism.  The 
special  forms  of  our  thinking  are  traceable  to  special  sections 
of  the  brain.  When  we  think  of  things  we  have  seen,  one  part 
of  the  brain  is  active,  when  of  things  we  have  heard,  another 
portion  of  the  brain  is  at  work.  The  emotional  life  is  occasioned 
by  still  other  parts  of  the  brain.  The  success  that  has  thus  far 
attended  the  investigations  along  these  lines,  has  inspired  the 
belief  that  ultimately  all  the  activities  of  the  mind  will  be  ex- 
plained in  terms  of  brain  function  and  nerve  reaction.  Mind 
will  then  have  become  a  negligible  term.  If  still  retained  in 
scientiflc  discussion  it  will  be  retained  much  as  we  continue  to 
speak  of  the  rising  and  setting  of  the  sun  notwithstanding  that 
astronomy  has  shown  this  form  of  speech  to  be  founded  upon 
an  illusion. 

The  naturalistic  view  of  mind  rests  upon  the  assumption 
that  the  term  function  as  applied  to  the  mind  always  means 
productive  function.     Consequently  it  overlooks  or  ignores  the 


fact  that  the  word  function  is  ambiguous.    It  may  mean  per- 
missive  or  transmissive  function,  as  James  has  pomted  out  m 
his  Ingersoll  lecture  on  Human  Immortality.     Strictly  speaking, 
as  elsewhere  indicated,  naturalistic  science  can  properly  do  no 
more  than  draw  our  attention  to  the  fact  that  brain  states  are 
attended  by  certain  mental  activities  and  vice  versa,  the  general 
fact  that  thinking  is  attended  by  the  functioning  of  the  bram. 
To  go  beyond  into  either  interpretation  of  the  further  significance 
of  the  functioning  process,  as  to  whether  it  is  productive  or 
merely  permissive  of  thought,  is  to  make  an  incursion  mto  the 
field  of  metaphysics.     By  himself  adopting  the  transmission 
theory  of  brain  function,  James  in  his  Ingersoll  lecture  allied 
his  psychological  views  with  those  of  the  idealistic  philosophy. 
3    From  the  standpoint  of  absolute  idealism  the  human  mmd 
is  a  manifestation  of  the  Absolute  Mind.     It  exists  for  the  Abso- 
lute and  in  the  Absolute.     It  is  the  Absolute  Mind  as  finite  and 
imperfect,  the  Absolute  in  negative  relation  to  itself,  to  make 
use   of  a  strictly   Hegelian  expression.    The  Universal  Mmd, 
rising  above  the  threshold  of  human  consciousness  thus  appears 
at  the  level  of  reality  which  is  found  in  human  life.     Other 
idealists,  such,  for  example,  as  Ormond,  regard  the  human 
mind  as  an  existent  instituted  by  the  Absolute,  having  a  capac- 
ity for  thought  and  will  of  its  own  and  not  so  completely  identi- 
fied with  the  Universal  Mind  as  the  foregoing  statement  would 
seem  to  imply.    In  either  case  the  human  mind  is  the  imperfect 
expression  of  those  ideals  and  capacities  which  in  the  mmd  of 
the  Absolute  are  perfect  and  complete.  .    ,.  ..     , 

We  have  already  discussed  somewhat  fully  the  individual 
human  mind  as  an  expression  of  purpose.  It  is  necessary  here 
merely  to  call  attention  to  a  few  leading  features  of  that  dis- 
cussion How  the  purposes  and  capacities  characteristic  of  an 
individual  become  organized  in  the  life  of  the  child  we  have  no 
means  of  knowing.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  not  all  these 
purposes  within  the  compass  of  a  mind  come  to  development 
within  the  period  of  a  lifetime.  The  degree  of  individuahty  is 
determined  by  that  the  choice  of  which  is  most  complete  and 
most  constantly  and  persistently  pursued,  or,  if  more  than  one 
purpose  be  expressed,  by  the  degree  to  which  each  is  developed. 
From  the  human  side,  individuality,  to  the  extent  m  which  it 
is  individual,  is  determined  by  this  purpose  to  wm  a  umque 


hi 


48 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


THE    HUMAN    MIND   AND   THE    NATURAL  ORDER 


49 


I 


place  by  maturing  as  fully  as  possible  the  chosen  end  and  aim. 
From  the  standpoint  of  the  Absolute,  as  already  remarked,  the 
Ultimately  Real  is  thus  manifested  in  the  time-space  worid, 
and  in  the  relations  of  human  society  through  the  finite  mind. 

The  human  mind  finds  its  development  not  apart  from  but 
within  relations  to  physical  objects.  Its  special  life  and  activity 
are  manifested  in  and  through  the  human  body,  by  means  of 
which  it  is  connected  with  the  physical  order.  It  is  in  fact 
through  the  opposition  of  the  physical  world  that  it  becomes 
aroused  to  full  self-consciousness.  By  the  physical  world  it  is 
stirred  into  activity;  for  when  not  invited  into  new  lines  of 
endeavor  it  is  goaded  into  the  exercise  of  its  powers  in  sheer 
self-defense  in  order  to  preserve  life  and  all  that  it  holds  dearest, 
or  to  promote  the  welfare  of  these.  The  very  furnishings  of  the 
mind  are  derived  from  physical  existents.  Its  imagery  is  drawn 
from  sense  objects.  The  language  which  it  speaks  and  by 
means  of  which  it  thinks  clearly  is  permeated  with  the  traces  of 
physical  and  material  things.  But  these  material  objects  no 
less  than  the  human  mind  are  maintained  by  the  Absolute 
Mind.  Both  are  held  in  their  mutual  relations  by  the  Over- 
Soul. 

V.     MviuaX  relations  of  mind  and  body, 

1.  We  have  endeavored  to  reach  definitions  of  body  and  soul 
from  the  idealist's  point  of  view,  to  consider  what  each  is  in 
itself  and  in  its  relations.  Their  mutual  relations  have  in  part 
been  involved  in  the  preceding  discussion.  Nevertheless  it 
remains  to  inquire  further  how  they  are  related  to  each  other. 
It  will  readily  be  admitted  that  they  are  causally  connected, 
but  how  this  causal  connection  exists  and  acts  it  is  difficult  to 
determine.  The  view  that  the  soul  is,  to  use  Bradley's  ex- 
pression, "a  mere  adjective  depending  on  the  body,"  a  mere 
effect,  we  have  already  found  to  be  unsatisfactory  and  have  in 
consequence  sought  for  a  more  adequate  definition  of  mind. 
On  the  other  hand  a  complete  view  of  the  situation  must  recog- 
nize that  the  body  holds  a  more  vital  and  organic  connection 
with  the  mind  than  is  implied  by  the  popular  view  in  regarding 
it  as  an  attendant  of  the  mind.  Nor  can  the  body  be  considered 
as  a  creation  of  the  soul,  for  physical  changes,  it  would  then 
appear,  come  from  the  soul,  and  as  effects  of  the  soul,  could  not 


A 


react  upon  it.    Yet  this  interaction  is  one  of  the  facts  in  the 

problem  to  be  explained.  ... 

2  In  seeking  to  understand  the  mutual  relations  existmg 
between  mind  and  body  we  shall  be  aided  by  keeping  clearly  in 
view  the  conclusions  already  attained.  Both  mind  and  body 
are  manifestations  of  the  Absolute  at  different  degrees  of  reahty. 
Both  are  maintained  by  the  Absolute  in  fulfillment  of  their 
several  functions.  They  are  intimately  and  most  vitally  con- 
nected with  each  other. 

There  are  indications,  also,  that  their  relations  are  not  paral- 
lel Under  certain  circumstances  the  teleological  functioning 
of  conation  is  first  in  order  of  time  and  importance.  The  will 
then  prevails  and  draws  the  body  into  its  service  along  the  line 
of  its  endeavor.  There  are  other  circumstances  in  which  the 
habitual  reactions  of  the  bodily  organization  are  primary,  when 
the  mind  is  scarcely  conscious  of  what  is  taking  place. 

3  The  true  relation  between  the  body  and  the  mind,  it  now 
appears,  must  be  sought  in  some  form  of  interactionism,  not  m 
regarding  either  as  fundamentally  the  cause  of  the  other,     bince 
neither  mind  nor  body  is  self-subsistent  and  independent  but 
both  exist  for  and  in  the  Absolute  it  will  be  recognized  that  this 
interaction  has  its  ultimate  basis  within  the  Absolute  Mind. 
But  the  full  extent  of  that  close  interrelation  it  is  not  possible 
to  trace  in  detail.    To  this  conclusion  Bradley's  discussion  in 
his  chapter  on  Body  and  Soul  also  leads.    He  regards  both  soul 
and  body  as  series  of  phenomena.    "Each,  to  speak  in  general, 
is  implicated  in  the  changes  of  the  other.    Their  supposed  mde- 
pcndence  is,  therefore,  imaginary,  and  to  overcome  it  by  mvok- 
ing  a  faculty  such  as  will  is  the  effort  to  heal  a  delusion  by  means 
of  a  fiction.    A  psychical  state,  once  conjoined  with  a  physical 
may  normallv  restore  it;  and  hence  this  psychical  may  be  treated 
as  the  cause"    It  is  not  properly  the  cause  since  it  is  not  the 
whole  cause;  but  it  is  most  certainly  an  effective  and  differential 
condition.    The  physical  event  is  not  the  result  of  a  mere  physi- 
cal state.    And  if  the  idea  or  feeling  had  been  absent,  or  if  again 
it  had  not  acted,  this  physical  event  would  not  have  happened. 
Bradley  concludes  that  in  the  end  no  complete  explanation  of 
how  mind  and  body  act  upon  each  other  is  possible.       Ihe 
connection  between  body  and  soul  is  in  the  end  inexphcable, 

lAppearanee  and  Reality,  p.  335. 


J 


50 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM  AND   IMMORTALITY 


ETERNAL    LIFE    AND    THE    FLOW   OF    TIME 


51 


:l 


i 

I 


f"' 


and  the  further  inquiry  as  to  the  'how'  is  irrational  and  hope- 
less/'^ Soul  and  body  he  regards  as  equally  unreal  in  the  sense 
that  each  is  a  fragment  artificially  abstracted  from  the  whole. 
It  is  impossible  in  the  end  to  understand  how  either  comes  to 
exist. 

4.  It  seems  fair  to  conclude,  however,  that,  inasmuch  as 
the  Absolute  is  Mind,  the  human  mind  is  far  more 
closely  related  to  the  Absolute  than  the  body.  It  is  a 
fuller  expression  of  Reality  than  any  purely  physical  mani- 
festation can  be.  It  is  therefore  more  fundamental.  Aristotle 
defined  the  soul  as  "the  first  entelechy  of  an  organized  body 
possessing  life  potentially.''  To  conceive  of  it  in  this  way  is  to 
attribute  to  it  a  degree  of  reality  such  as  would  render  it  capable 
of  surviving  the  fate  of  the  body.  To  the  same  conclusion  we 
are  led  by  best  idealistic  thought  of  the  present. 

The  human  mind,  then,  has  a  definite  and  characteristic 
place  within  the  natural  order.  By  virtue  of  its  existence  in  the 
body  it  is  incorporated  in  the  order  of  nature.  It  may  be  re- 
garded as  nature's  finest  development,  its  most  perfect  fruitage. 
But  if  within  the  natural  order  it  is  not  wholly  within  it.  It 
rises  above  nature.  Its  fullest  life  is  to  be  found  in  the 
spiritual  realm.     Its  abiding  home  is  with  God  and  in  Him. 


^Appeaimaoe  and  Reality,  p.  330. 


'■ 


CHAPTER  III. 


The  Life  Eternal  and  the  Flow  of  Time. 

I.  Early  anticipations  of  the  modern  conception  of  eternal  life.  The 
ideas  of  worth  and  permanence  seeking  harmonious  expression.  Immortality 
among  the  Greek  philosophers,  Plato  and  Aristotle,  m  the  Persian  hjrmns 
and  prayer,  and  in  the  Hebrew  psalms.  ^     ,.      . 

II.  The  Christian  conception.  Nature  of  eternal  life.  Implications. 
Man's  capacity  to  receive  the  divine  gift.    Over-individual  aspects  of  human 

life. 

III.  Eternal  life  defined  with  over-emphasis  upon  value.  Spinoza's 
doctrine  of  unmortality.  The  conception  of  Mtinsterberg:  human  life  beyond 
time,  which  like  science  is  a  creation  of  mind;  the  real  personality  found  in 
will-attitudes:  mind  as  expression  of  value  is  uncaused;  relation  to  the 
Absolute.  Criticism  of  MtUisterberg:  obscurity  of  his  doctrine;  individuality 
dissipated  in  the  Absolute;  over-emphasis  upon  value. 

IV.  Temporal  aspect  of  eternal  life.  Need  of  clearer  definition.  Un- 
reality of  time  as  presented  bjr  Taylor.  Reality  of  time,  the  view  of  naive 
realism  and  pragmatism.  Mediating  position  of  Watson.  Time  a  ^'sublated 
form  of  being  within  a  perfected  experience."  The  eternal  expresses  itself 
in  the  temporal,  otherwise  an  abstraction.  The  eternal  life  the  fulfillment 
of  the  present. 

I.     Early  conceptions  of  eternal  life, 

1,  Human  life,  under  any  proper  conception  is  something  more 
than  bare  existence.  Merely  to  exist  is  not  to  live.  Accord- 
ingly the  conception  of  life  after  death  has  its  deepest  motive, 
not  in  the  desire  for  continuance  growing  out  of  the  dread  of 
annihilation,  but  in  the  sense  of  worth,  and  the  attendant  feel- 
ing that  what  has  the  truest  value  should  and  does  also  pos- 
sess permanence. 

These  two  elements  have  ever  contended  for  united  and  har- 
monious expression.  In  the  best  thought  of  antiquity  the 
worth  of  life  is  the  theme  of  the  deepest  meditations  o^  the 
noblei«t  minds.  The  union  of  the  idea  of  worth  with  that  of 
duration  into  the  conception  of  an  eternal  life,  in  which  the  best 
of  the  present  finds  its  completest  expression,  was  indeed  antic- 
ipated in  the  ancient  world  but  not  grasped  with  full  assur- 
ance before  the  Christian  Era. 

2.  Greek  philosophy  at  its  best  approaches  our  modem  con- 
ception of  eternal  life  in  an  interesting  degree.  Plato  endeavored 
to  understand  the  world  according  to  a  pattern  laid  up  in  heaven. 
His  dream  of  the  ideal  society  was  prompted  by  the  desire  that 
righteousness  prevail  in  the  social  order  and  in  the  government 
of  the  state.    There  can  be  little  doubt  that  in  presenting  the 


{ 


r 


1      ! 


ETERNAL    LIFE   AND   THE    FLOW   OF   TIME 


53 


'■I 


52 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


proper  course  for  the  lover  of  wisdom,  he  reflects  his  own  mature 
thought  when  he  says:  "Now  he  who  has  become  a  member 
of  this  little  band  (of  true  lovers  of  wisdom)  and  has  tasted  how 
sweet  and  blessed  his  treasure  is,  and  has  watched  the  madness 
of  the  many,  with  the  full  assurance  that  there  is  scarcely  a 
person  who  takes  a  single  judicious  step  in  public  life,  and  that 
there  is  no  ally  with  whom  he  may  safely  march  to  the  succor 
of  the  just  *  *  *  *  —having,  I  say,  weighed  all  this,  such  a  man 
keeps  quiet  and  confines  himself  to  his  own  concerns,  like  a  man 
who,  in  a  storm  of  dust  and  spray  driven  by  the  wind,  takes 
shelter  behind  a  wall;  and  when  from  his  retreat  he  sees  the 
infection  of  lawlessness  spreading  over  the  rest  of  mankind, 
he  is  well  content  if  he  can  in  any  way  live  his  life  here  un- 
tainted in  his  own  person  by  unrighteousness  and  unholy 
deeds,  and  when  the  time  for  his  release  arrives  takes  his  de- 
parture with  noble  hope  and  with  a  serene  mind.''* 

The  future  life  as  conceived  by  Aristotle  is  a  life  of  growth, 
of  development,  of  insight  into  what  in  the  earthly  life  was  mys- 
terious  yet    attractive  to  the  inquiring   mind   ever  eager  to 
understand  and  to  know  fully  the  meaning  and  relations  of 
things.      The  ardent  desire  of  the  Apostle  Paul  to  know  fully 
even  as  he  was  fully  known  was  no  less  that  of  Aristotle,  whose 
mind,  the  highest  expression  of  the  scientific  impulse  of  his  time, 
possessed  little  of  the  mystic  and  poetic  soul,  but  in  its  passion  for 
knowledge,  sought  to  include  all  things.     Aristotle's  ode  to  the 
intellectual  life  is  most  significant  in  that,  from  the  side  of  pure 
and  consistent  thought  he  has  attained  to  exalted  conclusions 
in  regard  to  God  and  man's  relation  to  Him,  yet  has  not  come 
to  a  well-defined  conception  of  an  eternal  life  in  conscious  fellow- 
ship  with  Him.     In  the  metaphysics  he  writes:     "In  this  way,, 
however,  is  the  Deity  disposed  as  to  existence,  and  the  prin- 
ciple of  life  is,  at  any  rate,  inherent  in  the  Deity;  for  the  energy 
or  active  exercise  of  mind  constitutes  life,  and  God— as    above 
delineated— constitutes  this  energy;  and  essential  energy  be- 
longs to  God  as  his  best  and  everlasting  life.     Now  our  state- 
ment is  this,-  that  the  Deity  is  a  living  being  that  is  everlast- 
ing and  most  excellent  in  nature ;   so  that  with  the  Deity  life  and 
duration  are  uninterrupted  and  eternal:    for  this  constitutes 
the  very  essence  of  God."' 


iThe  Republic.  496  C. 


"Metaphysics  Bk.  XI,  Ch.  VII,  6  p.  332  M'Mahon  tr.. 


■^ 


3.  Persian  thought,  at  its  best,  discloses  a  similar  identi- 
fication of  the  truest  life  of  man  with  the  knowledge  of 
God.  In  many  of  the  prayers  of  the  Zend-Avesta  we  may 
trace  a  surprisingly  clear  conception  of  human  fellowship  in 
the  life  and  eternity  of  God,  as  for  example  in  the  following: 
"And  do  Thou,  O  Lord,  the  Great  Creator!  come  to  me  with 
Thy  Good  Mind;  and  do  Thou,  who  bestowest  gifts  throughThy 
Righteousness,  bestow  alike  long-lasting  life  on  us.  And  that 
this  life  may  be  spent  aright,  do  Thou,  by  means  of  Thy  lofty 
words,  bestow  the  needed  powerful,  spiritual  help  upon  Zara- 
thustra  and  upon  us,  whereby  we  may  overcome  the  torments 
of  the  tormentor  *  *  *  *. 

"That  best  of  gifts,  therefore,  do  I  beseech  of  Thee,  0  Thou 
best  of  beings,  Ahura!  who  art  one  in  will  with  Thy  Divine 
Righteousness  within  us,  likewise  the  best  of  spirits,  desiring 
it  as  I  now  do  for  the  heroic  man  Frashaastra  and  for  me  upon 
whom  also  may'st  Thou  bestow  it  not  for  time  alone  but  for 
all  the  ages  of  Thy  Good  Mind,  that  reign  of  Thy  Benevolence 
which  shall  be  to  us  as  Heaven."* 

4.  How  suggestive  these  sentiments  are  of  many  similar 
thoughts  expressed  in  the  Psalms  of  the  Hebrews,  from  which 
we  select  the  following: 

"Thou  wilt  show  me  the  path  of  life; 

In  Thy  presence  is  fulness  of  joy. 

At  Thy  right  hand  there  are  pleasures  forever  more."* 

"As  for  me,  I  shall  behold  thy  face  in  righteousness. 
I  shall  be  satisfied,  when  I  awake,  in  thy  likeness.'" 

"Whom  have  I  in  heaven  but  thee? 

And  there  is  none  upon  earth  that  I  desire  beside  thee. 

My  flesh  and  my  heart  faileth: 

But  God  is  the  strength  of  my  heart  and  my  portion 
forever."* 


iSftcred  Books  of  the  East,  Ed.  F.  Max  MuUer.  vol.  XXXI. 
Ill,  L.  H.  Mills,  pp.  21-22. 
•Psalm  16:11. 
•Psalm  17:15. 
«Psalm  73:26. 


The  Zend  Avesta,  Part 


54 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM  AND   IMMOBTALITY 


II.     The  Christian  conception  of  eternal  life. 

1.  The  conception  of  eternal  life  finds  its  most  satisfactory 
expression  in  the  Christian  view  of  man's  nature  and  destiny.  In 
this  immortality  is  everywhere  assumed.  Life  and  immor- 
tality are  brought  to  light  by  Christ.  And  by  as  much  as  the 
fully  developed  mental  and  spiritual  life  surpasses  mere  physical 
existence,  so  the  life  eternal  surpasses  the  best  that  is  attainable 
under  the  conditions  of  our  phenomenal  existence  in  time.  Yet 
the  eternal  is  not  unrelated  to  the  present  life.  It  is  not  a  boon 
received  at  death  or  after  death.  It  is  on  the  contrary  a  present 
possession.  He  that  believes  in  Christ,  who  is  in  life-fellowship 
with  him,*  has  eternal  life  now,  so  that  in  the  Christian  concep- 
tion time  and  eternity  are  not  true  antitheses,  but  the  latter 
includes  the  former.  Eternal  life  is  God's  gift  to  men,  an  endow- 
ment not  earned  but  bestowed  out  of  His  free  and  abundant 
favor.  It  is  conferred  through  the  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
who  brings  conviction  of  sin,  inspires  the  loathing  for  sin  and 
awakens  new  desires  in  the  individual.  He  presents  to  the  soul 
the  perfect  life  of  Christ  and  gives  aid  to  pattern  after  that  great 
example.  Eternal  life  for  man,  then,  means  that  the  divine 
life  dwells  in  him.  It  is  the  union  and  communion  of  the  human 
with  the  divine.  It  means  the  subordination  of  the  baser  ele- 
ments and  the  progressive  attainment  of  our  noblest  ideals  and 
purposes.  That  life  is  not  interrupted  by  death,  for  death,  to 
the  believer,  means  simply  "to  depart  and  be  with  Christ  which 
is  far  better"*  than  the  earthly  existence.  The  goal  of  the  eter- 
nal life  is  full  likeness  to  Christ  in  nature  and  character.  It  is 
that  of  perfect,  unbroken  fellowship  with  Him. 

The  complete  conception  of  the  life  eternal  is  thus  seen  to 
be  something  far  richer  and  fuller  than  that  merely  of  an  im- 
mortality of  the  soul.  To  its  proper  conception  the  immortality 
of  the  soul  holds  much  the  same  relation  as  the  skeleton  to  the 
normal,  healthy  body.  It  means  the  survival  of  death  but 
more.  It  is  the  incapability  of  death.  Death  has  no  dominion 
over  it.  Immortality  is  a  negative  term.  The  conception  of 
eternal  life  gives  to  it  positive  and  concrete  meaning,  since  the 
latter  is  a  life  enriched  by  the  divine  life  in  ever  increasing  full- 
ness.    How  that  life  in  eternity  shall  ultimately  be   manifested, 

>8t.  John  5:24. 

S8t.  Paul.  Philippimns.  1:23. 


ETERNAL   LIFE  AND   THE    FLOW   OF   TIME 


55 


► 


ill  what  kind  of  world-surroundings,  and  through  what  modes 
of  expression  we  need  not  consider  here,  further  than  to  remark 
that  the  conception  of  life  eternal  contemplates  an  environment 
in  harmony  with  the  best  aspirations  of  the  soul,  through  means 
capable  of  adequately  and  perfectly  manifesting  its  full  activity. 
2.  This  conception  of  eternal  life  implies  certain  capacities  in 
the  individual  which  render  him  capable  of  receiving  the  offered 
divine  gift.     It  involves  possibilities  which  may  be  developed 
almost  without  limit.     The  general  temperament  is  unchanged 
by  the  divine  gift,  but,  under  the  power  and  influence  of  the 
divine,    continues    essentially    that   which    it    was    formerly. 
The  same  adaptations  continue,  lifted,  indeed,  to  a  higher  plane 
and  put  to  a  nobler  use  than  would  otherwise  be  the  case.     But 
there  is  no  approximation  to  a  dead  level  of  life,  either  by  a 
levelling  down  of  the  natural  endowments  of  the  more  gifted, 
or  through  a  levelling  up  of  the  less  highly  endowed.     The 
natural  adaptations  of  men  are  simply  exercised  and  developed. 
In  fact,  instead  of  leading  to  a  dead  uniformity  among  men, 
capacities  which  would  tend  to  remain  latent;  perhaps  become 
ultimately  lost,  are  called  into  healthy  exercise.     This  concep- 
tion of  the  life  eternal  therefore,  recognizes  that  the  inherent 
capacities  of  men  are  such  as  fit  them  for  divine  fellowship  when 
they  shall  have  become  sufficiently  unfolded.     That  fellowship 
exists,  in  truth,  even  in  the  temporal  life.     It  restores  the  divine 
image  in  man.      It  gives  promise  of  even  more  than  the  tradi- 
tional first  estate  of  man;  for 

"In  Him  the  sons  of  Adam  boast 
More  blessings  than  their  father  lost." 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  idealistic  doctrine  of  human  individu- 
ality as  an  organized  system  of  specialized  functions  and  capac- 
ities interprets  with  a  considerable  degree  of  accuracy  the 
implications  of  the  Christian  conception  of  immortality. 

3.  In  this  conception  also  the  over-individual  aspect  of  human 
life  in  regard  to  moral  and  spiritual  character  is  even  further 
brought  to  our  notice.  The  power  of  God  lays  hold  of  some- 
thing in  man  not  altogether  foreign  to  Himself,  although,  it  is 
true,  Christian  teaching  has  sometimes  been  so  formulated  as 
seemingly  to  maintain  that  the  human  soul  is  dead  toward  His 
influence  till  made  alive  by  the  Almighty  power.     However,  by 


t  ■ 


56 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


this  represention  is  meant  a  certain  powerlessness  of  the  human 
will  rather  than  an  absence  of  all  knowledge  of  God  and  assent 
to  the  binding  character  of  His  will  as  duty.  But  when  the 
eternal  life  has  entered  through  the  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit  it 
is  to  find  there  as  a  starting  point  an  elemental  moral  and  spiritual 
light.  "We  also  are  His  offspring/'  declared  St.  Paul  to  the 
the  Athenian  philosophers  upon  the  Areopagus,  quoting  approv- 
ingly the  Greek  poet,  Aratus.  And  St.  John,  frequently  as- 
sumed to  have  had  the  deepest  insight  into  the  meaning  and 
teachings  of  Jesus,  presents  him  as  the  Eternal  Word  or  Reason 
through  whom  all  things  were  made,  in  whom  was  life.  "And 
the  life  was  the  light  of  men.  *  *  *  There  was  the  true  light, 
even  that  which  lighteth  every  man,  coming  into  the  world."* 
Other  passages  of  similar  import  might  be  cited,  but  these  are 
sufficient  to  reveal  the  underlying  kinship  of  the  life  of  man 
with  that  of  the  Eternal.  It  is  a  quality  of  human  nature  that 
under  the  developing  influence  of  the  Spirit  of  God  is  capable 
of  the  highest  expression,  when  all  opposition  of  an  estranged 
will  shall  have  been  removed,  and  the  hindering  conditions  of 
life  in  the  phenomenal  world  shall  have  disappeared.  Then  our 
ideals  shall  find  fitting  expression,  our  suppressed  purposes  will 
attain  proper  development,  and  life  be  full  and  complete  in  God. 
What  that  full  expression  will  be  we  can  but  faintly  realize. 

III.     Eternal  life  defined  vrith  excessive  emphasis  upon  value. 

The  general  Christian  conception  assumes  that  the  eternal 
life  is  the  full  expression  of  what  is  implied  in  the  temporal, 
under  the  moulding  and  guiding  influence  of  the  Divine  Spirit. 
It  combines  the  two  elements  of  worth  and  duration  which  the 
ancient  philosophers  and  seers  had  held  in  uncertain  and  im- 
perfect unity.  It  remains  to  notice  another  conception  of  im- 
mortality which  so  overemphasizes  the  value  of  human  life  as 
in  effect  to  underestimate  it,  paradoxical  as  that  may  seem. 
This  conception  may  be  seen  in  Spinoza  and  in  the  thought  of 
Fichte  as  expressed  by  Hugo  Miinsterberg  in  his  monograph 
on  The  Eternal  Life. 

1.  Spinoza  teaches  that  in  the  highest  stage  of  intellectual 
development  man  refers  all  things  to  the  idea  of  God.  Mem 
efficere  potest ,  ut  omnes  corporis  affectioneSf  seu  return  imagines 

>Gmim1  of  St.  John.  1 :  4.  9  R.  V. 


1 


ETERNAL    LIFE   AND   THE    FLOW   OF   TIME 


57 


ad  Dei  ideam  referantur.^     In   this  state   all   passion  having 
ceased,  feeling  and  will  have  become  absorbed  in  the  knowledge 
and  love  of  God.     This,  the  highest  kind  of  virtue,  both  frees 
man  and  confers  upon  him  immortality.    This  intellectual  love 
of  God  is  independent  of  bodily  states.      Consequently  the  de- 
struction of  the  body  can  not  affect  it.     Spinoza  speaks  rather 
of  eternity,  however,  than  of  immortality.     By  this  he  means 
that  a  thing  forms  an  essential  part  of  the  universe,  and  there- 
fore can  not  cease  to  exist.     It  is  a  condition  into  which  the  soul 
enters,  in  which  it  is  above  time  relations.     He  apparently  does 
not  conceive  eternal  life  as  belonging    by   nature  to  all  men, 
but  regards  it  as  something  to  be  acquired  by  each  one,  and 
as  being  acquired  in  different  degrees.     It  is  generally  ques- 
tioned whether  the  immortality  of  which  Spinoza  speaks  is  im- 
mortality at  all.     Spinoza  is,  indeed,  careful  to  guard  against 
the  doctrine  that  the  individual  is  absorbed  in  God.     In  pomt- 
ing  out  that  in  the  final  state  in  which  man  attains  his  highest 
unity  in  God,  he  at  the  same  time  attains  the  highest  conscious- 
ness of  self,  the  conclusion  appears  to  be  so  framed  as  to  convey 
the  impression  that  while  we  retain  our  individuality  we  shall 
have  no  means  of  knowing  ourselves  as  the  same  individuals. 

2.  For  Munsterberg  also  **we  are  beyond  time  in  the  reality  of 
our  immediate  life.^'*  Time  is  an  idea  created  by  the  mind  as 
the  form  of  its  objects.  If  we  choose  to  regard  our  personality 
as  in  time  we  do  so  for  certain  purposes. 

Science,  equally  with  time,  is  the  creation  of  our  mind.  If 
the  men  who  hold  a  scientific  view  of  the  world  and  the  men 
who  hold  the  religious  view  of  the  world  are  found  in  sharply 
separated  camps  we  are  not  to  yield  too  ready  an  assent  to  all 
that  science  appears  to  demand.  Science  is  dominated  by  the 
category  of  necessity.  However,  since  it  too  is  the  creature  of 
the  mind  by  which  to  accomplish  certain  ends,  the  scientist  is 
greater  than  his  science,  and  it.  therefore,  fails  likewise  to  ex- 
press the  reality  in  which  we  live.  The  real  personality  is 
bevond  these  constructions  of  the  mind.  Time  is  here  regarded 
as 'an  order  in  which  the  reality  of  one  member  excludes  the 
reality  of  every  other.  The  only  time-instant  which  is  real  is 
the  present.    The  past  has  already  become  unreal  and  the 

lEthiea,  t.  14. 

<The  Etvmftl  Life,  p.  15. 


^t^'^ 


58 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


I 


i'f 


future  will  not  become  real  until  the  present  shall  have  passed 
away.  In  this  sense  our  whole  life  will  have  become  unreal  at 
death.  In  life  considered  as  a  mere  series  of  phenomena  there 
can  of  course  be  no  value. 

The  real  personality  is  found  in  its  attitudes  and  will-acts. 
It  is  not  to  be  perceived  as  a  thing.  Its  true  meaning  is  to  be, 
not  a  phenomenon,  but  a  will  whose  acts  are  valid  for  ourselves, 
and  from  others  claim  acknowledgment. 

One  will  is  related  to  another  directly,  through  mutual  in- 
terest, not  as  scientifically  constructed  bodies.  This  mutual 
interest  forms  a  direct  will-connection.  Our  thoughts  and 
feelings  are  "judgments,  attitudes,  volitions  which  bind  one 
another  by  their  meaning,  without  relation  to  time  or  succession." 
It  is  in  these  universals  in  which  mutual  interests  are  expressed 
that  one  will  meets  another.  These  interests  in  which  are  ex- 
pressed our  acts  of  will  are  bound  together  by  a  unity  of  purpose. 

It  becomes  meaningless,  therefore,  to  inquire  what  came 
before  and  what  will  come  after  my  personal  being.  My  per- 
sonality was  uncaused.  It  is  independent  of  birth  and  death. 
Biological  events  have  no  relation  to  it.  It  is  not  born,  it  will 
not  die.  It  is  immortal,  it  is  eternal.  The  will  is  likened  to  a 
circle  having  neither  beginning  nor  end.  "It  is  endless,  infinite." 
If  the  question  of  the  value  of  such  a  life  be  raised,  it  is  answered, 
"Only  that  which  is  an  ultimate  end  for  us  is  really  a  value." 
The  true,  the  beautiful,  the  moral  deed,  the  intellectual  achieve- 
ment, the  work  of  civilization,  religious  faith,  the  repose  of 
philosophic  conviction  are  ends  in  themselves  and  are  respected 
as  final. ^  But  this  means  that  they  are  more  than  individual, 
personal  experiences.  Our  own  will  is  satisfied  in  them,  but 
at  the  same  time  we  know  our  will  as  more  than  an  individual 
volition.  Our  will- acts  are  then  to  us  "expressions  of  an  abso- 
lute will."  They  are  our  will-acts,  however,  "only  in  so  far  as 
we  are  absolute  subjects,  in  so  far  as  our  consciousness  is  the 
over-individual  consciousness,  the  Over-Soul."' 

The  relation  sustained  by  the  human  will  to  the  absolute 
will  Miinsterberg  represents  as  that  of  "a  personality  which  has 
found  complete  satisfaction  of  its  aims"  and  therefore,  "has 
no  possible  further  intention."     To  such  an  one  "it  would  be 

*The  Eternal  Life,  p.  46. 
>Ibid.  60. 


ETERNAL    LIFE   AND   THE    FLOW   OF   TIME 


59 


meaningless  to  attach  externally  a  supplement  of  individual  ex- 
istence."* In  carrying  out  this  thought  he  refers  again  to  his 
deceased  friend  and  declares,  "you  and  I  do  not  know  a  reality 
of  which  he  is  not  in  eternity  a  noble  part;  the  passing  of  time 
cannot  make  his  personality  unreal  and  nothing  would  be  added 
to  his  immortal  value  if  some  object  like  him  were  to  enter  the 
sphere  of  time  again.  *  *  *  *  If  I  mourn  for  our  friend  I  grieve 
not  because  his  personality  has  become  unreal  like  an  event  in 
time,  but  because  his  personality  as  it  belongs  eternally  to  our 
world  aims  at  a  fuller  realization  of  its  intention,  and  at  a 
richer  influence  on  his  friends."^ 

3.  The  ancient  Hebrews  thought  of  the  state  of  the  dead  as 
most  shadowy.  In  Sheol  there  was  no  remembrance  of  God, 
no  thought  nor  device.  From  quite  another  starting  point 
Miinsterberg  comes  to  a  similar  obscurity  as  to  whether  there 
is  any  genuine  personal  identity  of  the  individual  who  has  passed 
from  the  time-space  world.  He  appears  to  imply  such  a  con- 
tinuance of  personality  when  he  speaks  of  his  grief  as  resulting, 
not  from  any  "unreality  as  of  an  event  in  time"  having  befallen 
his  friend,  but  because  his  personality  "aims  at  a  fuller  realiza- 
tion of  its  intentions  and  at  a  richer  influence  on  his  friends." 
But  what  is  thus  implied  is  destroyed  by  the  force  of  the  earlier 
statement,  "You  and  I  do  not  know  areality  of  which  he  is  not  in 
eternity  a  noble  part."  He  is  then  a  part  of  truth  as  such,  of 
beauty,  of  life,  of  God.  It  is  further  destroyed  by  the  earlier  state- 
ment, "a  personality  which  has  found  complete  satisfaction  of  its 
aims  has  no  possible  further  intention,  and  it  would  be  mean- 
ingless to  attach  to  it  externally  a  supplement  of  individual  exist- 
ence."' This  certainly  implies  surrender  of  individual  being, 
and  submergence  in  the  Absolute. 

But  inasmuch  as  we  also  who  remain  in  the  phenomenal 
world  are  not  in  time  but  beyond  it^  immortal  and 
eternal,  independent  of  the  biological  eV^ts  of  birth 
and  death,  it  follows  of  necessity  that  we  toosare  eternal 
subjects,  having  our  place  in  the  grand  symphony,  ^^s  being 
true  the  distinction  of  the  acts  of  our  individual  will  fmn  the 
will-acts  of  the  Over-Soul  appears  devoid  of  meaning. 

In  short  Miinsterberg's  conception  of  the  eternal  life  is 

>Tbe  Eternal  Life,  p.  62. 
*Ibid.  pp.  68. 71. 
•Ibid.  p.  62. 


1  i[ 


V 


eo 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


obscure  to  be  of  real  service.  It  overemphasizes  value  and  that 
in  such  a  way  that  the  individuality  of  man  is  emptied  of  true 
significance.  Personality  becomes  dissipated  into  the  great 
ideals  which  have  been  its  inspiration  in  the  earthly  state.  Nor 
has  he  presented  an  adequate  consideration  of  the  time  element 
in  the  idealism  of  man.  The  slurring  over  of  this  feature  of  any 
conception  of  eternal  life  leaves  much  to  be  desired  in  the  way 
of  closer  analysis  of  the  time  process  in  relation  to  immortality. 

IV.     The  temporal  aspect  of  eternal  life. 

1.  But  how  are  we  to  conceive  of  eternal  life  in  relation  to 
the  time-process?  Spinoza  and  Munsterberg,  as  we  have  seen, 
have  pronounced  the  time  element  unreal,  a  construction  of  the 
mind  to  serve  its  purposes.  Others  regard  time  as  the  a  priori 
condition  of  sense-perception.  In  doing  so,  however,  they  have 
presented  no  satisfying  treatment  of  the  situation  involved. 
There  is  need  of  a  further  effort  to  bring  the  conceptions  of  life 
in  time  and  of  life  in  eternity  into  harmony  with  each  other  in 
such  a  way  that  the  truth  of  neither  shall  be  neglected  or  ignored. 

We  shall,  perhaps,  be  better  enabled  to  arrive  at  a  construct- 
ive result  if  we  glance  first  at  the  opposing  views  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  time-process. 

2.  From  the  side  of  absolute  idealism  the  unreality  of  time 
finds  an  able  advocate  in  A.  E.  Taylor  in  his  chapter  on  Space 
and  Time.*  Time  is  here  considered  as  perceptual  time,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  as  conceptual  on  the  other.  Perceptual  time  is 
limited,  but  is  sensibly  continuous.  It  consists  not  only  of  a 
quantitative  element,  but  has  likewise  a  qualitative  character 
which  depends  on  the  relation  of  the  here  and  now  of  immediate 
individual  feeling.  Conceptual  time  is  constructed  out  of  the 
data  of  perception  by  a  process  of  synthesis,  analysis,  and  abstrac- 
tion. It  is  unlimited,  is  mathematically  continuous  and  is 
regarded  as  infinitely  divisible.  But  neither  perceptual  time 
nor  conceptual  time  is  to  be  considered  real.  The  former  in- 
volves reference  to  the  here  and  now  of  finite  experience.  The 
latter  contains  no  principle  of  internal  distinction  and  is  there- 
fore not  individual.  To  take  time  as  real,  Taylor  holds,  leads 
to  difficulties  about  qualities  and  relations  and  so  to  the  indefi- 
nite regress.      There  is  no  principle  of  unity.     The  time  order 

'Etomoita  of  Mttaphjrsiefl,  pp.  241-265. 


ETERNAL   LIFE   AND   THE    FLOW   OF    TIME 


61 


is  an  imperfect  phenomenal  manifestation  of  the  logical  relation 
between  the  inner  purposive  lives  of  finite  individuals.  It  is  an 
inevitable  aspect  of  finite  experience.  Within  the  Absolute, 
it  is  held,  there  may  be  many  time  orders  with  no  temporal  con- 
nection.    But  how  time  is  transcended  in  the  Absolute  it  is 

impossible  to  say. 

3.  The  common  sense  point  of  vie w  assumes  that  time  is  a  real 
factor  in  the  universe.     This  position  is  likewise  held  by  recent 
pragmatism.     It  is  that  put  forward  by  Mr.  F.  C.  S.  Schiller  in 
his  volume  entitled  Humanism.     He  regards  time  as  an  experi- 
ential  factor  which  ultimately  rests  on  the  practical  necessity 
of  finding  formulas  for  calculating  events  without  waiting  to 
observe  their  actual  happening.*     If  the  ultimate  explanation 
of  the  world  be  in  terms  of  ends,  these  must  be  realized  in  the 
time-process  and  by  means  of  it,  since  these  are  individual  ends. 
From  this  standpoint  Schiller  urges  that  a  proper  metaphysic 
of  the  time-process  will  hold  the  same  relation  to  the  phenomena 
of  history  and  their  explanation  as  a  metaphysic  of  abstract 
ideas  holds  to  their  explanation  by  universal  laws.     The  diffi- 
culties of  the  problem  are  not  to  be  ignored.     Yet  when  it  is 
assumed  that  a  further  development  of  the  human  mind  may 
lead  to  a  satisfactory  solution,  the  reality  of  the  time-process  in 
which  the  development  takes  place   can  not    be  denied,  and 
abstract  metaphysic  becomes  indebted  to  it  for  the  means  to 
solve  its  difficulties.     It  is  only  in  the  direction  of  the  abandon- 
ment of  prejudice  against  the  reality  of  the  time-process  that 
Schiller,  at  least,  *'can  descry  a  future  for  hope,  a  future  for 
philosophy  and  a  philosophy  for  the  future."' 

4.  Between  these  two  opposing  views  of  the  time-process  it 
should  be  possible  to  find  a  middle  way  that  would  keep  clear 
of  the  extreme  consequences  of  each.  The  time-process  is  too 
patent  to  be  regarded  as  an  illusion.  On  the  other  hand  if  it 
be  considered  real,  it  should  be  clear  in  what  sense  it  is  so  con- 
sidered. In  aa  able  article  on  the  The  Absolute  and  The  Time- 
Process,'  Prof.  Watson  takes  up  the  position  that  the  Absolute 
must  be  manifested  in  the  time-process,  unless  the  time-process 
be  considered  an  illusion.  In  the  latter  event  the  very  possij 
bility  of  knowledge  would  be  destroyed.     Ultimately  the  world 

iHumaniem,  p.  104. 
iHumanism,  p.  109. 
•Philosophical  Review,  vol.  IV,  353,  485. 


62 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


i 


■\: 


I 


> 


I 


il 


and  the  time-process  of  the  finite  presuppose  a  single  self-deter- 
mining principle  which  is  manifested  in  and  through  this  time- 
process.  The  supposition  that  this  self-determining  principle 
can  be  separated  from  time  would  lead  to  the  contradiction  that 
a  self-complete  Absolute  can  be  independent  of  its  manifesta- 
tions. Watson  defines  time  as  "the  universal  possibility  of 
events.'*  The  only  sense  in  which  it  can  be  considered  real  is 
as  this  universal  possibility.  All  reality  implies  succession. 
Yet  this  process  of  succession  can  not  be  treated  as  substantial. 
There  is  no  world  of  events  as  there  is  no  world  without  events. 
5.  It  seems  fair  to  conclude,  that  time  not  only  has  a 
meaning  for  our  minds  but  that  it  has  a  meaning  also 
for  the  Absolute  Mind.  We  may  recognize  then  that  the 
eternal  is  in  no  sense  a  true  antithesis  to  the  temporal, 
but  rather  that  the  former  includes  the  latter  in  some 
genuine  sense.  Had  the  time-process  no  meaning  for  the 
Absolute  it  would  be  difficult  if  not  impossible,  so  far  as  we 
can  see,  for  an  orderly  cosmos  to  exist.  For  if  the  order  of 
sequence  had  no  significance  for  the  Author  of  all  things  man 
might  have  appeared  in  an  age  of  the  world  utterly  unadapted 
to  his  normal  development,  instead  of  at  the  culmination  of  the 
physical  order.  Instead  of  such  a  coordination  of  events  as 
occurred,  for  example,  at  the  appearance  of  Christianity  to  intro- 
duce the  new  era  upon  a  world  ready  to  receive  it,  its  signifi- 
cance  might  have  been  utterly  lost.  Instead  of  geographical 
discoveries,  the  revival  of  learning,  the  art  of  printing  and  the 
invention  of  gunpowder  occurring  at  a  time  when  their  combined 
influence  served  to  usher  in  the  modern  era,  these  things  would 
have  been  distributed  so  promiscuously  that  they  could  not 
have  been  the  instruments  of  a  mighty  progress.  But  because 
the  time  order  has  a  meaning  for  the  Eternal  mind,  no  less  than 
for  ours,  events  are  not  scattered  so  promiscuously  as  to  point 
to  no  ultimate  goal,  but,  viewed  in  their  larger  relations,  they 
are  seen  as  steps  in  an  unfolding  progress.  Time  is  ''an  aspect 
of  the  totalizing  meaning  which  pervades  and  organizes  experi- 
ence," even  if  "a  relatively  subordinate"  one.*  The  doctrine 
that  regards  time  as  thoroughly  subjective  and  the  time-exper- 
ience as  wholly  finite  has  never  been  consistently  or  completely 

>E.  L.  Hinman,  Time  as  an  Absolute  Principle  of  Negativity,  University  Studies,  vol. 
VI,  p.  7. 


.•  tl 

It  11 


ETERNAL    LIFE   AND   THE    FLOW   OF   TIME 


G3 


carried  out.  Nor  does  it  appear  capable  of  yielding  a  concep- 
tion that  is  entirely  clear.  It  is  most  probable  that  time  is  a 
sublated  form  within  a  perfected  experience.  But  it  is  little 
short  of  nonsense  to  attempt  to  make  it  appear  that  time  is  noth- 
ing more  than  a  subjective  illusion  of  the  finite  consciousness. 
Time  belongs  to  the  larger  whole  and  is  organic  to  it.  It  is  a 
mode  of  manifestation  of  the  Absolute.  Reality,  in  certain 
aspects  of  its  meaning,  is  beyond  the  flow  of  time  indeed  but  in 
certain  others  it  expresses  itself  within  the  time-series.  It 
**partakes  of  time  but  denies  its  power."  It  is  impossible  to 
define  time  aside  from  the  higher  meaning  of  the  timeless,  and 
conversely  the  timeless  or  eternal  can  not  be  defined  independ- 
ently of  the  time-process.  If  it  is  to  be  more  than  an  abstraction 
the  eternal  must  express  itself  in  the  temporal. 

6.  Eternity  is  involved  in  man's  life.  He  is  formed  by  the 
Eternal  and  for  the  Eternal.  The  capacities  of  his  nature  speak 
of  fellowship  with  God.  His  activities  reveal  God  present  within 
him  as  the  very  ground  and  possibilitiy  of  all  that  he  does  or 
undertakes,  man  in  God  and  God  in  him.  Thus  does  that 
which  is  temporal  partake  of  the  Eternal  and  the  Eternal  ex- 
presses itself  in  that  which  exists  in  time.  These  human  capac- 
ities are  quickened  and  developed  by  divine  power,  so  that 
the  desire  and  prayer  of  the  ancient  Hebrew  or  Greek  or  Persian, 
that  the  worth  of  human  life  be  combined  with  true  permanence 
in  the  Absolute,  has  a  secure  basis  of  fulfillment.  Our  life  is 
already  in  eternity.  Time  **the  destroyer"  has  no  real  power 
over  it.  Not  out  of  relation,  therefore,  with  our  present  or  our 
past  will  our  future  be.  It  will  present  the  completion  of  that 
which  the  present  holds  as  by  promise. 


h 


64 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


THE   REALITY   OF   THE  IDEAL 


67 


CHAPTER  IV. 


The  Reality  of  the  Ideal. 

I.  The  ideals  of  science  and  knowledge.  Science  presupposes  a  rational 
order  in  the  world.  It  results  from  processes  of  idealization.  Knowled^ 
in  any  sense  is  possible  only  through  the  activity  of  the  universal  mind  withm 
thought.  How  scientific  knowledge  advances.  It  is  primarily  a  faith.  But 
the  degree  of  verification  of  that  mith  shows  the  scientific  ideal  to  be  a  true 

expression  of  Reality.  ,    ,.,      .  *  .  i.  . 

II.  Immortality  as  an  ideal  of  reason.  It  likewise  rests  on  faith  in 
the  rational  order  of  the  world.  The  reasonableness  of  this  faith.  The 
persistence  of  the  belief,  it  is  practically  universal.  Its  cultural  value  and 
mfluence.  Influence  of  this  ideal  as  a  social  factor  in  the  overthrow  of 
slavery  and  other  forms  of  servitude;  in  the  creation  of  asylums  for  orphans, 
the  aged,  blind,  insane,  and  the  like;  in  reformatories,  industrial  homes  and 
generally  in  e£forts  to  reform  and  care  for  convicted  persons;  in  systems 
of  public  instruction,  in  legislation  for  regulation  of  industries  and  in  the 
efforts  to  establish  mtemational  peace.  Influence  of  the  ideal  of  immor- 
tality upon  poetry  and  the  fine  arts.  Presence  of  this  ideal  in  morals  and 
religious  movements  for  reform.  ^       ^      .^    . ,    , 

Reality  involved  in  the  ideal  of  immortality  as  truly  as  m  scientific  ideals. 
The  voice  of  the  Most  High  in  favor  of  the  eternity  of  every  human  life. 

I.     The  ideal  element  in  science  and  in  all  knowledge, 

1.  If  we  search  for  the  secret  of  the  mighty  progress  of  the 
present  age,  we  find  at  bottom  the  feeling,  instinct,  or  belief 
that  the  world  is  rational  and,  therefore,  inter pretable  by  human 
reason.  The  conviction  of  Kepler  that  he  was  thinking  God's 
thoughts  after  Him  well  expresses  the  presuppositions  of  science 
universally.  For  it  is  because  the  world  displays  Mind  in  every 
part  that  the  human  mind  is  able  to  build  up  its  science.  Our 
reason  simply  interprets  for  us  the  Reason  displayed  in  the 
constitution  of  things.  '*If  a  man  should  meet  a  being  whose 
language,  signs  for  thought,  and  symbols  for  the  world  were 
wholly  different  from  his  own,  with  absolutely  no  point  of  contact 
between  them,  he  would  never  be  able  to  arrive  at  any  knowl- 
edge of  that  being.  Kinship  between  them  existing  nowhere,  it 
would  be  impossible  ever  to  come  to  a  mutual  understanding. 
They  would  be  to  one  another  like  the  stone  faces  that  stare  at 
each  other  from  the  opposite  columns  of  some  gate.  It  would 
be  sphinx  looking  at  sphinx  in  endless  perplexity  and  everlast- 
ing silence.  In  the  same  way,  if  the  Infinite  by  which  man's 
life  is  surrounded  were,  like  this  strange  being,  an  absolute  and 
eternal  contrast  to  humanity,  knowledge  itself  would  be  im- 


.f 


•  t 


\ 


))l 


possible.  One  would  be  permanently  unable  to  discover  an> 
thing,  to  find  thought  in  the  heavens  above,  or  in  the  earth  be- 
neath; to  understand  the  figure  and  motion  of  the  globe,  the 
orbits  and  orders  of  the  stars;  to  reach  any  sort  of  science  upon 
any  subject  whatever.  *****  Because  we  do  know  men  and 
things;  because  the  world  lends  itself  to  thought,  melts  into  the 
the  receptivities  of  sense,  runs  into  the  forms  of  the  understanding, 
rises  into  a  unity  that  corresponds  to  the  personal  unity  of  the 
soul;  because  the  world  is  an  intelligible  world,  we  believe  that 
it  is  alive  with  mind,  that  it  is  an  expression  of  the  Infinite  Mind, 
and  that  in  reading  its  order  we  are  reaching  his  plan."* 

2.  Science  is  through  and  through  the  result  of  processes  of 
idealization.  To  the  plain  man  the  world  divides  itself  into  the 
material  and  the  immaterial.  But  so  soon  as  one  gets  beyond 
the  most  elementary  facts  and  begins  to  inquire  more  closely 
how  these  same  things  are  constituted,  thought  takes  upon  it- 
self a  somewhat  different  form.  The  matter  that  seemed  so 
hard  and  fast,  we  now  learn,  is  composed  of  atoms  inconceivably 
minute.  Every  atom  within  a  given  element  is  like  every  other 
atom  composing  it.  But  no  one  ever  beheld  an  atom.  The 
most  powerful  microscope  can  not  reveal  it  to  our  curious  gaze. 
It  is  in  short  an  ideal  creation,  a  conceptual  rather  than  a  purely 
perceptual  existent.  Scientists  in  the  last  few  years  have 
carried  out  this  principle  of  interpretation  of  the  physical  world 
still  farther.  The  progress  of  investigation  and  discovery  has 
tended  to  show  that  the  atom  is  not  indivisible,  as  had  been 
supposed,  but  is  in  turn  made  up  of  electrons.  But 
these,  even  more  if  possible  than  the  atom,  are  metaphysical 
creations  pure  and  simple.  The  whole  splendid  structure  of  the 
world  which  seemed  so  hard  and  fast  has  thus  become  known  to  us 
not  directly  and  as  things  are  in  themselves,  but  indirectly 
through  a  process  of  idealization,  the  results  of  which  warrant 
us  in  concluding  that  this  our  knowledge  of  the  elemental  forces 
and  materials  is,  in  the  main,  true. 

But  not  only  does  idealization  enter  into  our  knowledge  of 
the  most  fundamental  characteristics  of  the  inorganic  world. 
We  endeavored  to  point  out  in  a  preceding  chapter  that,  in  the 
realm  of  the  organic  also,  the  ideal  of  the  completed  organism  is 
the  guiding,  molding  factor  in  the  development  of  its  life,  and  that 

Kx.  A.  Gordon,  Immortality  and  the  New  Theodicy,  pp.  114:-116. 


fV 


\ 


64 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


THE    REALITY   OF   THE  IDEAL 


65 


li 


|i  ' 


CHAPTER  IV. 


The  Reality  of  the  Ideal. 

I.  The  ideals  of  science  and  knowledge.  Science  presupposes  a  rational 
order  in  the  world.  It  results  from  processes  of  idealization.  Knowled^ 
in  any  sense  is  possible  only  through  the  activity  of  the  universal  mind  within 
thought.  How  scientific  knowledge  advances.  It  is  primarily  a  faith.  But 
the  degree  of  verification  of  that  faith  shows  the  scientific  ideal  to  be  a  true 

expression  of  Reality.  ,    ,.,      .  #  ..t.  . 

II.  Immortality  as  an  ideal  of  reason.  It  likewise  rests  on  faith  m 
the  rational  order  of  the  world.  The  reasonableness  of  this  faith.  The 
persistence  of  the  belief,  it  is  practically  universal.  Its  cultural  value  and 
mfiuence.  Influence  of  this  ideal  as  a  social  factor  in  the  overthrow  of 
slavery  and  other  forms  of  servitude;  in  the  creation  of  asvlums  for  orphans, 
the  aged,  blind,  insane,  and  the  like;  in  reformatories,  industrial  homes  and 
generally  in  efforts  to  reform  and  care  for  convicted  persons;  in  s^tems 
of  public  instruction,  in  legislation  for  regulation  of  industries  and  in  the 
efforts  to  establish  international  peace.  Influence  of  the  ideal  of  immor- 
tality upon  poetry  and  the  fine  arts.  Presence  of  this  ideal  in  morals  and 
religious  movements  for  reform.  ^       .      .^    .^    , 

Reality  involved  in  the  ideal  of  immortality  as  truly  as  m  scientific  ideals. 
The  voice  of  the  Most  High  in  favor  of  the  eternity  of  every  human  life. 

I.     The  ideal  element  in  science  and  in  all  knowledge. 

1.  If  we  search  for  the  secret  of  the  mighty  progress  of  the 
present  age,  we  find  at  bottom  the  feeling,  instinct,  or  belief 
that  the  world  is  rational  and,  therefore,  inter pretable  by  human 
reason.  The  conviction  of  Kepler  that  he  was  thinking  God's 
thoughts  after  Him  well  expresses  the  presuppositions  of  science 
universally.  For  it  is  because  the  world  displays  Mind  in  every 
part  that  the  human  mind  is  able  to  build  up  its  science.  Our 
reason  simply  interprets  for  us  the  Reason  displayed  in  the 
constitution  of  things.  "If  a  man  should  meet  a  being  whose 
language,  signs  for  thought,  and  symbols  for  the  world  were 
wholly  different  from  his  own,  with  absolutely  no  point  of  contact 
between  them,  he  would  never  be  able  to  arrive  at  any  knowl- 
edge of  that  being.  Kinship  between  them  existing  nowhere,  it 
would  be  impossible  ever  to  come  to  a  mutual  understanding. 
They  would  be  to  one  another  like  the  stone  faces  that  stare  at 
each  other  from  the  opposite  columns  of  some  gate.  It  would 
be  sphinx  looking  at  sphinx  in  endless  perplexity  and  everlast- 
ing silence.  In  the  same  way,  if  the  Infinite  by  which  man's 
life  is  surrounded  were,  like  this  strange  being,  an  absolute  and 
eternal  contrast  to  humanity,  knowledge  itself  would  be  im- 


i.1 


k 


possible.  One  would  be  permanently  unable  to  discover  any- 
thing, to  find  thought  in  the  heavens  above,  or  in  the  earth  be- 
neath; to  understand  the  figure  and  motion  of  the  globe,  the 
orbits  and  orders  of  the  stars;  to  reach  any  sort  of  science  upon 
any  subject  whatever.  *****  Because  we  do  know  men  and 
things;  because  the  world  lends  itself  to  thought,  melts  into  the 
the  receptivities  of  sense,  runs  into  the  forms  of  the  understanding, 
rises  into  a  unity  that  corresponds  to  the  personal  unity  of  the 
soul;  because  the  world  is  an  intelligible  world,  we  believe  that 
it  is  alive  with  mind,  that  it  is  an  expression  of  the  Infinite  Mind, 
and  that  in  reading  its  order  we  are  reaching  his  plan."* 

2,  Science  is  through  and  through  the  result  of  processes  of 
idealization.  To  the  plain  man  the  world  divides  itself  into  the 
material  and  the  immaterial.  But  so  soon  as  one  gets  beyond 
the  most  elementary  facts  and  begins  to  inquire  more  closely 
how  these  same  things  are  constituted,  thought  takes  upon  it- 
self a  somewhat  different  form.  The  matter  that  seemed  so 
hard  and  fast,  we  now  learn,  is  composed  of  atoms  inconceivably 
minute.  Every  atom  within  a  given  element  is  like  every  other 
atom  composing  it.  But  no  one  ever  beheld  an  atom.  The 
most  powerful  microscope  can  not  reveal  it  to  our  curious  gaze. 
It  is  in  short  an  ideal  creation,  a  conceptual  rather  than  a  purely 
perceptual  existent.  Scientists  in  the  last  few  years  have 
carried  out  this  principle  of  interpretation  of  the  physical  world 
still  farther.  The  progress  of  investigation  and  discovery  has 
tended  to  show  that  the  atom  is  not  indivisible,  as  had  been 
supposed,  but  is  in  turn  made  up  of  electrons.  But 
these,  even  more  if  possible  than  the  atom,  are  metaphysical 
creations  pure  and  simple.  The  whole  splendid  structure  of  the 
world  which  seemed  so  hard  and  fast  has  thus  become  known  to  us 
not  directly  and  as  things  are  in  themselves,  but  indirectly 
through  a  process  of  idealization,  the  results  of  which  warrant 
us  in  concluding  that  this  our  knowledge  of  the  elemental  forces 
and  materials  is,  in  the  main,  true. 

But  not  only  does  idealization  enter  into  our  knowledge  of 
the  most  fundamental  characteristics  of  the  inorganic  world. 
We  endeavored  to  point  out  in  a  preceding  chapter  that,  in  the 
realm  of  the  organic  also,  the  ideal  of  the  completed  organism  is 
the  guiding,  molding  factor  in  the  development  of  its  life,  and  that 

Kj.  a.  Gordon,  Immortality  and  the  New  Theodicy,  pp.  114-116. 


» 


/ 


66 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  AND  IMMOBTALITT 


the  conception  of  "the  nkn  !f  .k       u  !  *■■'  '^^''^^^  '*  ^e  under 

bearing  partides  that  g^"  fort  tL    '    "  "^°'^^'  '"^  '"^^  »f- 
we  speak  of  "tendency  "  or  -  «         T  °'««'>i«™'  or  whether 

It  is  due  to  thelSlement  thatr""'  .'l*^"'"*  '"^  P-''^'^- 
ing  organism  such  as  woXesS  tTnl^  "-T  "  ''''  ^°'- 
portionately  developed.  Thr-'ln  of  K  ^S'^"*'*  °'  *«?'«- 
ency"  or  "influence^  is  as  we  have  ll  ^Jk''  '  *"^  "*«'»^- 
nothing  less  than  the  directing  actMtv^f  ;».  lu  *'*  *"*'y^'^' 
all  ideals  exist.  They  are  exnt.^  ^ r  u  *  ^^*''"**  ^"  ^^om 
rules  and  pervades  alfth^ngs'"'         '  """*  *'""«*'*  *'«'* 

to  ^terp^S:  ^t^w^oSr^rtor^-^r"''^*^-^- 
tions  even  more  fundamenta:^^  c XL"  rh 'th? ""  "'  ''""- 
of  know  edge.     How  is  if  tL*         ,       ^'*"  *'»«  very  process 

comes  it  that  we  are  able  to  f"n  f  ^T  *'''°'^  ''^  *"?  How 
a  thought  may  L  Ltd  froL T  "^t''''^'  knowledge,  that 
i«telli^ble  to'^that'^^theJ/T  iT^  7^"^  *°  *"*'*''^'  '"^^  ^e^ome 
factor  that  is  displa^  evervwhl  '  '''  '^'  ^"*«  ""'^ying 

world?    It  is  tSZtnJZtT^  °"'  acquaintance  with  the 
influence  of  Anothe^  who  h!/  "*"  *^''''''°«  t'**'^  «  the 

«8  and  so  diC^cts  them  thjrr  T*™'*"^  °"'  '"«"*'''  P'oces- 

jUndtomindTy^^iron^USbt;^^^^  ^'^T^'  T 
due  that  progress  in  knowledge  rpoS'.K^""'*''*'""'* 
that,  properly  stated   are  vIh5  .  J  ^""^'^  arguments 

minds.  '  "*  ""^''^  *'^''  conclusive  for  all  normal 

'^-^nTlrZ^^ il^'^S:::'^^^^^  how  it  is  that 

Science  deals'^fh  LlTllZ"'"'"'  "T'  '"^  "^  "^eved 
implications  of  tho^  il2  1*^'^  'f  "^'^  '^"^  '"""^^iate 
verification  to  anJ^e  at  L.l  ^  ^  ^''^  "^'^'''^  °^  '^'^^^^ 

It«  ideal  is  the  eSness  atta^ir"';:*^'"**^"'''^  established. 
In  consequence  of   hraplTto  l'°  '^'  "Mathematical  sciences. 

patient  with  views  arco^clLro^wKT!, '*  ^  "P*  *°  ^  '"m- 
exact  scientific  test «      '*'''''"''°'"  ^»»»<'h  do  not  yield  to  this 


THE    REALITY   OF   THE  IDEAL 


67 


But  whatever  be  the  ideal  of  science,  true  scientific  progress 
is  made  very  largely  by  the  method  of  trial  and  error.  Successive 
hypotheses  are  formed  which  purport  to  explain  facts  as  known. 
As  other  facts  are  brought  to  light  which  tend  to  weaken  or 
destroy  the  old  theory,  a  modification  of  the  old  or  an  entirely 
new  hypothesis  is  introduced  to  meet  the  requirements.     The 
planet  Neptune  was  discovered  because  observed  irregularities 
in  the  orbits  of  other  planets  seemed  to  require  an  unknown 
planet  as  the  most  reasonable  explanation.     Its  existence  was 
first  of  all  a  surmise,  then  a  well-defined  faith,  afterward  verified. 
The  wonderful  discoveries  made  through  the  use  of  the  spectro- 
scope rest  upon  the  belief  that  the  characteristic  lines  in  the 
spectra  are  results  produced  from  certain  elements  known  to 
us  to  be  present  in  the  structure  of  the  earth,  but  assumed  to  be 
present  in  the  sun  and  stars.     In  other  words  the  conclusion 
reached  as  to  the  presence  of  these  elements  in  other  bodies  of 
our  solar  system  and  in  the  stars  beyond  it  is  mainly  a  belief, 
although  to  be  sure  a  thoroughly  reasonable  faith.      There  is 
no  more  brilliant  illustration  of  this  truth  that  science  rests 
upon  faith,  than  in  the  field  of  biology.     The  theory  of  evolution 
when  brought  forward  was  admittedly  in  advance  of  the  facts 
to  be  explained.     Several  gaps  existed  in  the  argument  so  far 
as  actual  verification  from  known  facts  was  concerned.     And 
these  gaps  have  not  all  been  filled  even  now.     Yet  as  a  working 
hypothesis  it  explained  the  known  facts  so  well,  and  filled  so 
admirably  the  intellectual  demand  for  unity  that  it  has  led  to 
a  reconstruction  not  only  in  biology  but  in  every  other  science. 
It  has  likewise  found  support  in  subsequent  discoveries  to  such 
an  extent  that,  instead  of  losing  ground,  it  is  more  generally 
accepted  today  than  ever  before.     Yet  for  all  that  it  has  been 
to  a  large  extent  a  faith,  not  a  fully  demonstrated  fact. 

Through  long  application  to  a  given  subject  or  field  of 
knowledge  there  comes  to  be  developed  a  scientfiic  instinct 
which  leads  to  further  progress  in  the  chosen  field.  Of 
these  higher  instincts  within  men  it  has  been  eloquently  said, 
"Their  true  history  seems  to  be  that  they  are  in  us  but  not  of 
us.    They  passed  through  the  highways  of  our  life  like  the  wire 

tiyity  is  held  by  many  soientiats  to  be  such  as  to  amount  to  a  practical  impossibility.  But 
the  conclusion  to  which  such  considerations  lead,  that  because  a  thing  lies  b»rond  ex- 
perience it  is  therefore  inconceivable  and  practically  impossible,  proves  too  much,  and.  as 
Fiske  observed,  militates  in  the  field  of  science  as  well  as  in  that  of  philosophy. 


6S 


ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM  AND  IMMORTALITY 


THE    REALITY   OF   THE   IDEAL 


69 


W 


paths  for  the  electric  current  in  the  street;  they  carry  forward 
with  inexhaustible  vigor  the  best  work  of  humanity.  But  they 
do  not  seem  to  begin  or  end  with  this  earth."* 

Even  aside  from  the  confidence  which  underlies  all  knowl- 
edge, science  therefore,  rests  upon  faith  grasping  certain 
ideals.  It  is  rooted  in  the  conviction  that  the  universe  reveals 
rational  order  and  is,  in  consequence  capable  of  interpretation. 
The  growing  development  of  science  occurs  first  of  all  through  a 
belief,  then  through  the  verification  of  that  belief.  But  that 
verification  at  the  same  time  affords  a  certain  degree  of  proof 
that  the  regulative  ideals  of  science  are  true  expressions  of 
reality.    The  essential  ideals  of  science  are  real. 

II.     Immortality  as  an  ideal  of  reason. 

1 .  Immortality  rests  upon  precisely  the  same  basis  as  science 
in  this  respect.  It  is  a  reasonable  expectation.  Its  verifica- 
tion can  not  be  established  experimentally,  but  perhaps  what 
it  appears  to  lose  in  this  respect  in  the  way  of  absolute  certainty 
is  more  than  made  good  by  the  greater  univer^y  and  persist- 
ence of  the  belief. 

It  seems  fair  to  conclude  that  a  faith  so  persistent,  involving, 
as  we  shall  see,  the  best  and  worthiest  in  human  life*  if  rejected 
as  invalid  must  tend  to  create  distrust  of  every  other  develop- 
ment of  thought  which  rests  on  the  principle  of  faith,  including 
science  itself.  But  on  the  other  hand  the  degree  of  verification 
established  in  the  field  of  science  jgoes  far  to  establish  the  pre- 
sumption that  immortality  also  is  the  expression  of  the  Real  and 
will  ultimately  become  for  each  one  a  fully  experienced  fact. 

2 .  To  some  it  may  seem  too  large  an  assertion  that  immortality 
has  retained  a  place  in  the  consciousness  of  men  through  every 
grade  of  civilization.  A  considerable  amount  of  evidence  has  been 
accumulated  which  purports  to  show  that  even  at  present  there 
exist  tribes  entirely  destitute  of  the  belief.  It  has  been  not 
uncommon  that  travelers  have  imagined  they  had  found  com- 
mimities  which  were  without  any  instinct  of  a  future  life.  These 
conclusions  have  generally  been  found  to  have  been  hastily 
drawn,  In  some  instances  they  have  been  subsequently  re- 
tracted by  their  authors.  Philosophers,  explorers,  mission- 
aries, even  historians,  such  men  as  Darwin,  Sir  Samuel  Baker, 

KSordon,  Immortality  and  the  New  Theodicy,  p.  112. 


Moffat,  Niebuhr,  have  shown  that  it  is  not  difficult  to  err  in 
observations  within  this  field.*  Closer  acquaintance  with  tribes 
believed  to  be  destitute  of  any  beliefs  of  this  character  have, 
in  more  than  one  instance,  revealed  ideas  of  continued  existence 
even  richer  than  would  have  been  surmised.  Instances  of  this 
kind  have  occurred  among  the  tribes  of  Africa,  South 
America,  North  America,  Australia,  and  remote  islands. 
Tylor  records  a  curious  illustration  of  this  that  occurred  among 
the  Ahts,  a  native  tribe  of  Vancouver's  Island.  A  Mr.  Sproat 
spent  two  years  among  these  people  studying  their  characteristic 
habits,  ways  of  living  and  modes  of  thought  before  he  learned 
that  they  had  any  notion  whatever  of  a  future  state.  He  then 
discovered  that  they  had  been  striving  to  conceal  from  him  "a 
whole  characteristic  system  of  religious  doctrines  as  to  souls 
and  their  migrations,  the  spirits  who  do  good  and  evil  to  men, 
and  the  great  gods  above  all."*  So  many  apparent  exceptions 
have  broken  down  under  closer  and  more  rigorous  investiga- 
tions that  Tylor  and  other  careful  students  of  the  subject  have 
concluded  that  "belief  in  some  sort  of  existence  after  death  is 
found  to  be  a  catholic  belief  of  humanity."'  And  M.  Renouf 
has  recorded  his  judgment  that  "a  belief  in  the  persistence  of 
life  after  death,  and  the  observation  of  religious  practises  found- 
ed upon  the  belief,  may  be  discovered  in  every  part  of  the 
world,  in  every  age,  and  among  men  representing  every 
degree  and  variety  of  culture."* 

A  more  recent  French  writer  upon  the  subject  voices  the 
same  judgment  in  somewhat  different  form:  "Cette  id^e  a 
formed  encore  le  fondement  commun  des  traditions  religieuses 
de  tous  les  peuples  qui  ont  6t€  les  educateurs  de  V  humanity 
civilis^e,  comme  les  Hindous,  les  Egyptiens,  les  Chald^ens  ou 
les  Gaulois,  et  on  pent  dire  en  un  mot  qu'elle  resume  en  elle 
Tenseignement  de  la  sagesse  antique."* 

3.  The  precise  influence  of  the  belief  in  immortality  upon 
the  development  of  culture  is  somewhat  difficult  to  determine 
owing  to  its  close  connection  with  other  beliefs  and  with  religion 
in  general.  Yet  that  it  has  exerted  a  profound  influence  upon 
human  life  and  conduct  will  be  readily  admitted  by  every 

»8.  p.  F.  Salmond,  The  Chriatian  Doctrine  of  ImmortaUty,  p.  12. 

•Tyior,  Primitire  Culture.  1.  pp.  422. 

*8almond.  Chriatiaa  Doctrine  of  Immortality,  p.  10. 

«Hibbert  Leeturea  1879,  4th  ed.  1897,  p.  124. 

>L.  Elbe.  La  ne  future,  Paris  1005  p.  386. 


70 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


THE    REALITY   OP   THE   IDEAL 


71 


\ 


thoughtful  person.  The  judgment  of  Elbe  concerning  the 
wisdom  of  the  ancients  is  no  less  true  of  the  best  in  modern 
civilization. 

a.  We  have  grown  so  familiar  with  that  conception  which 
regards  the  individual  as  having  an  eternal  worth,  that  we 
seldom  pause  to  consider  the  influence  that  conception  has 
exerted  in  undermining  institutions  hostile  to  its  spirit  and  in 
creating  new  institutions  which  recognize  more  fully  the  eternal 
value  of  a  life.  The  well  grounded  belief  that  before  God  every 
individual  is  essentially  equal  to  every  other  leads  directly  to 
the  conclusion  that  wealth  and  rank  should  confer  no  title 
of  precedence  in  civil  affairs.  The  conviction  that,  before 
Him,  master  and  slave  stand  upon  an  equal  footing 
that  'Hhere  cannot  be  Jew  and  Greek,  circumcision  and  un- 
circumcision,  barbarian,  Scythian,  bondman,  freeman,"* 
has  destroyed  slavery  in  the  state.  It  is  impossible  seriously 
to  entertain  such  a  conviction  of  the  nature  and  destiny  of  man 
without  finding  that  it  enters  into  and  molds  our  views  of  all 
human  relationships  whatever,  individual  and  social.  Let  the 
conception  become  lodged  in  a  sufficient  number  of  minds  that, 
without  reference  to  rank,  wealth  or  social  prestige,  men  stand 
essentially  upon  the  same  level,  each  with  an  eternal  worth,  and 
sooner  or  later,  from  the  working  out  of  that  principle,  every 
form  of  ser\4tude  as  between  man  and  man  must  disappear. 
The  lot  of  woman  is  made  more  tolerable.  That  conception  of 
the  individual  is  the  bulwark  of  democracy  and,  in  the  field  of 
government,  tends  to  make  the  private  citizen  the  ultimate  ruler 
in  affairs  of  state.  Or  let  the  conception  that  the  human  body 
is  the  temple  of  God  take  possession  of  a  man's  thought  and  he 
will  pay  more  heed  to  habits  that  promote  healthy  and  cleanly 
living  than  before.  Let  it  become  rooted  in  a  community  and 
it  leads  to  every  precaution  that  is  practicable  against  diseases 
and  vices  that  ruin  and  degrade.  Or  if  the  logical  consequences 
of  the  thought  that  the  growing  life  is  taking  upon  itself  a  char- 
acter that  is  becoming  fixed  forever  be  drawn,  men  begin  to  see 
to  it  that  the  best  possible  opportunities  be  given  every  child 
and  youth.  It  is  undeniable  that  our  motives  for  providing 
higher  education  within  the  reach  of  all,  for  reclaiming  the 
erring  through  our  system  of  reformatories  and  industrial  homes, 

>Col.  3:11  (Am.  Rer.) 


for  caring  for  the  orphaned,  the  blind,  the  indigent,  the  feeble- 
minded and  insane,  and  for  reforming  prisoners  and  caring  for 
them  when  discharged,  are  not  merely  utilitarian,  having  in  view 
one's  value  to  society,  but  have  a  deeper  root  in  that  essential  trait 
of  permanence  in  life  as  the  result  of  which  each  one  should 
have  opportunity  to  develop  the  best  life  possible  here  and  now. 
This  conception  of  human  worth  is  improving  the  industrial 
conditions  of  today,  it  enters  even  into  international  conditions 
and  is  a  powerful  factor  toward  the  prevention  of  war  and  the 
introduction  of  the  era  of  peace  and  good  will. 

b.  But  the  cultural  value  and  influence  of  immortality  is  to  be 
traced  not  only  in  the  institutions  which  men  have  reared  or 
demolished  under  its  influence  as  social  need  has  dictated.  It 
may  be  traced  as  clearly  also  in  poetry  and  the  fine  arts. 
And  truly  the  fine  arts  in  themselves  have  a  cultural 
worth  by  no  means  insignificant.  Take  from  poetry 
that  part  of  it  which  is  concerned  with  the  themes  suggested  by 
death  and  destiny,  and  the  best  and  most  fruitful  part  of  it 
would  be  by  that  act  withdrawn.  The  Iliad  and  Odyssey  of 
Homer  not  only  present  their  heroes  in  their  deeds  of  valor, 
but  also  portray  their  death  and  their  state  of  being  after  death. 
Dante's  Divine  Comedy  has  for  its  theme  the  life  beyond  the 
present.  Milton's  great  epic  treats  not  only  of  the  earthly  life 
of  man  but  also  of  his  destiny.  The  great  poems  of  the  past 
century,  of  Shelley,  Browning,  Tennyson,  Bryant,  Longfellow, 
dwell  much  on  these  themes.  It  was  the  untimely  death  of  his 
bosom  friend,  Arthur  Hallam,  that  moved  Tennyson  to  write 
his  great  poem  In  Memoriam,  many  of  whose  finest  sentiments 
have  become  enshrined  in  the  heart  of  the  English  speaking 
race.  Quite  in  the  vein  of  absolute  idealism  itself  are  the  lines, 
80  often  quoted, 

'*0  yet  we  trust  that  somehow  good 
Will  be  the  final  goal  of  ill 
To  pangs  of  nature,  sins  of  will, 
Defects  of  doubt,  and  taints  of  blood. 

That  nothing  walks  with  aimless  feet. 
That  not  one  life  shall  be  destroyed 
Or  cast  as  rubbish  to  the  void. 

When  God  hath  made  the  pile  complete." 


72 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


THE   REALITY  OF   THE   IDEAL 


73 


\ 


In  short  without  the  themes  connected  with  death  and  human 
destiny  poetry  would,  in  very  large  measure,  lose  its  charm  and 
power  of  appeal. 

If  it  be  objected  that  poetry  is  inspired  by  feeling  and  is, 
therefore,  unworthy  of  being  accepted  as  a  teacher  upon  the 
deeper  issues  of  life,  it  may  be  sufficient  to  point  out  with  others 
that  this  is  no  more  true  of  poetry  than  of  other  forms  of  mental 
life. 

But  we  are  under  no  necessity  here  to  vindicate  the  method 
of  poetry  in  attaining  its  goal.  The  place  of  the  poet  in  human 
culture  is  unquestioned.  His  influence  is  most  profound  and 
far  reaching.  Our  purpose  is  simply  to  draw  attention  to  the 
fact^that  a  large  part  of  his  noblest,  most  powerful  themes  grow 
out  of  thoughts  connected  with  the  fact  of  death  and  its  signifi- 
cance for  human  life. 

What  is  true  of  poetry  is  true  no  less  of  the  fine  arts  in  general. 
Medieval  art  in  particular  drew  its  inspiration  from  themes 
connected  with  the  exalted  destiny  of  man.  Even  the  noblest 
works  of  architecture  that  adorn  Europe  today,  the  great  cathe- 
drals, point  in  silent  and  massive  grandeur  the  toiling,  struggling 
mass  of  humanity  at  their  base  to  the  true  goal  of  all  their  hopes 
and  aspirations. 

c.  It  will  be  worth  our  while,  to  consider  here  more  fully  the 
place  of  the  ideal  in  general  within  the  moral  consciousness,  for 
these  ideals,  rightly  interpreted,  conduct  us  to  the  Eternal.  Of 
these  it  has  been  beautifully  said,  "We  do  not  discover  our 
ideals,  they  discover  us.  They  take  us  to  the  housetop,  as  Samuel 
took  Saul, and  there,  in  the  name  of  the  new  day  that  is  break- 
ing, they  tell  us  that  we  are  kings." 

The  note  of  permanence  that  gives  confidence  to  our 
mental  processes  in  the  attainment  of  knowledge  through  the 
working  of  an  Over-Mind  is  found  also  in  the  moral  sphere, 
inspiring  a  similar  confidence.  The  unity  for  which  the  moral 
nature  of  man  hungers  points  to  its  high  origin  and  its  ultimate 
goal.  It  is  grounded  in  the  deepest  Reality.  It  is  this  fact  that 
gives  strength  and  courage  to  the  moral  reformer  in  the  face  of 
the  greatest  opposition.  It  is  this  that  inspires  him  to  condemn 
the  existing  order  as  failing  to  express  that  which  is  highest  and 
best  and  therefore  most  real. 

It  was  the  Real  within  the  moral  consciousness  which  moved 


theTearly^^agitators  for  the  abolition  of  slavery.  One  has  but  to 
ask  whether  it  was  the  defenders  of  the  existing  order  of  things 
during  slavery  days,  or  the  agitators  for  the  complete  abolition 
of  ownership  of  human  beings,  who  brought  the  real  into  our 
national  life  to  receive  answer  in  favor  of  the  Abolitionist.  The 
actual  does  not  always  represent  the  real.  The  ideal,  however, 
as  it  becomes  expressed  in  human  life  and  afiFairs  does  give  ex- 
pression to  the  real,  to  that  which  God  ordained  and  will  in  the 
end  make  actual.  It  was  the  real  that  Cromwell  stood  for  when 
he  sought  the  emancipation  of  England.  It  was  the  real  for 
which  Luther  did  battle  when  he  fought  with  heroic  energy 
against  the  power  of  pope  and  emperor.  A  higher  order  than 
the  existing  one  had  uttered  its  voice  in  his  inmost  being  with 
such  force  as  to  render  him  indifferent  to  any  fate.  That  sub- 
lime courage  in  Paul,  the  Apostle,  rendered  him  not  unmindful 
of  the  heavenly  vision  in  which  he  had  caught  sight  of  his  life 
work  among  the  Gentiles.  Though  in  constant  peril  on  land  and 
sea,  from  enemies  and  false  friends,  from  strangers  and  his  own 
countrymen,  even  from  fellow  Christians  of  his  own  nation,  none 
of  these  things  moved  him.  He  had  caught  sight  of  a  higher  order 
of  things,  and  his  great  mission  was  to  introduce  that  new  order 
at  all  costs.  All  the  advantages  which  had  been  his  as  a  Hebrew 
of  the  Hebrews,  a  Pharisee  of  the  Pharisees,  as  touching  the 
righteousness  of  the  law  and  zeal  for  it  blameless,*  as  one  of  the 
most  gifted  and  most  learned  of  his  nation,  yet  withal  enjoying 
all  the  rights  of  Roman  citizenship, — all  these  he  counted  as 
refuse  for  the  sake  of  a  higher  reality.  As  yet  it  was  ideal  rather 
than  actual.  But  so  impressed  was  he  with  the  reality  of  the 
things  which,  though  unseen,  are  eternal  and  so  united  in  one- 
ness of  fellowship  with  God  that  he  is  *' persuaded  that  neither 
death  nor  life,  nor  angels,  nor  principalities,  nor  powers,  nor  things 
present,  nor  things  to  come,  nor  height,  nor  depth,  nor  any  other 
creature  shall  be  able  to  separate  us  from  the  love  of  God  which  is 
in  Christ  Jesus  our  Lord."^  No  wonder,  that  under  convictions 
of  this  kind  and  with  such  indomitable  courage,  the  early  advo- 
cates of  the  new  faith  made  such  inroads  upon  existing  con- 
ditions and  institutions  that  old  things  passed  away  and  a  new 
order,  more  fully  expressing  the  divine  reality,  took  their  place. 

iPhilippians  3:  5-12. 
'Romans  8:  3S-39. 


74 


ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM   AND   IMMORTALITY 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


75 


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4.  In  the  course  of  our  reflections  upon  the  reality  of  the  ideal 
we  have  been  led  to  notice  that  it  is  the  presence  of  the  ideal 
element  in  science  that  makes  it  possible  and  trustworthy  and 
that  this  ideal  operates  in  and  through  the  faith  or  confidence 
that  the  world  everywhere  displays  the  presence  and  activity  of 
a  mind  that  is  cognate  to  the  human  mind.  The  most  splendid 
progress  of  science  has  resulted  from  the  leading  of  that  faith 
or  feeling, — or  scientific  instinct  if  the  term  be  preferred.  In 
all  knowledge  we  have  found  this  note  of  permanence  grounded 
in  the  Over-Mind  or  Absolute  as  the  basis  of  our  confidence  in 
the  knowing  process.  The  extent  to  which  scientific  faith  has 
been  justified  by  its  degree  of  subsequent  verification  creates 
the  presumption  that  a  faith  so  much  more  universal  and  persistent 
in  humanity  through  all  ages  and  under  every  degree  of  culture 
can  not  be  founded  upon  an  illusion.  Nor  is  a  mere  illusion 
capable  of  producing  results  so  lasting  and  beneficial  to  human 
well-being  in  the  advancing  civilization  of  the  race.  Beyond 
estimate  is  the  power  of  this  ideal  of  immortality  not  only  direct- 
ly in  promoting  the  lifting  up  of  backward  peoples  and  in  the 
improvement  of  general  social  conditions,  but  also  indirectly 
in  its  influence  upon  poetry  and  the  fine  arts,  many  of  whose 
noblest  themes  are  furnished  by  thoughts  of  human  destiny. 
In  the  ideals  which  impart  moral  tone  and  character  to  life,  in 
constancy  of  devotion  to  a  great  purpose  in  the  face  of  great 
opposition,  in  the  feeling  of  an  inward  compulsion  which  leads 
men  to  disregard  every  personal  comfort,  even  life  itself,  in  the 
struggle  to  bring  nobler  and  better  conditions  into  human 
affairs,  we  rest  upon  that  which  is  eternal.  It  is  the  Ultimate,  the 
Real  voicing  itself  in  human  life.  The  ideal  of  immortality  is 
grounded  in  the  Eternal.  It  expresses  the  real  no  less  truly 
than  the  ideals  of  science  and  knowledge.  It  is  in  short  "the 
verdict  of  the  Infinite"  within  the  human  consciousness,  the 
voice  of  the  Most  High  in  man's  inner  being  giving  sentence  in 
favor  of  the  eternity  of  every  human  life. 


\ 


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